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According to the Mexican law, private individuals are allowed to grant higher education as long as they fulfill the 
established requirements. Different a priori (legislation, agreements, basic requirements and approvals) and a 
posteriori (supervisions and recognition of degrees) instruments are used by multiple authorities to regulate the 
system, constraining mainly the academic autonomy of the higher education institutions. However, these mechanisms 
seem not to be sufficient because, in recent years, many low quality private higher education institutions have 
flourished. Therefore, in order to understand how these regulations constrain or enhance the institutions’ capacities 
and explore their role in the proliferation of low quality institutions, this study analyzes in depth the nature of the 
private higher education in Mexico, the current mechanisms that regulate the sector, and the different degree of the 
autonomy that they enjoy in their several dimensions. 
To achieve the purpose of this study, a qualitative research, and more specifically, an exploratory qualitative 
inquiry research, has been carried out. Hence, first of all, this research starts by analyzing the private higher education 
and the characteristics of the autonomy it enjoys, as well as the current mechanisms that exist for its regulation. 
Second, it reviews the policy documents that today regulate the private higher education in Mexico (The Mexican 
Constitution, The General Law of Education, The Law for the Coordination of Higher Education, the Agreement 243 
and the Agreement 17/11/17), and the contributions that other authors have made over time, to have a better 
understanding of the phenomenon. Third, it analyzes the information collected in several interviews, in order to 
comprehend the interpretations of those involved in the phenomenon. Thus, a purposive sampling was selected and 
semi-structured interviews were carried out to explore the perspectives of different actors that are part of the higher 
education system in Mexico, playing diverse roles in the field, and with varied working experiences in different 
institutions.  
The findings of this research reveal that private higher education in Mexico is perceived as a fundamental sector of 
the tertiary education level, playing a specific role for the formation of the elites that opposed the ideology taught at 
the public sector, but also for granting education to a sector of the population that is left without access from the 
public sector. Therefore, private education has become a complex topic of study. In general, it has been found that 
private higher education institutions enjoy a high degree of autonomy, as regulations do not seem to limit very much 
their ability to act and self-govern. While they enjoy higher degrees of autonomy in the financial, organizational and 
staffing dimensions, the academic dimension is the most constrained. Despite this high degree of autonomy, most 
participants do not consider that regulations have been the reason for the proliferation of low quality education 
institutions, as the literature has pointed out; on the contrary, participants concur that the lack of access is the main 
reason for their proliferation.  
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I. Introduction 
I. 1 Research problem 
Private higher education institutions began in Mexico in the early 1910’s. Before, the state and the 
Church had all the control over the higher education institutions but, as the revolutionary war1 took place, 
the private sector saw the opportunity of granting education away from the government’s ideology2 
(González, 2012). However, its expansion was very short due to the lack of recognition by the government 
(Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011), so only one institution, the Escuela Libre de Derecho, survived during the 
years.  
For this reason, the birth of the private Mexican university is located, historically, until the second half of 
the 1930’s when the economic boom, the population growth, and the Spanish immigration3 led a couple of 
businessmen to the establishment of several institutions (Martínez, 2012; Rangel, 1979). Therefore, from 
this moment on, private higher education has multiplied considerably (Urquidi et al, 1967), especially 
during the 90’s, when neoliberalism policies were introduced in the country (Instituto de Investigaciones 
sobre la Universidad y la Educación México, 2002), promoting privatization, deregulation and the reduction 
of the state’s intervention to increase competition (Friedman, 1951). Thus, by 2010, Mexico had a total of 
1339 private universities around the country (de Garay, 2013), and 1800 by 2011 according to Álvarez 
(2011). 
The Mexican private university is regulated by different instruments as they are the Mexican 
Constitution, the General Law of Education, and the Agreements 243, and 17/11/17. The Mexican 
Constitution (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 2017 as amended 1917) in its third article, and the General Law of 
Education (Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 2017 as amended 1993) clearly state that 
private entities can provide education in all its different types and modalities, as long as all the established 
requirements in the law are fulfilled, and the state has granted the Recognition of Official Validity of Studies 
(RVOE). The Agreements, in particular, establish the general conditions and basis that the institutions need 
to fulfill to get the Recognition (Agreement 243: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1998), and the 
procedures they must follow during the process (Agreement 17/11/17: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 
2017).   
The Recognition of Official Validity of Studies is granted by the Ministry of Education, and does not 
assure quality; on the contrary, it merely assures that the minimal requirements established by the law are 
met (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2015). Buendía (2016) mentions that the Ministry of Education 
approves the majority of applications to obtain the Recognition, rejecting only a minority. As requirements 
are minimal, higher education institutions enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, institutions enjoy 
it in different degrees, according to the parameters defined in the Agreement 17/11/17 (Secretaría de 
Educación Pública, 2017). Also, there are some institutions that are granted the RVOE by presidential 
decrees, which enjoy even a higher degree of autonomy. 
                                                     
1 The revolutionary war was an armed movement that began in 1910 with the purposes of overthrowing Porfirio Diaz, who had 
exercised power for more than 30 years, and of expanding the access opportunities for the upper middle class to power. The 
movement lasted for 16 years, properly ending in 1928 with the creation of the national party who dominated the power for more 
than 71 years (Serrano, 2012; Aguilar & Serrano, 2012). 
2 The struggle of ideologies between liberals and conservatives had dominated the political sphere throughout the nineteenth 
century, to the extent that institutions of higher education closed their doors depending on the party that held the power at the 
time (Bolaños, 2000). 
3 Spanish thinkers that had left their country due to the Civil War were great supporters of the development of the higher 
education system (Pla, 2001). 
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The autonomy of higher education institutions has been studied to a large extent, especially in the 
recent years. Different authors (Raza, 2009; Volkwein and Malik 1997; Berdahl, 1990; Enders, de Boer & 
Weyer, 2013) have analyzed it from several perspectives, creating diverse classifications for its better 
understanding. Today, the most widely accepted categorization for the autonomy consists of analyzing the 
concept according to the activities or the operational dimensions of a higher education institution. 
Therefore, according to Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel (2011), the institutional autonomy has four 
dimensions: 1) organizational autonomy, 2) financial autonomy, 3) staffing autonomy, and 4) academic 
autonomy. 
Based on this categorization, in general terms, the organizational autonomy refers to the capacity of 
choosing its leaders and its governance structures; the financial autonomy relates to the possibility of 
deciding the mechanisms used to raise the resources needed for its operation, as well as the capacity to 
manage its finances; the staffing autonomy has to do with the capacity of establishing norms and 
procedures for selecting, hiring, promoting and dismissing its workers; and finally, the academic autonomy 
appertains with the student’s selection, and the competency in creating and offering new programs. 
A private university in Mexico enjoys high degree of organizational autonomy, financial autonomy, and 
staffing autonomy, but faces constraints in the academic autonomy. In other words, it is able to organize 
itself and decide its form of government, having its own internal rules and procedures; also, it is able to hire 
and remove its academic and administrative staff as pleasing, and to decide which students will study in it. 
In addition, it has freedom of teaching and researching, and the ability to decide what to do with its 
resources and how to spend the profits it makes (Marsiske, 2010). Namely, the need of authorization is 
reduced to the plans and study programs, as well as the ability to issue titles and degrees. Other minimal 
considerations regarding the accreditation of the staff and the conditions of the real state, where the 
process of education takes place, are also considered (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1998).  
Hood (2004) describes four different ways in which a government exercises control over its institutions: 
mutuality, contrived randomness, competition, and oversight. Even though these are contextualized to the 
public sector, oversight is applicable to the private sector. It refers, on one hand, to the laws and 
regulations and, on the other hand, to the inspections and monitoring processes carried out to assure 
compliance. The Mexican Ministry of Education uses both of them to assure that the minimal requirements 
are met by the private institutions. Therefore, ordinary and extraordinary inspections are carried out by the 
Ministry’s supervisors (López, 2010). The first inspection takes place prior of granting the Recognition, to 
make sure the application matches reality. Nevertheless, Kent (2004) and Canales (2016) point out that the 
lack of actual supervision after getting the Recognition, and of proper sanctions when requirements are not 
met, are the main problems of the system. In addition, there are some institutions that enjoy the “simplify 
regime” or administrative simplification, in which private universities with historic tradition in granting a 
high quality education, when applying for the Recognition of Validity of Studies do not need to detail the 
study programs (Rodríguez, 2004a; Buendía, 2011). 
This has led several authors like Rodríguez (2004a), Silas (2008), Acosta (2011), Cuevas (2011a), de Garay 
(2013), Álvarez (2011) and Buendía (2016), to conclude that there is a very flexible and low regulation 
policy towards private higher education in Mexico, contributing to the establishment and proliferation of 
low quality and low cost institutions, who grant university degrees to a low and medium low economic 
sector of the population that is left without accesses to the public education. These institutions either 
operate without the RVOE or with a partial recognition in some of their programs (de Garay, 2013; Aguilar, 
2003). 
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Therefore, the Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la Educación México (2002) identifies 
two different types of private institutions in the country: those destined to the formation of the Mexican 
elite, and those low quality institutions for the masses, as mentioned above. But, as de Garay (2013) points 
out, all of these are teaching oriented institutions who mainly form professionals for the labor market, and 
who exert political influence through their graduates and the positions they occupy in the public sphere. 
 
I. 2 Research gap 
Despite the fact that private higher education has grown considerably, as we have seen, the Instituto de 
Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la Educación México (2002) and Buendía (2009) recognize that its 
study has not been relevant in the Mexican research agenda. As a matter of fact, Ibarra (2001) found out 
that between 1987 and 1996, the period of boom of this private sector, only four papers were published in 
this study field, while 218 referred to the public institutions. And, most of the existing research regarding 
the private higher education institutions is classified under three categories:  
1) Historic development, and conceptualization: Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la 
Educación México (2002), Acosta (2011), Durand, Bravo and Contreras (2007), González (2012), Rangel 
(1979), Urquidi et al (1967), Gama (2010), Arias (1985), Olivier (2007), de Garay (1998), Silas (2005a), 
Serna (2006). 
2) Privatization and neoliberalism: Aboites (1997), García (2006), Rodríguez and Ordorika (2011), Labra 
(2003). 
3) Expansion and quality issues: Buendía (2011, 2016), Cuevas (2011a), Gil (2005), Kent (2004), Muños 
and Silva (2013), Rodríguez (2004a). 
 
As can be seen, in the recent years the research on Mexican private higher education institutions has 
increased. However, there is still not enough research to understand its complexity, as Buendía (2016) 
points out. In addition, as seen before, most research focuses on the historic development of the Mexican 
private higher education system. Few authors, like Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la 
Educación México (2002), Acosta (2011), Olivier (2007), Muños and Silva (2013), and Buendía (2016) 
address the issue of the lack of regulation.  
The Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la Educación México (2002) worries about the 
increase of the higher private education institutions without the proper regulations. Acosta (2011) 
describes the policies implemented by the Mexican government to regulate the private higher education 
institutions. Olivier (2007) studies the historical changes of these regulatory policies. Muños and Silva 
(2013) do the same, raising the problem of equity. And Buendía (2016) studies the problems of regulation, 
control and quality that the private higher education faces in Mexico. Nevertheless, all authors conclude 
that further studies should be carried out to understand its complexity and make recommendations for 
improvement.  
Referring to the autonomy of private institutions few studies have been carried out. Serna (2006) for 
example, analyzes the granting autonomy to private universities from the legal perspective, and Rodríguez 
(2004a) mentions the high degree of autonomy private universities enjoy, especially when achieving the 
administrative simplification. However, most studies analyze the concept and implications of the autonomy 
of the public institutions.  
As private higher education in Mexico develops it becomes more and more complex. Hence, Rodríguez 
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(2008f) asserts when mentioning that 
 
The rules must change: it is not the same to interact, as in the fifties, with a handful of private elite 
universities, or as in the eighties with a sector divided between good and poor quality institutions. Now 
things are more complex: the private system is more complex, it has different dynamics of growth, 
diversification, academic specialization, […] among other guidelines. It is necessary to recognize this 
complexity and build a proper system of regulation. 
 
Moreover, Buendía (2009) concludes, that there are remaining topics that need to be researched about 
the private institutions like “the regulation and its relationship with the autonomy, and the responsibility to 
exercise it” (p. 11). Thus, in the context it has been introduced, there is a clear need to study the regulatory 
policies exercised by the Mexican government over private higher education institutions and their 
relationship with the autonomy of the institutions. Acosta (2011) suggests in his study that there is a 
problem with the regulation of the Mexican private higher education sector as the current instrument, the 
RVOE, does not really assure quality, it mainly focuses on general requirements like teaching staff and 
infrastructure (Rodríguez, 2017d). Muños and Silva (2013) agree with Acosta when mentioning that still has 
not been established a regulatory and policy framework that guarantees the quality. Rodríguez (2004a) and 
Buendía (2011) worry about the high degree of autonomy private institutions enjoy due to very flexible 
regulations. And, Olivier (2007) notes that there are incongruences among the regulatory policies. 
Hence, the purpose of this study is to analyze in depth the nature of the private higher private education 
in Mexico and the current mechanisms that regulate the sector, as well as to explore the different degree 
of the autonomy that they enjoy in their several dimensions, in order to understand how these regulations 
constrain or enhance the institutions’ capacities and explore their role in the proliferation of low quality 
institutions. 
To achieve the purpose, this study is guided by the following questions:  
1) How is private higher education perceived in Mexico?  
2) To what extent private higher education is regulated in Mexico and what level of autonomy does it enjoy 
in its several dimensions?  
3) How are regulations and the existing level of autonomy related to the proliferation of the low quality 
institutions? 
 
To answer these research questions, this investigation has been structured based on the qualitative 
methodology, and specifically on the exploratory qualitative inquiry approach. Therefore, three main 
sources have been used to present its findings: the literature review, the analysis of policy documents, and 
the data collected on the interviews. 
 
I. 3 Structure of the thesis 
To answer the previous questions, the following research has been structured into four main sections: 
Chapter I. “Literature review and analytical framework”; Chapter II. “Methodology”; Chapter III. “The 
Mexican private higher education system”; and, Chapter IV. “Conclusion”. The first chapter, “Literature 
review and analytical framework”, has the purpose of establishing the theoretical framework that provides 
the foundations for this research. Therefore, it explores, reviews and analyzes the contributions of different 
authors to the fields of the autonomy and the regulations, with specific focus on higher education 
institutions. In this sense, the concept of autonomy is defined; the dimensions of the autonomy are 
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explored and explained; the state of autonomy in higher education is analyzed; and its specificity in the 
private sector is highlighted. In a similar way, the characteristics of a public policy are identified, with focus 
on the instruments; the diverse conceptualizations of instruments are studied; the instrument of the 
regulations is scrutinized to detail; and the regulatory instruments used for higher education are carefully 
examined centering, specially, on the ones used to regulate the private higher education sector. 
Then, in the second chapter, “Methodology”, the process of data collection and analysis is explained to 
detail. In this regard, the basic qualitative research is explained and its choice for this investigation is 
justified; the profile of the participants is described; the process of data collection is detailed; the process 
of data analysis is construed meticulously; the processes for achieving validity and reliability are indicated; 
and the issue of cross cultural research is addressed. 
Following, in the third chapter, “The Mexican private higher education system”, the historical 
development of the Mexican private higher education is unveiled, for a better understanding of the policy 
today, through the comprehension of its evolution over the years; the Mexican private higher education 
sector today is briefly illustrated; the regulatory instruments to the private higher education are analyzed 
to detail; the degree of autonomy of these institutions is explored; and the results of the data collection are 
examined and contrasted. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter, “Conclusion”, the analytical framework, the document analysis of the 
Mexican context and the results obtained from the interviews are compared, in order to find similarities 
and discrepancies, and to establish conclusions. Also, limitations of the research have been addressed and 
recommendations have been issued. It is hoped that these pages are found useful and interesting to the 
reader, to reflect in an issue of such importance for higher education, as it is the private sector.  
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II. Literature review and analytical framework 
II. 1 Understanding private higher education 
Higher education, as we conceive it today, has its roots in the middle ages, where the first universities 
were established, becoming the center of the intellectual activity by focusing on the tasks of extension and 
dissemination of the existing knowledge (Abbagnano et al, 2000; Newman, 2011; De Ridder-Symoens, 
2003). Today, higher education institutions are educational organizations responsible for forming men and 
women in their freedom and in the different areas of the knowledge in order for them to perform 
successfully their professional tasks, contributing to the human progress and the social justice (Autores 
varios, 2009). Duderstadt (2000), Rhodes (2009), and Brennan, King and Lebeau (2004) coincide when 
pointing out that they are key institutions for the development of the economy, politics, social structures 
and culture, through their main activities of teaching, researching and extending the culture.  
In other words, higher education institutions play a fundamental role in society, in its progress, its 
economic prosperity and its wellbeing by forming the human capital, developing skills for the labor market, 
producing knowledge, creating science and technology, and fostering social cohesion. Castells (2001) has 
clustered these different functions that higher education institutions perform into four main tasks: first, 
they propagate ideologies; second, they educate the elite population, becoming places where networks are 
built up; third, they produce new knowledge through research; and fourth, they train professionals for the 
labor market. In summary, as we can see, higher education institutions play diverse roles in society, being 
all of them essential for the society’s development and progress. 
As the tertiary level has developed throughout the years, and the process of massification has taken 
place, higher education has diversified, being this sector no longer exclusive to the university. For instance, 
in the particular case of Mexico, the higher education system is formed by 11 different types of institutions4 
(Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2006), that mainly developed in the 20th Century. Within these 11 
different types, private higher education institutions can be found. 
Private higher education has had different development processes throughout the globe, being in 
Mexico a key player in the sector of tertiary education, where its grown has not been exclusive of the 
process of massification. On the contrary, as Castells (2001) mentions, educating the elite population has 
been the most important task of these institutions in the developing countries for years, and so has been 
the case of Mexico. 
Private higher education, in general, has mainly developed in the 20th Century as Levy (2007) points 
out, as the separation of the Church from the state duties was consumed, and a clear division of public and 
private sectors arose. To put it differently, before, what we consider today the private and public sectors 
used to cooperate and work together, but from the process of secularization on, a marked division on 
responsibilities took place. 
Without taking into account the United States, Levy (1986; 2011) considers Latin America as the pioneer 
region of the private higher education, where this sector began developing in the 1930’s, in opposition to 
the ideologies transmitted by the government in public universities. From then on, it has grown 
                                                     
4 The 11 different types of institutions that form the Mexican higher education system are: 1) public federal universities; 2) state 
public universities; 3) public technological institutions; 4) public technological universities; 5) public polytechnic universities; 6) 
intercultural public universities; 7) teacher education institutions; 8) public research centers; 9) private institutions; 10) public 
institutions that depend directly on the Ministry of Education or the local Ministries of Education; and 11) other public institutions, 
that do not fit the descriptions mentioned above (Ministry of Public Education, 2006). 
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consistently, until suffering a major boom in the 90’s as the neoliberal ideology was implemented in the 
region, and deregulation and privatization became a trend. Today, private education is an important sector 
of the tertiary level (Altbach, 1998b) to the extent that Cheng (2009) has asserted that the state’s 
monopoly in higher education has finally ended. 
However, it is still major topic of debate, as different postures surrounding the nature of education 
exist. Certainly, education cannot be considered as a public good because it is excludable and rivalrous 
(Tilak, 2008), but it cannot be denied as a human right, because it is inherent to the human being regardless 
its purchase capacity. Understanding education as a semi-public good, the study of private higher education 
becomes relevant today, specially with the aim of reducing the risk of turning education into a million dollar 
industry whose only objective is making money. Education, foremost, is an ongoing process of self-
development and growth of the human being in every aspect (Bernal, 2007). 
In this sense, private higher education institutions are understood as organizations established by either 
businessmen or religious congregations that assume the task and responsibility of granting tertiary 
education to a specific population5. As in the case of public institutions, they are responsible for the 
education of professionals who commit themselves to the truth and to the service to the common good, 
playing a strategic role in national life in both the public and private sectors. Therefore, their principal 
mission does not, and should not differ from the specific one of higher education, even though that Levy 
(2008) asserts that they pursue different goals than public institutions.  
Although this statement is true, as in some cases the individual economic interests exceed the desire to 
achieve the common good, in its essence higher education institutions educate, and the term education 
clearly encompasses a positive concept since it implies the improvement of the human being through the 
search for the good and the truth. On the contrary, the term learning does not necessarily imply 
improvement, and therefore there may be positive learning that fosters the growth of the person, or 
negative learning that distances it from the good and the truth. In this way, it is in practice where certain 
institutions of higher education teach instead of educate. 
As a sample of it, the different objectives that have driven its development; on one hand, private higher 
education institutions have emerged as oppositions to the ideology implanted by the government but, on 
the other hand, as Altbach (2005a) points out and in most cases, to fill in the gap of the public sector, 
facilitating the access that the state fails to provide, in the absence of space, as Levy (1986) denotes. 
Indisputably, private higher education offers diversity to the sector of tertiary education, ending with the 
state’s monopoly on education. And it is undeniable that, in many countries, private higher education 
institutions enjoy great prestige and are even considered as the best option to study tertiary education, as 
so is the case, as Altbach (1998b) points out, of many Latin American countries. 
Levy (1986) mentions that the clearest distinction between public and private occurs in the legal 
framework, although the source of the financial resources might seem the clearest signal of the ownership 
of an institution. For its nature, private institutions tend to private investment, in contrast with public 
institutions that are financed by the state. Thus, private higher education institutions acquire most of their 
capital through the payment of tuition fees. However, it is important to remember that in many countries 
students pay tuition fees in public institutions despite the ownership of the state (Altbach, 2005a). For 
example, in Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), the main public higher education 
                                                     
5 It is important to mention that this conceptualization of private higher education is aligned to the context to which this 
investigation belongs: Mexico, where the dichotomy between public and private institutions is very clear. Because, as Levy (1986) 
comments, the dichotomy of the public and private does not exclude the intervention of one another. 
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institution, requests what it is called a regulatory fee of $0.20 Mexican pesos, which is approximately $0.01 
dollars annually (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2012). Also, in many countries the 
government gives financial support to the private institutions throughout loans or research funds6 (Geiger, 
1988; Altbach, 1998a; 1998b; Fielden & Cheng, 2009; Dittrrich & Weck-Hannemann, 2010; Levy, 2011).  
Another distinction, as Levy (1986; 2007; 2008) identifies, is that private institutions have mainly 
focused on the professionalization of the labor force, as specialization has become their priority. To put it 
differently, private higher education institutions have been characterized for preparing men and women as 
workforce for the industry and business sectors. As this statement can be clearly applied to the case of the 
Mexican institutions, it is also important to note that the public sector also tends toward 
professionalization in this particular country, where very few institutions truly make research and produce 
knowledge. 
As can be seen, some characteristics of the private higher education that have been previously pointed 
out, can be generalized to the sector, but they are not exclusive. Other characteristics that will be pointed 
below, on the contrary, show the heterogeneity of the sector. 
Ownership. Private higher education institutions might be owned or affiliated to different groups. Both 
Levy (2007; 2009; 2011) and Altbach (2005a) recognize religious organizations like the Catholic Church, as 
the first group to have established private higher education institutions. While their participation in higher 
education has been decreasing over time, in Mexico they still represent a strong sector associated with 
quality. Businessmen constitute the other majority group that has established higher education institutions, 
being their institutions more diverse in quality. Altbach (2005b; 2005c) also points out that some of these 
new private institutions can be owned by families. This means that a family not only owns the institution 
but, generally, it is in charge of its administration and governance, ensuring its continuity and its original 
mission. While some family-owned institutions might have been established for a noble cause, in most of 
the cases the economic profit becomes the priority in this kind of business, where all the family members, 
or most of them, depend on the profits to live. In fact, Fielden and Cheng (2009) comment that, in many 
cases, the founders of the institutions perceive a very large salary, turning higher education into a very 
attractive business. 
Legal constitution and the use of surpluses. Private higher education institutions might be constituted as 
non-profit organizations or as for profit. Non-profit organizations are advocated to the cause, in this case 
education, and instead of paying taxes they reinvest all the surpluses in the institution to achieve and excel 
in their mission. For profit organizations’ main objective, on the contrary, is making money; therefore, 
investors can keep their money for themselves, reinvest it in the institution, or decide to invest it in other 
businesses. Altbach (1998a; 2005a; 2005b) mentions that for profit organizations in higher education are 
growing fast, and this can be seen in the context of Mexico, where they did not exist over 20 years ago, and 
today they mainly belong to international groups (Rama, 2012) like Laureate and Apollo (Levy, 2007; 2011). 
Regarding for profit organizations Altbach (2005a) worries about the transparency in the use of their 
resources and their financial strategies. For Levy (2009) usually for profit institutions are low quality.  
Specialization. As the mission and the consolidation of private higher education institutions vary 
considerably, the academic profile of the institutions may differ. Altbach (2005a; 2005b), Dittrrich and 
                                                     
6 Cheng (2009) makes a comprehensive and detailed classification of the spectrum of possibilities of public investment in the 
private higher education institution. In general terms he presents the following classification: 1) joint venture public and private 
institutions; 2) government appropriation of some of the activities of the private institutions; 3) public project based management 
like research funds; 4) indirect public subsides like scholarships; 5) one and only public subside like the land grants; 6) no money 
from public investment. 
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Weck-Hannemann (2010), and Fielden and Cheng (2009) point out that some institutions are highly 
specialized and concentrate their academic offer in just one area of the knowledge, especially those market 
driven disciplines. While some private institutions can be specialized in health sciences, most of them tend 
to focus in social and administrative sciences, as it is the case of the Mexican private institutions due to the 
low investment required in the infrastructure these disciplines require (Baptista & Medina, 2011; Kent & 
Ramírez, 1999). Other reason for this specialization is, according to Dittrrich and Weck-Hannemann (2010) 
its market orientation. This means that they establish their programs according to the disciplines that 
students seem more interested on studying because their survival depends on enrollment numbers. 
However, other institutions seek a more comprehensive offer according to their nature as universities, 
educating in the different areas of knowledge. 
Orientation and students. As there is high especialization in most private higher education institutions, 
Dittrrich and Weck-Hannemann (2010) also point out that they tend to have a more regional orientation, 
meaning that students’ preparation focuses on national or even more local needs. Therefore, most 
students tend to be from the same region where they operate. In addition to this, students tend to be more 
diverse. In other words, as flexibility is higher due to the orientation to the costumer, and the focus on the 
professionalization of the labor market, private education students might be working at the same time they 
are studying, specially when studying degree programs where experience in the field is rewarded, or be 
commited to motherhood responsabilities.  
Academic profession. The academic profile goes hand in hand with the academic profession; mainly private 
institutions tend to operate with mostly part time professors, instead of full time academics (Altbach, 
2005a). In many cases this is associated with saving money (Altbach, 2005b), as hiring full time professors 
requires paying higher salaries. In these cases the academic freedom might also be constrained, as the 
hourly hired professor becomes only an executor of the curricular content, while at the same time, in many 
cases, lacks the theoretical knowledge and the research skills that the academic profession requires and 
develops. Nevertheless, this cannot be generalized, as there are some private higher education institutions 
committed to develop the academic profession. 
Research. As most private higher education institutions operate with part time professors, the small 
number of full time academics is over burned with administrative responsibilities, leaving research behind 
(Altbach, 2005a; 2005b; Levy, 2008). In this sense, their focus on the professionalization of the labor market 
is better understood, as there is little time and human resources committed to producing new knowledge. 
Quality. Quality is perhaps the main issue of the private higher education institutions. While some of them 
take care of fulfilling and exceling quality standards many more institutions, specially the ones established 
recently and whose purpose is to make money, do not pay attention to the quality. Increasingly today, 
many private institutions can be identified as demand absorbing, which can be distinguish for their low 
quality education (Altbach, 1998b), fact that has led Levy (2007) to conclude that many so called private 
higher education institutions cannot really be called universities. In other words, these institutions operate 
in many cases without the government’s recognition and, hence, without being accredited and certified for 
taking care of the quality standards; they take advantage of the growing consumers’ demand, in an 
opportunity to make profit. Other aspect that might not contribute to increase the quality of the private 
higher education institution its precisely its market orientation, as in order to keep the students enroll and 
paying fees, there might be an over focus in keeping students satisfied as both Dittrrich and Weck-
Hannemann (2010) and Psacharopoulus (2004) comment, and little rigor in the admission process. To put it 
differently, the need of receiving the money from the tuition fees to keep the instituion afloat might lead to 
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enroll more students based on the capacity to pay the fee, rather on the requiered profile for completing 
the higher education program, translating into underachiving students that know they will get a degree 
without the greatest effort. 
Autonomy. Private higher education institutions enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than public ones, 
especially financially, administratively and academically speaking  (Altbach, 1998a). This means that even 
though they enjoy more freedom to make most of the decisions, they still are subject to some external 
control by the government, quality assurance agencies, and the society in general. 
Regulations. Regulations are meant to ensure quality and efficiency (Fielden & Varghese, 2009). However, 
Altbach (2005a) suggests that in general, private higher education suffers little constraints being the market 
the main source of regulation. Levy (2007; 2011) brings forward an interesting fact that regulations to the 
private sector tend to be established after its first development, and so has been the Mexican case. Due to 
this fact, most regulations to private higher education are lax, as they tend to a laissez-faire policy, leading 
to the development of low quality institutions. For this reason, today most systems have turned to the 
quality assurance processes as the key mechanism to regulate the private education, but in many systems, 
like the Mexican one, it remains a voluntary option for the private providers (Cuevas, 2011b; González, 
2012). Other regulatory mechanisms include professional associations, to put an example, and balances 
through funding schemes, which seem to be incrementing lately. However, as quality is as varied as it is 
mentioned above, this task is quite complex. In addition, regulations depend from on country to another; 
some systems are overregulated for granting private education like the Indian case (Altbach, 1998a), while 
most systems are so deregulated that the expansion of diploma mills has been an issue over the last couple 
of years. Levy (2011) points out that sometimes, the groups owning the private institutions, like the 
religious one, excerpt a lot of power, making it difficult for the system to regulate them. In other cases, the 
governments prefer to keep loose regulations to promote entrepreneurship, and consequently job creation 
and the circulation of economic resources. Therefore, for Fielden and Cheng (2009) the task is so 
challenging that the government has mainly limited to create incentives that attract private investors to 
align with the national agenda. 
Governance and transparency. Altbach (2005a) points out that data related to private higher education 
institutions is usually not available to everyone. This is due mainly because the economic resources 
invested are not public but private. Consequently, for this characteristic it is very difficult to demand 
accountability (Levy, 2007). To put it differently, they have the responsibility to be only accountable to their 
stakeholders, but not to the society as a whole, as the tax money is not invested. However, in most cases, 
and as in most of the businesses, the shareholders and the governing bodies keep the information for 
themselves, and use it to make the institutional decisions, omitting sharing this information with 
consumers and the staff. Inclusive, as Salto (2016) mentions, there is a tendency in private institutions to 
hire managers for the administrative purposes, leaving academics behind in the decision-making processes 
(Levy, 2008). 
The characteristics described above help understand the typical typology of private higher education 
institutions that has been developed by authors like Levy (2009). Usually presented as a dichotomy, it is 
important to remember that there are institutions that can be found between the spectrums of both poles. 
Thus, private higher education institutions tend to be classified as elite institutions or demand absorbing. 
Elite, as its name indicates are usually identified as world-class universities or, failing that, universities with 
high national prestige which grant education to the privileged. These institutions tend to be selective and 
expensive, as they are identified for its quality education; usually they are conservative and tend to 
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entrepreneurial education. On the contrary, demand absorbing institutions are considered non-elite; they 
tend to be small, and non-transparent, and the quality of education is dubious. Therefore, they can be 
questioned as higher education institutions. 
The following Table 1 “Characteristics of private higher education institutions by type of institution” 
seeks to have a greater understanding of the types of institutions mentioned above, according to the 
characteristics that distinguish them. Again, it must be remembered that nuances are found between both 
poles. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of private higher education institutions by type of institution 
 Elite institutions Demand absorbing 
Ownership Religious congregations 
Businessmen 
 
Businessmen 
Families 
Politicians 
Legal 
construction 
Non-profit For profit 
Source of income Mainly tuition fees but some indirect 
funding through research funds and 
scholarships 
Tuition fees 
Specialization A more comprehensive offer oriented 
to the different areas of the 
knowledge 
Highly specialized; they concentrate 
their academic offer in just one area of 
the knowledge, generally social 
sciences and humanities 
Infrastructure High investment: laboratories and 
special equipment, but still lacking the 
infrastructure of the public institution 
Non-specialized infrastructure 
Academic 
profession 
High number of hourly hired professors 
More commitment to develop the 
academic profession in the long run  
No desire to expand full time 
professors as the main objective is the 
economic surplus 
Orientation Professionalization of the labor market 
Research Desire to increase and improve 
research but most academic staff is 
over burden with administrative tasks. 
Therefore little research is carried out 
No desire on carrying out research 
Quality High quality 
Quality certified by accreditation 
agencies 
Legal recognition by the government 
Low quality. In many cases they 
operate without government’s 
recognition and/or without quality 
assurance accreditation 
Autonomy High degree of autonomy 
Regulations Mostly low constraints by regulatory instruments 
Governance Academics form part of the 
governance bodies 
Managers integrate the governance 
bodies 
Target 
population 
High and upper middle class Middle low and low social class 
Degree offer Doctoral, master and undergraduate 
education, with specialization and 
certifications  
Undergraduate education, 
specialization and certifications 
Table elaborated by the author based on the information presented above. 
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As can be seen so far, private higher education constitutes a varied and diverse study field in terms of 
development, objectives, population of students, sources of income, and values taught, which makes it very 
complex to develop an inclusive public policy. However, in this task is, foremost important, that the essence 
of higher education is preserved.  
The private sector has grown steeply in recent years, and with it, the number of students has multiplied, 
especially as the sector has diversified. Today, it has become a considerable part of higher education 
systems that cannot be denied, and its growth will continue to take place, in most of the countries so, more 
than ever, it is essential to deepen in the issues that have remained pending.  
Two of these pending issues are precisely the autonomy and the regulations. As can be seen, autonomy 
seems to be highly enjoyed by private higher education institutions, while regulations tend to be lax. 
Autonomy is highly appreciated in the academic world generating an important weight when looking to 
regulate the system more efficiently; specially, as most economical resources of this sector are private, the 
public sector is hesitant to intervene in the governance of these institutions. On purpose, little was 
deepened in the previous analysis of the private higher education, since this will be done in the next 
sections of this research. However, what can be seen in the aforementioned that private higher education 
institutions, in general, enjoy a high degree of autonomy as little is restricted by the lax regulations. While 
autonomy is the heart of academic work, regulations play an indispensable role in ensuring the quality of 
the system. Therefore, a balance is needed for a healthy system. In other words, to what extent can a 
private higher education institution exert autonomy while the government imposes some limitations and 
constraints to assure the quality?  
Following the concepts of autonomy and regulations will be explored and analyzed to, later on, 
understand how they coexist. This will provide with an analytical framework that will allow to understand 
the present situation of the higher education institutions in the context of Mexico, with the aim of, 
subsequently, answering the following research question: To what extent private higher education is 
regulated in Mexico and what level of autonomy does it enjoy in its several dimensions? How are 
regulations and the existing level of autonomy related to the proliferation of the low quality institutions? 
 
II. 2 Autonomy 
II. 2.1 The concept of autonomy 
Autonomy is one of the most important aspects and strengths of a higher education institution in order 
to achieve successfully its responsibilities of teaching, researching and the spreading the culture. The 
concept is widely used in both the political and academic spheres, in a constant struggle by the institutions 
to obtain greater degree of autonomy and by the government to exercise greater control through 
regulations, for the preservation of educational quality. In other words, there is a permanent tension 
regarding this matter. 
Higher education institutions have been historically linked with different authorities, being these the 
Church or the state, to guarantee societal accountability (Nybom, 2008). Therefore, autonomy is not 
something that one has or does not have, but is exercised in different degrees, according to its multiple 
dimensions. The word autonomy comes from the Greek words of autos, which means one self, and, nomos, 
which refers to norms or law. As González (2004) mentions, autonomy is the capacity that a person or an 
institution has to be governed by its own law. Namely, in this context, it is the ability of an institution to 
govern itself under its own rules. 
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At the beginning, autonomy was mainly understood as academic freedom and academic self-
governance, granted specifically to individual people rather than to an institution as a whole (Fumasoli, 
Gornitzka & Maasen, 2014; Amaral & Magalhães, 2001). In other words, autonomy used to refer to the 
capacity of teaching, researching and discussing ideas freely and without censure, in the aim of seeking for 
the truth, and to the ability of making decisions regarding academic matters such as designing the 
curriculum and warding degrees, among others.  
Nevertheless, over the years, the concept has been extended. Hence, today, autonomy is defined by 
Varghese and Martin (2013) as the “freedom of an institution to run its own affairs without direct control 
or influence by the government” (p. 18). Autonomy, hence, is enjoyed at the institutional level and it 
implies freedom from part of the government, and authority from part of the institutional managers. To put 
it differently, autonomy is, on one hand, the capacity to act internally, and on the other hand, the ability to 
act independently from the government. However, autonomy is different from sovereignty, and does not 
mean a complete separation from the state (Narro, 2011); on the contrary, it means also complying with 
the law and being accountable to the society. 
For this reason, Grau (2013) asserts that a good relationship between the government and the higher 
education institution is fundamental to assure autonomy. In other words, as autonomy is an attribution 
granted by the state, a respectful and pleasant relationship with it is essential, in order to keep the degree 
of autonomy that has been enjoyed until now; on the contrary, an atrocious relationship with the 
government fractures the autonomy and leads to a greater control and, hence, to the reduction of the 
degree of freedom of action that the institution enjoys. 
Autonomy and accountability are, therefore, a constant negotiation between the state and the 
institution (Roversi-Monaco et al, 2003), a renewable contract (Neave, 2012) where their operation and 
interference is agreed and the institutions’ academic position is constantly being redefined; a negotiation 
between the institution and the government to assure that the mission of the university is being fulfilled 
(European University Association, 2005). According to Narro (2011) “it is illusory to think that autonomy is 
won once and for all, permanently there are new challenges and new tasks for university students in the 
desire to preserve and expand it in all its facets” (p. 27). Paraphrasing, as autonomy is an attribute granted 
by the authority, it is limited in certain aspects and, therefore, the quest to achieve more autonomy, and 
the struggle to maintain it, is endless.  
In other words, higher education institutions will always seek to increase their autonomy in order to 
govern themselves more freely by making their own decisions regarding their own matters because, in 
reality, they know better that anyone else how to perform on the tasks and duties they do in the best 
possible way. In words of Mayntz (1993) autonomy is a protective mechanism against the “the destructive 
consequences of ignorant state intervention” (p. 15). 
However, the government will also always seek to exercise greater control since, on the one hand, the 
institutions exercise a fundamental role in society by training professionals, producing knowledge and 
extending the culture; hence, the state needs to protect and make sure that the human right to education 
is fulfilled in the society where it exerts control. The state is responsible for safeguarding this human right, 
and for securing and ensuring the interests and common goods of its people. On the other hand, for the 
most part and speaking specifically of the public university, universities use public funds to sustain, keep 
afloat, and carry on their responsibilities; thus, the state must ensure the good use and the correct 
administration of these financial resources. It cannot go away from demanding accounts and regulating 
higher education. 
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In this sense, autonomy goes hand in hand with the structures designed by the government for 
controlling and monitoring the quality (Roversi-Monaco et al, 2003); in other words, with the accountability 
of the institution. Thus, based on this argument, for Nybom (2008) autonomy cannot be considered a 
negotiation but a technical formula with quantitative indicators that guarantee that the institution 
safeguards the public good of education. The author mentions that for the state, autonomy is an 
“operational tool promoted and accepted […] as the best practical means for running ‘university business’ 
efficiently” (p. 136). Autonomy, then, is a functional instrument that ensures the proper functioning of 
higher education institutions; the best tool that the state has found to govern harmonically over the 
institutions. 
But autonomy is more than delegating authority, because as Fumasoli, Gornitzka and Maasen (2014) 
point out, it has also to do with the historical conditions of a country, and the role the institution has played 
over the years. This means autonomy is achieved throughout the years, but it is influenced by the culture 
and values of the country. Hence, autonomy, from one country to another, is perceived and interpreted in 
different ways. 
Accordingly, for Narro (2011), and Estermann and Nokkala (2009), autonomy refers to the degree of 
control that the government exercises over the higher education institutions at a specific time and place. 
Hence, autonomy is dynamic as it varies from one context to another, and from one historic period to 
another, depending on the particular circumstances. Autonomy then is built upon the conditions of the 
environment and the legal framework of the country where the institution is located. This legal framework 
is essential for Martuscelli and Martínez (2013), and for González (2004) as it is the one that grants the 
university a full legal and decentralized status that allows it to operate without certain interference from 
the state. It is the mechanism the authorities use to give the autonomy to an institution, and to safeguard 
it.  
To say it in a different way, autonomy is embodied in the law, by means of which legislators make it a 
norm, making it an obligation to be respected by the authority of the government. The legislation, then, is 
the one that safeguards the university’s autonomy and prevents being breached. However, this legislation 
also denotes certain responsibilities that autonomy implies with it; therefore, the university is not 
untouchable, but it must respond responsibly to duties that autonomy imply with it. In other words, it is a 
socially responsible institution that is given a free margin of action so that it can perform its tasks 
successfully and without being tied to the personal interests of the political sphere. Nonetheless, it is 
important to remember that the legal autonomy might not be the same as the real autonomy (Raza, 2009; 
Enders, de Boer & Weyer, 2013). To put it differently, in some countries the legal framework might grant a 
high degree of autonomy to the higher education institutions, but the fact is that governments can still 
constrain the institutions, or on the other way around, the law might restrain the institution for managing 
itself, but in reality there is no application or implementation of the law. Namely, the degree to which the 
law is applied is also an indicator of the amount of autonomy enjoyed by institutions in a system. 
 Autonomy enables universities to make changes inside its organization, but also guarantees that there 
is academic freedom when carrying on its activities of teaching and research (Nybom, 2008; Prodi, 2003). 
Then, autonomy has to do with self-determination and self-regulation, as well as with the imposed limits 
exerted by the government (Henkel, 2005). To put it differently, it grants the possibility for an institution to 
act independently from the government in its own matters, but this does not mean that it does not comply 
with the national regulations and laws, which are meant to protect the system and its people. It cannot be 
forgotten that every higher education institution is part of a state, and therefore they have to comply with 
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its norms, rules, and regulations. In other words, to the legal framework of each country (Martuscelli & 
Martínez, 2013), and with other mechanisms, the government uses to exert control to protect the people. 
In this regard, increasing autonomy means increasing evaluation and accountability measures, through 
mechanisms such as funding schemes, accreditation processes, and supervision that affect the institutions 
governance (Anderson & Johnson, 1998; Beleiklie & Kogan, 2007; Raza, 2009; Berdahl, 1990). As Nybom 
(2008) continuous, autonomy “is certainly no synonym for independence; it is rather a case of widened 
scope of decision making under certain important constraints, with less local power but more local 
responsibility than ever before” (p. 137). 
Universities are not isolated from the world; on the contrary, and certainly autonomy does not mean 
that they turn out to be “ivory towers” (Narro, 2011, p. 16) that do not communicate with the outside 
world. On the contrary, communication is essential for interacting with society and for responding to its 
needs through its daily work activities. Autonomy and responsibility go hand in hand. According to González 
(2004) the university’s autonomy does not opposes to the public good, but on the other hand it is itself a 
public good. It is in the university where freedom and responsibility make sense. As Narro (2011) mentions: 
 
Autonomy is freedom to think, say and do in the framework of the aims of the institution. Therefore it 
requires spaces to exercise criticism and to propose, to conduct itself independently in the saying and doing 
of academic order, as it also demands respect, understanding and support (p. 17). 
 
Autonomy then enables higher education scholars and students to express without constraints, but it 
requires the maturity to be exercised with respect and with responsibility for the actions and consequences 
that derive from it. Therefore, autonomy has several dualities; first, it is given by an authority, but at the 
same time it is exercised by another one, that although it is less powerful on a national scale its role is 
determinant for the progress of the society to which it belongs, since it produces knowledge for the public 
sphere and prepares and trains future government officials. Second, it involves freedom and obligation; not 
only to comply with national norms and to be accountable to society, but also that all dialogue requires 
responsibility for what is said and for the implications of what it may bring. Therefore, requires 
commitment to the truth with the desire to always seek it above all. Third, requires talking and listening, a 
dialogue among all actors, a continuous questioning and search for answers in which one accepts the own 
limitations and searches to build knowledge through the interaction with others.  
As can be seen, autonomy is a complex concept and, even though the legal framework is meant to 
protect it, Neave (2012) suggests that this do no necessarily guarantees it. On the contrary, today the 
pressure for the institutions to develop their own capacity with less support and greater control has 
become a challenge. A university has to develop its capacity throughout the power that is granted to 
determine its own mission and programs, as well as the resources that will be used to fulfill so (Kogan & 
Hanney, 2000), but with less resources than ever before and with more constraints than in the past. As 
Huisman and Currie (2004), Henkel (2005), and Nybom (2008) claim, restrains have increased, and hence, 
Grau (2013) concerns that the academic identity has been diminished, especially because of the increment 
of the legislation. 
In short, the autonomy of a higher education institution is a dynamic and contextual attribute that 
depends partly on the culture and values of a society and partly on the inherited regulatory mechanisms 
that have been used by the government through the history to protect the higher education. Neither a 
complete autonomy nor a perfect autonomy exist, as accountability is always needed, but a good balance is 
necessary for the development of a healthy system. 
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II. 2.2 The dimensions of the autonomy 
Autonomy in higher education can be analyzed from several perspectives. Classically, scholars have 
classified autonomy into two main groups: substantive and procedural autonomy (Raza, 2009; Volkwein 
and Malik 1997; Berdahl, 1990), which correspond to the nature of the actions. Hence, substantive 
autonomy refers to the decisions that correspond to the academic matters or pedagogical aspects, 
concerning the activities that affect or have an impact on the teaching and the research of the institution. 
Substantive activities include designing the curriculum, awarding degrees, appointing the staff, or 
establishing admission policies. Furthermore, the procedural autonomy deals with the managerial and 
administrative activities carried out at the institution. These activities include budgeting, contracting, 
financial management and the selection of non-academic staff, among others. 
This classification provides a broad picture of the concept of autonomy. Nevertheless, as autonomy and 
governance have changed over the years, this distinction has seemed not to be enough (Fumasoli, 
Gornitzka & Maasen, 2014). Therefore, in a deeper analysis, authors that will be studied next, suggest a 
division of autonomy according to the activities of the institution itself: the organization, the finance, the 
staffing and the academic. Other classifications have been proposed like the one of Enders, de Boer and 
Weyer (2013), but will not be analyzed in this study, as their established dimensions seemed to be 
overlapping7. 
In this sense, the first one is the organizational autonomy, which refers to the capacity of an institution 
to organize itself internally (Grau, 2013). This means a university can make their own decisions regarding its 
governance bodies and its academic structures. In other words, enjoying organizational autonomy means 
exercising institutional leadership and deciding on the leadership model (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009).  
Second, the financial autonomy, which is considered by Grau (2013) as the heart of an institution’s 
autonomy, or in other words, as the one that enables an institution to carry out other tasks. Financial 
autonomy is defined as financial self-sufficiency that guarantees independence, allowing acting according 
to its own interest rather than political and marketing oriented ones. Estermann and Nokkala (2009) 
understand the financial autonomy as the diverse ways of getting economic resources and funds for 
carrying on the daily activities, and the ability to allocate them according to its own needs. This autonomy is 
crucial for the university as it has direct influence over other aspects of the institution.  
Third, the staffing autonomy, defined as the ability of the higher education institutions to hire their own 
staff and negotiate with them the terms of their employment conditions (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009).  
Finally, the academic autonomy, which is, perhaps, the one in which the academic identity builds upon 
(Henkel, 2005) and the core dimension of a higher education institution (Grau, 2013). For González (2004) 
the “academia is the university itself” (p. 72), for which academic freedom is essential. Namely, the 
academic autonomy is specific of institutions advocated to education, and therefore it refers to the very 
thing of education: the educational act. 
Neave (2012) relates the academic autonomy of a university with the “pedagogical act” (p. 28) as it has 
to do with the freedom of teaching and researching. In other words, it can be defined as the power 
                                                     
7 Enders, de Boer and Weyer (2013) identify two dimensions of the autonomy: 1) ability to make decisions, which include the 
managerial (financial and human resources decisions), policy (decisions about the resources and the services they provide), and 
governance (decisions regarding structures, processes and policy instruments) autonomies; and 2) constraints to decision making 
process, which contains the financial (sources of income), legal and interventional (reporting, auditing and evaluating interventions 
from the government) autonomies.  
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exercised by the university’s staff in determining their own work. It refers to the institution’s capacity on 
choosing its institutional strategy and its academic profile (Estermann & Nokkala, 2009). However, in any 
system, nor for public or private institutions, academics control all this type of autonomy. On the contrary, 
they all face constraints from the government (Neave, 2012), and even from the market as Henkel (2005) 
points out.  
The following Chart 1 “The dimensions of the autonomy” presents, graphically, the different aspects, 
activities and abilities, per dimension of autonomy, that are affected by the diverse degrees of autonomy 
that an institution has. The chart intends to be a Venn diagram, where autonomy is the big universe that 
encompasses the four different areas: organizational, academic, staffing and financial. Within each area, 
the activities have been allocated, classifying them, at the same time, according to their nature of 
administrative (procedural) or academic (substantive) tasks. Highlighted some activities, that even though 
have been classified into the substantive categories, because of their great pedagogical impact, are highly 
administrative.  
Of course, it should be clarified that the chart represents the maximum autonomy that an institution can 
enjoy until today, since this is what is understood up to now by autonomy. However, as autonomy is a 
dynamic concept, it might be broaden in the future, as it has happened historically, and that has been 
documented in this research. In addition, it is important to mention that this chart does not represent the 
autonomy of a particular institution, but the possibilities of autonomy that are given. The autonomy 
depends on the regulations of each country, as will be seen later and, therefore, it is very difficult to 
combine all these elements in one system. However, there are systems in which autonomy is greater, 
allowing institutions to perform more of these listed activities. 
As can be seen from the chart, the two major areas in which higher education institutions enjoy more 
autonomy are the organizational and the academic ones. However, the nature of both differs, while the 
organizational autonomy focuses mainly on administrative activities, academic autonomy, in substantive 
activities. In the case of staffing autonomy it is observed that several activities have been duplicated. This is 
because although, in their nature they are administrative tasks, they have a significant impact in the 
academic area. Therefore, the distinction between administrative staff and academic staff has been made 
in the nature of the activities.  
It is observed, broadly speaking, that the autonomy increase has focused more on the freedom to make 
administrative decisions than academic decisions, which in fact are easier to measure and be accountable 
for, allowing the state to exercise greater control in those areas and without the need to be the one that 
makes the decisions. In fact, Anderson and Johnson (1998) found out in their research of the state of 
autonomy in 20 countries, that academics perceive the governments exercise the most authority to the 
academic standards (excluding activities like teaching and curriculum design), and the use of financial 
resources. 
With the population’s increase after the Second World War, with the growth of the markets after the 
relatively global bonanza of the postwar period, and the massification process of the higher education 
systems, the state has delegated managerial and administrative activities since its capacities have been 
surpassed. In this context, it makes sense that it has delegated activities that are easier to be measured, in 
contrast with the academic activities that, while some freedoms were already enjoyed due to the existence 
of the academic freedom, they are, in generally, more difficult to be measured and evaluated. Although the 
quality assurance processes have tried to do so, in most of the contexts they have not had the desired 
outcomes, as will be seen later in the case of Mexico.  
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Chart 1. The dimensions of the autonomy 
Autonomy 
 
 
Organizational Academic   
 Procedural Substantive   Procedural Substantive 
Determine legal 
status 
Define internal rules 
and procedures 
Select members of 
executive board and 
academic bodies 
Establish criteria and 
durability of 
leadership positions 
Dismiss the 
university’s head 
Select external 
members in the 
governing bodies 
Determine 
administrative 
structures 
Create a legal entity 
Decide the 
orientation of its 
governance bodies 
Decide mission and 
goals 
Determine 
academic 
structures 
Define internal 
rules and 
procedures 
Establish criteria 
and durability of 
leadership 
positions 
 
 
Decide the number 
of students 
 
Determine 
mission and 
academic profile 
Open/close 
programs 
Design curriculum 
and content 
Establish 
admission 
mechanisms 
Design and 
implement 
quality assurance 
mechanisms 
Make research 
decisions 
Select language of 
instruction 
Award degrees 
  
Staffing Financial 
 Procedural Substantive   Procedural Substantive  
Recruit and select 
administrative staff 
Determine salary 
scales 
Establish staffing 
policies 
Dismiss academic 
staff 
Promote 
administrative staff 
Recruit and select 
academic staff 
Establish 
mechanisms to 
asses staff’s 
performance 
Dismiss academic 
staff 
Promote academic 
staff 
Keep surplus 
Borrow money 
Own buildings  
Charge tuition fees 
Invest in financial 
markets 
Decide 
expenditures. 
Determine sources 
of money 
 
  
  
 Chart elaborated by the author based on the findings of Raza (2009), Grau (2013), Kogan and Hanney, 
(2000) Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel (2011), and Martuscelli and Martínez (2013) 
 
 
II. 2.3 The state of autonomy today 
The phenomenon observed in the previous chart can be explained with the recent events that have 
taken place in higher education. In recent years, as neoliberal policies have been implemented and New 
Public Management has been adopted, aiming to solve the problems of bureaucratization, inefficiency and 
over regulation, business-management tools have been introduced in the public sphere (Ziegele, 2008; 
Enders, de Boer & Weyer, 2013). Therefore, the relationship between the government and the public 
higher education institutions has been transformed. In other words, from control and over regulation, the 
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government’s role changed to supervisor; from highly centralized decision making, decentralized structures 
were adopted (Kivistö, 2008). Namely, granting autonomy, developing mechanisms for accountability, and 
strengthening institutional leadership, among others, have been the main changes implemented. 
This means that governments have tried to step away from the every day decision of the institutions, 
especially in the managerial aspects, with the aim of gaining efficiency. However, accountability, as has 
been mentioned before, is still there and has even increased (Huisman & Currie, 2004; Henkel, 2005; 
Nybom, 2008), as institutions have to respond to the society’s expectations and demands. 
Fumasoli, Gornitzka and Maasen (2014) study the recent autonomy trends in public institutions, 
especially in the European context, to find out that it tends towards centralization, formalization, 
standardization, legitimization, and flexibility. To say it differently, as autonomy has seemed to increase 
with the changes in the regulations, institutions have suffered some transformations in order to play a 
more relevant role in the administration of their resources. First, institutions autonomy has tended to 
centralize governance bodies, encouraging managers to assume positions of responsibility and decision 
making instead of academics. Second, internal procedures have tried to be formalized, as reporting and 
output indicators have become mechanisms to ensure accountability. Third, there has been a 
professionalization and specialization of the administrative staff. Fourth, flexibility has been granted, 
especially in the research sphere and profile, giving more possibilities to researchers so that they can apply 
for additional research funds. 
As can be seen, the increase of autonomy has mainly centered in the organizational dimension of the 
institutions, and the administrative issues, while academic autonomy has mostly remained the same in the 
recent years. Nor the autonomy has been enjoyed in activities that have a greater national level implication 
and that could lead to conflicts with the government. Hence, the state has preserved the tasks of designing 
the national policy and strategy for higher education, in order to coordinate it with the national objectives 
of negotiating the budget at both system and institutional levels, and of coordinating the higher education 
sector with other relevant areas for the country (Fielden, 2008). For this reason, Marginson, cited by 
Anderson and Johnson (1998), has stated that higher education today has become a product of the state, 
serving for its own purposes, as academic freedom, sublimely, is limited by the government. Higher 
education institutions, in contrast with the first institutions, have become a government’s vehicle to 
transmit its ideology, as it was seen at the beginning that Castells (2001) suggested. 
In fact, the government’s control over the higher education institutions can be classified into four main 
groups, as Fielden (2008) has noted. The first one concerns the state’s tight control over the higher 
education institutions where this are owned and operated directly by the Ministry of Education or another 
dependency or agency of the state. The second one are the semi autonomous institutions, owned by the 
government but with a little more margin of maneuvering. The third one refers to semi-independent, 
where the institution is not owned by the state, but it is highly supervised monitored and regulated. The 
fourth and final institutions are completely independent meaning that their ownership is private too, but 
the control is made by linking the institution’s objectives to the national strategy, in many cases through 
funding schemes. 
Fielden’s (2008) first two classifications refer to the public sector, while the last two concern to the 
private one. The following Chart 2. “Degree of autonomy enjoyed by each type of institution” illustrates the 
control the government exercises to these institutions. It is important to note that degrees vary according 
to the country and the specific institution; hence, in one country different semi autonomous institutions 
can enjoy different degrees of autonomy, but this chart is meant to represent the generalities. Independent 
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institutions are more rare, as they are private institutions that have been granted complete freedom to act. 
In the case of Mexico, this segment is integrated by private institutions that have been granted more 
autonomy by presidential decrees, as will later be studied. In general terms, independent institutions 
operate with a greater degree of organizational, staffing, financial and especially academic autonomy, than 
semi-independent and semi autonomous institutions. Specifically, they operate without requiring getting 
the states’ authorization when creating or closing new programs, capability that semi-independent 
institutions do not enjoy.  
It can also be seen that semi autonomous and semi-independent institutions are regulated to some 
extent by the government and, even though they enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than the ones 
completely operated by the government, the state does keep control over them. Hence, both institutions 
enjoy a similar degree of autonomy, but both are regulated in different ways as will be later analyzed. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that private institutions do enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than 
public ones, as seen in the chart. 
 
Chart 2. Degree of autonomy enjoyed by each type of institution 
Operated by the government   Semi-independent Independent 
                          Semi autonomous  
          --             Degree of autonomy + 
Chart elaborated by the author based on the findings of Fielden (2008). 
 
The degree of autonomy depends on the degree of control exercised by the government to a particular 
institution, but both private and public institutions enjoy it in different ways. As autonomy is contextual, as 
it has already been said, in some countries semi-independent institutions’ autonomy can be more similar to 
semi autonomous; it all depends on each country’s regulations. 
 
II. 2.4 The specificity of autonomy for the private higher education 
So far, the concept of autonomy has been explored in a general way. Nevertheless, it is precisely to 
distinguish the particularities of the autonomy in the private sector. In some contexts, like the Mexican one, 
this particular task is convoluted, because there is a false belief that if the investment of the higher 
education institution is private, the institution is already autonomous and the state cannot get involved and 
interfere in its affairs8.  
However, as it has been previously said, autonomy is not the act of letting do without any restrictions; 
on the contrary, it is an attribute that goes hand in hand with accountability and, therefore, with the 
regulations of the state. Now, the state regulates different aspects in a myriad of ways and to diverse 
extents, as it will be studied in a later stage of this research. Regulations constrain some aspects and, in 
higher education, these vary and depend from private to public institutions. Therefore, the private sector, 
as the public one, enjoys some degree of autonomy, while it is also regulated by the state. However, the 
form and limitations are different from one sector to another, as it will be analyzed now. 
In general, private higher education institutions enjoy a greater degree of autonomy than the public 
sector, as Raza (2009) points out, where the clear exceptions are countries like India and Kazakhstan. In the 
particular case of Mexico, private institutions enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, as regulations have 
been limited.   
                                                     
8 See authors Pinto (1974), Poder Judicial (2005), and Carpizo (2002). 
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As found in their research, Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel (2011), Estermann and Nokkala (2009), 
Fielden, (2008), and Bennetot and Estermann (2017) agree that public higher education institutions, in 
general, face the most constrains in the organizational and staffing autonomies, having more freedom 
when it comes to the academic matter. In contrast, private higher education institutions enjoy the greater 
degree of autonomy in the organizational aspects, while the academic one is the one that faces the most 
constrains (Bernasconi, 2011; Geiger, 1988; Levy, 2011). See ANNEX 1 for detail information and 
comparison of the different degrees of autonomy enjoyed by the public autonomous institutions and the 
private ones.  
In other words, as a whole, private higher education institutions seem to enjoy a greater degree of 
autonomy in contrast with the public ones. Operated by the government higher education institutions (non 
autonomous) are the ones that face the most constraints and restrictions, while independent institutions 
are the ones that operate more freely. Independent institutions, in general, seem to face restrictions in the 
financial aspects, as in many countries private higher education institutions have to be non-profit 
organizations, which means that they have to reinvest their surpluses in improving the institution’s 
capacity. Therefore, the owners of the institutions cannot profit from them. This phenomenon can also be 
seen in semi-independent institutions where the financial autonomy is also constrained, although is not the 
one that faces the most restrictions. However, following, a detailed analysis contrasting the different 
degrees of autonomy in autonomous public institutions and private institutions, according to each 
dimension of the autonomy, is presented. Segments of ANNEX 1 are included (Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5), but 
explanations and detailed information are found in the annex section9. 
The financial autonomy for private higher education institutions is usually constrained because 
institutions usually have to be registered as non-
profit institutions. This forces the institutions to 
use of the surpluses to improve the higher 
education institutions and the pedagogical act, 
and limits the sources of revenue. Nevertheless, as 
it will be seen later, mechanisms to assure 
accountability in this regard are constantly 
missing. Often this occurs due to the private 
nature of the institutions, where private 
investments are used to carry on their activities. In 
many cases, this obliges the government not to be 
able to exercise control over the economic resources and financial matters generating a lack of 
transparency about the acquisition and use of their resources (Altbach, 2005a). Hence, this makes it 
difficult for the government to assure that there is compliance with the legislation.  
In other cases, recently some countries have granted more financial autonomy to private higher 
education investors granting the possibility of establishing for profit institutions. This can lead to even more 
problems when regulating the system, as possibilities for ensuring that education does not become a multi-
million dollar business are now limited. In this case, there is no room for regulations on the use of resources 
                                                     
9 Each segment is based on the findings of Bennetot and Estermann (2017) Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel (2011), Estermann and 
Nokkala (2009), Bernasconi (2011), Fielden (2008), Geiger (1988), OECD (2003), and Levy (2011). Additionally, for each segment, the 
word high means, that, in generally, that type of institution is able to carry out that activity without restrictions from the 
government; medium, that institutions face some restrictions needing to comply with some requirements, requiring approvals or 
confirmations, or having to carry out negotiations with the government; and low, that restrictions are faced, ceilings are set, and 
processes and parameters need to be followed as established by the law. 
Table 2. Degree of financial autonomy 
From ANNEX 1 
 Public Private 
Semi 
autonomous 
Semi-
independent 
Independent 
Keep surplus  High Medium Low 
Borrow money Low High High 
Own buildings  High High High 
Charge tuition fees High High High 
Determine tuition fees Low High High 
Invest in financial 
markets 
Low Medium Medium 
Decide expenditures High Medium Low 
Determine sources of 
money 
High Medium Medium 
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and surpluses, which even gives the possibility of investing the money of the institution in the financial 
markets without any protection to the consumers (students), as has happened recently in Mexico. 
In contrast, it can be seen that public institutions have been granted some degree of autonomy in the 
financial matters recently, but still face some constraints. While most public institutions can own their 
buildings, charge tuition fees, keep surpluses, and decide on the expenditures, they still face restrictions on 
determining tuitions fees, borrowing money, and investing in financial markets which make a lot of sense as 
most of the money that is being used comes from tax payers. Hence, the government has to ensure that 
the institution, on one hand, makes good use of its resources without getting into debt, but on the other 
hand, that tuition fees remain accessible to the population. In short, since the resources used by these 
institutions are public, the state can demand accountability; it is understood and expected to do so, 
because society demands it. In this way, autonomy faces constraints. 
Other aspect of the autonomy that faces constraints in private institutions is the organizational 
autonomy, which is precisely the one 
that has advanced the most on reducing 
restrains in the public sector. 
Independent institutions are the ones 
that operate more freely in this regard 
having to be legally constituted mainly as 
non-profit institutions as the legislation 
points out. Hence, their legal status is 
subject to regulation. Similarly, semi-
independent institutions, in most cases, 
have to comply with the legal status 
determined by law. This, as has been 
mentioned, has been changing and has 
become less restricted, granting 
investors the possibility to decide on the legal status of the institution. 
In addition to this aspect, it can be seen that semi-independent institutions can establish their own 
mission, goals, rules and procedures, but in most countries need authorization of an external authority to 
make sure they comply with the national objectives and the country’s legislation. Thus, in this regard, 
autonomy is not completely enjoyed, as so is the case of the semi autonomous institutions, which also need 
this approval, as it is important that they also comply with the national higher education legislation and 
strategy. 
Nevertheless, regarding the institutions’ leadership structures, the private sector enjoys a greater 
degree of autonomy as it can decide freely the arrangement of its governing bodies, the members of these 
bodies, the periodicity of the positions, and the internal rules and procedures to name its authorities. 
Moreover, they can appoint or dismiss the institution’s authority without accountability to an external 
authority. In other words, the internal government of the institution is under the internal control of its 
structures, as in any other business operated by private investors, but must follow the legislations 
established in what concerns with its relationship with society. 
In contrast, public institutions, being part of state institutions and operating with public funds, suffer 
more limitations meaning that they have to follow more rules and guidelines, specially in the composition 
and structure of their governing bodies, as well as qualifications of their members and periodicity of the 
Table 3. Degree of organizational autonomy 
From ANNEX 1 
 Public Private 
Semi 
autonomous 
Semi-
independent 
Independent 
Determine legal status Low Medium Medium 
Define internal rules and 
procedures 
Low Medium High 
Select members of executive 
board and academic bodies 
Medium High High 
Establish criteria and durability 
of leadership positions 
Low High High 
Dismiss the university’s head Low High High 
Select external members in the 
governing bodies 
Low High High 
Determine structures High High High 
Create a legal entity High High High 
Decide the orientation of its 
governance bodies 
Low High High 
Decide mission and goals Low Medium Medium 
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positions. Furthermore, even though they can select their leaders they require the external approval to 
legitimate the positions. These regulations over the governing bodies are meant to keeping the institution 
aligned to the governments’ goals but also to ensuring a harmonious relationship between the state and 
the institutional authorities, where, among them, their work is not hindered. 
Now, both staffing and academic autonomies vary considerable from public to private institutions. 
Regarding the first one, the staffing autonomy, private institutions enjoy a considerable higher degree of it, 
while public institutions face more severe restrictions. In the case of independent institutions, there seem 
to be no visible constraints regarding this issue. However, semi-independent institutions do face some 
limitations. For instance, even though they 
can select their academic staff, this has to 
comply with some general requirements that 
include degree level, prior experience and 
activities they have to carry out, according to 
the level of the program where they will be 
working. Hence, staffing policies are not at 
the complete disposal of the institutions, as 
they usually have to follow national 
guidelines, as well as each country’s labor laws. The established guidelines are meant to protect and ensure 
the quality of the institutions as, otherwise, any person without a university professional training could 
become an academic, resulting in a dubious quality institution, and affecting the quality of the higher 
education system as a whole. 
In contrast, public institutions face more restrictions in this regard, as their staff is composed by public 
servants or civil servants and, therefore, they are subject to the state’s accountability. Thus, public 
institutions face restrictions and external regulations to which they need to comply with when establishing 
their staffing policies, recruiting and selecting their personnel, and dismissing or promoting their staff. In 
some cases, external approval is needed for some promotions or dismissals. Additionally, salaries are not a 
single decision of the institution, as once again, the resources of the institution are public. Then, they are 
more accountable for them, for which established salary ceilings ensure the healthy finances of the 
institutions, as well as greater equity and justice in the distribution of salaries. 
Finally, the academic autonomy is 
the one that faces the most  
constraints in the private higher 
education institutions. Nonetheless, 
there is a great disparity between 
independent institutions and semi- 
independent ones. Independent 
institutions enjoy a high degree of 
academic autonomy meaning that they 
can open and close programs, and 
design their curriculum and content 
without any restrictions, including the 
need for approval from an external authority. They also face no constraints in determining their academic 
profile as well as the number of students they enroll. This is similar to semi-independent institutions, which 
also face no constraints in this regard. As private higher education institutions depend on the tuition fees to 
Table 4. Degree of staffing autonomy 
From ANNEX 1 
 Public Private 
Semi 
autonomous 
Semi-
independent 
Independent 
Recruit and select 
academic staff 
Medium Medium High 
Recruit and select 
administrative staff 
High High High 
Determine salary scales Medium High High 
Establish staffing policies Medium Medium High 
Dismiss staff Low High High 
Promote staff Medium High High 
Table 5. Degree of academic autonomy 
From ANNEX 1 
 Public Private 
Semi 
autonomous 
Semi-
independent 
Independent 
Decide the number of students Medium High High 
Determine academic profile High High High 
Open/close programs Low Low High 
Design curriculum and content High Low High 
Establish admission 
mechanisms 
Medium High High 
Design and implement quality 
assurance mechanisms 
Low Low Low 
Make research decisions High High High 
Select language of instruction High High High 
Award degrees High Low High 
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survive, if they were not able to do so they would become bankrupt. In other words, private institutions 
depend on the market needs and demands; therefore they tend to orient their academic profile to the 
interests of the market, in order to be able to attract students into the institution. 
The number of students they enroll depends basically on the capacity the institution has in both their 
infrastructure and personnel. If institutions were set a ceiling or limit of students they should enroll, there 
would be a risk that they would lose money, in the case their staff and their infrastructure were more 
expensive than the income they receive from the tuition fees. 
Basically, the only aspect that is restricted for independent institutions is the quality assurance 
mechanism, which, in most countries, is designed and implemented by external agencies either belonging 
to the government or that have been granted power by the government to monitor the quality of the 
system. This constraint in the autonomy is due in order to protect the quality of the system because, when 
the same institution is part of and judge of the processes at the same time, personal or institutional 
interests can get involved in detriment of the systems and affecting the students’ education. In addition, as 
the OECD (2003) mentions, these restrictions also help assure the labor market that their future employees 
are well prepared, avoiding an unemployment crisis. 
In this same sense, semi-independent institutions are more restricted in the academic autonomy than in 
other aspects, in order to protect the quality. Independent institutions are supposed to have gained certain 
privileges due to tradition and outstanding performance that other private institutions still do not enjoy. 
Therefore, semi-independent institutions are more controlled by the government to avoid unwanted 
behavior and protect the human right that is higher education.  
For this reason, most of these institutions cannot open and close their programs as pleasing, but need 
an external authority to approve the new programs beforehand, in order to make sure these programs 
fulfill a specific list of requirements and follow the guidelines that have been established. These 
requirements include the number of credits and hours the programs need to have according to the level, 
and the guidelines instruct how objectives, outcomes, methodologies and assessing mechanisms, among 
others, should look like. However, despite these constraints, they can select, for example, the language in 
which they want to teach their programs. 
Lastly, another important restriction these institutions face is the capacity to award their own degrees. 
While independent institutions do not need the degrees to be rectified or validated by an external 
authority, semi-independent institutions need to do so, and therefore, the degrees they issue enjoy no 
validity if they are not signed and recognized by the external authority. This to ensure that the institution is 
approved and recognized by the state, and that operates legally and in accordance with the established 
requirements. This is, then, a form of control that guarantees the distinction and the legitimacy of 
institutions that operate in violation of the law.  
As can be seen, autonomous public institutions enjoy a greater degree of autonomy in this regard. 
Although in general, they are also subject to quality assurance by external agents and to the recognition 
and approval of new programs or their closures, public institutions are able to design their curriculum and 
decide on their content without having to fulfill specific requirements or having to follow some guidelines. 
Additionally, they grant their own degrees without the need for these to be recognized or approved by the 
state, as they are already part of the state’s system, and therefore have its backing.  
As in the case of private institutions, public ones are able to determine their orientation, make their 
research decisions (although in both cases face indirect restrictions through funding or, in other words, 
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research is oriented through funding schemes to align with the state objectives), and determine the 
language of instructions. In contrast with private institutions, they face constraints deciding the number of 
students, and in establishing their admission mechanisms where restrains, interestingly, depend on the 
level of the studies. These restrictions are meant to protect vulnerable populations and minority sectors by 
ensuring more accessibility to the higher education system. 
As Bernasconi (2011) points out, the main difference between the autonomy of the private and public 
institutions lies down in the fact that, while public institutions tend to be born autonomous, private ones 
acquire autonomy through time, by becoming independent institutions. This means that private institutions 
are granted autonomy, and generally this comes with time, while for public institutions is easier to get it, as 
sometimes they are even born being autonomous. 
In conclusion, private higher education institutions seem to enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than the 
public ones due to the private nature of the institutions, making it more difficult to control some of its 
dimensions. These institutions enjoy more freedom in establishing their leadership structures and in the 
use of their resources, but face limitations in the academic autonomy and the aspects of the other 
autonomies that overlap with it. Hence, they have to comply with a series of requirements for designing 
curriculum and recruiting academic staff, to mention some, and they need external approval for other 
issues like granting degrees or opening new programs. In other words, their main restrictions are meant to 
protect the quality of education (academic autonomy), and to avoid that education becomes a million 
dollar business where its essence gets lots (financial autonomy). 
Next, the regulatory instruments will be delved for a better understanding of why it is necessary to 
intervene in the autonomy of higher education institutions and what are the mechanisms to be used for 
this purpose. 
 
II. 3 Regulations 
II. 3.1 Public policies and their instruments 
Regulations have been less studied specifically on the field of higher education, in contrast with the 
concept of autonomy where scholars have developed a substantive literature in the specificity of autonomy 
in field. This requires a broader study, starting from the concept of public policies to dismantle the term 
and unveil the particularities of the instruments used to regulate higher education institutions.  
In this sense, public policy can be widely understood as a series of actions designed and implemented by 
a government (Cochran, Meyer, Carr & Cayer, 2009); a series of rules and norms that aim to solve a 
problem or to achieve a specific goal (Kraft & Furlong, 2013) of general interest for the whole population or 
for its vast majority (Torjman, 2005). In other words, public policies are a series of activities or processes 
that have been designed by the government to achieve a specific aim that concerns to a population or a 
segment of that population. In order to reach the goal, they are usually accompanied by a legal framework 
that reinforces its implementation. 
Lowi and Ginsburg define public policies as “an officially expressed intention backed by a sanction, 
which can be a reward or a punishment. […] a law, a rule, a statute, an edict, a regulation or an order” 
(Fischer, Miller & Sidney, 2007, p. XIX) elaborated by the legislative power and launched by the public 
administration (Wilson, 1887) to solve the problems that are presented (Anderson, 2010). In other words, a 
rule created by the government that uses sanctions or rewards to influence the behavior of a population 
(Lowi, 1985), but for Simeon (1976) they are not exclusively made to solve a problem. To put it differently, 
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public policies are governmental actions that materialize through different instruments10 and that pursue a 
specific objective, which sometimes might be to solve a problem, while other times may only be to improve 
the living conditions. 
Because of the above, public policies are distinguished by being inscribed in a context. Namely, Kraft and 
Furlong (2013) point out that they are created in and for a specific social, economical, political and cultural 
context that, although this context does not determine them it does have an influence on them. Therefore, 
what works in a context might not have the same positive impact in another one. 
According to Simeon (1976) public policies have three dimensions. The scope or the extent to which one 
thing is of public interest; the means or the way in which the policy is enforced; and finally, the distribution 
or the allocation of the resources. Therefore, public policies deal with aspects that go beyond the private 
aspect of a human being, where choices and responsibilities correspond only to a particular person, and 
thus, their degree of compulsion varies accordingly. In other words, some policies imply total compliance 
while, for others, compliance is voluntary. Also, they can either distribute resources to different extents, or 
they can constrain them. 
Public policies result from a decision-making process (Sharma, 2016; Torjman, 2005), and involve the 
integration of different actors and elements (Velásquez, 2009), making them very complex (Sharma, 2016). 
In fact, the process of planning and implementing public policies is called governance (Mayntz, 2006). To 
put it differently, policies are born from a dialogue between experts, law makers, politicians and the 
society, that is raised up after identifying the specific problem that is aimed to be solved; a dialogue that 
needs to consider a great number of formal and informal elements, including the values of the population 
involved, as well as a compilation of the available information of the problem, to explore and analyze all the 
possible solutions that can be implemented; a dialogue that ends, as far as possible, with a consensual 
decision that is reflected in the laws and that will be implemented soon. 
As can been seen, the process of making public policies is quite complex, and to this it is added the 
diversity of public policies that exist today, and that have been developed over time. Lowi (1985) proposes 
a simple classification that allows having a broad panorama of these types: distributive policies, regulatory 
policies, redistributive policies and constituent policies. It can be observed that the sanctions and the scope 
of the population represent the differentiating elements of the policies, which constitute important aspects 
to understand, in a later stage of this research, the regulatory instruments. Nevertheless, in broad terms, 
regulatory policies are policies that are individually targeted and are usually accompanied by a sanction. In 
other words, these impose obligations, and hence, sanctions if not followed. 
 Regulatory policies are designed for specific populations, which means that they seek to solve problems 
that are incumbent on certain actors of society. Therefore, they do not apply to everyone, but are exclusive 
to a segment of the population. Moreover, due to their nature of imposers of obligations, to ensure 
compliance they are accompanied by a sanction. Thus, there is a penalty that needs to be fulfilled or 
covered when not complying with the law. 
Now, to add to its complexity, public policies are composed of a series of elements or different parts 
that are connected. Authors like Velásquez (2009) and Hall (1993) have studied these elements of the 
public policies. First, public policies pursue a purpose; the purpose refers to the goal or aim that it is 
intended to achieve with the public policy. Then, they use instruments or objects and resources in their 
implementation. Also, they consider the setting or the context. To say it in another way, they consider the 
                                                     
10 Legislation, regulations, taxes, or subsides, among others. 
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past experiences and the available information of the problem when deciding on the instruments. Finally, 
they are evaluated or assessed to identify the strengths and the areas of opportunities of the policies. 
Stewart, Hedge, and Lester (2008) stress the importance of the evaluation, as it is fundamental in order to 
make the necessary adjustments that will lead to the desired results. Namely, evaluation and the 
subsequent readjustment of the policy are essential for the success or the failure of the policy. 
As it has been pointed out, instruments are an important element of the public policies because they 
indicate the how and the with what, pointing out the methodology and the objects and elements that 
support the process. Instruments make the public policies concrete as Lascoumes and Simard (2011) assert, 
to such a degree that it can be concluded that without them, the objective would not be reached. 
Understanding the instruments allows a greater comprehension of how governments operate and what 
distinctions exist among them.  
However, again, it is a convoluted task because its study has taken place from different perspectives, to 
the extent that Bressers and O’Tool (1998) claim that the diverse typologies and ways of understanding the 
instruments seem to be constantly overlapping, and in many cases incompatible. This diversity, to some 
extent, has evolved as policy instruments have been developed by both economists and political science 
actors (Howlett, 2005), and by the fact that the state has grown and developed considerably in the last 
couple of years (Le Galès, 2011). As the study of the instruments and their typologies is a research subject 
in itself, it is not intended here to make an exhaustive analysis of these, but to have a varied and complete 
panorama that allows a later understanding of the concept of regulations, since these are a particular kind 
of the instruments. In this way, for a better understanding, Hood's classification will be taken as the guide 
to understand what instruments are. 
Hence, Hood (2007) argues that there are three main perspectives from which the instruments that 
make up public policies have been studied: instruments understood by their “instrumentality” or nature, 
instruments understood as institutions, and instruments understood as tools. Let’s delve a little into each 
of these understandings. 
 
II. 3.1.1 Instruments as tools 
The theory of the instruments understood as tools, has been developed by authors like Linder and 
Peters, Howlett, and Bressers and O’Tool. In general terms, they consider instruments as the key element 
between the objective of the policy and its achievement. Therefore, the criteria for choosing the 
instrument are extremely important.  
For these authors, policy instruments are devices, mechanisms and tools that the government uses to 
reach its goals and direct the behavior of a population (Howlett, 2009, 2005, 1991; Linder & Peters, 1989; 
Bressers & O’Tool, 1998). Paraphrasing, instruments are a fundamental part of the policy design, as they 
constitute the method or the apparatus that enables the consecution of the purpose. Hence, they involve, 
to some extent, the authoritarian use of power exerted by the government.  
Policy instruments depend on the preference of choice of policymakers (Howlett, 2009, 1991; Bressers 
& O’Tool, 1998). In other words, the perception that the policy makers have of the instrument and their 
preferences, as well as the nature of the institution, is what determines both if it will be used or not, and 
which expectations should be there (Linder & Peters, 1989). Hence, familiarity with the instruments 
becomes key to the success or the failure of the policy. Therefore, instrument choices are subjective rather 
than objective because they depend on the people that make the decisions. Instruments are selected from 
a wide variety of options; from a list or catalogue; hence the policymakers are the center of the policy 
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design as selecting the instrument is their most important responsibility. Therefore instruments are 
classified according to their perspective of their instrumentality, which refers to their precision, intrusion, 
costs, coerciveness, and complexity to be administered.  
When instruments are seen as a tool, they are understood as mechanisms selected from an inventory or 
toolkit according to the context and policymakers preferences, who tend to weight the cost-efficiency and 
the risk of the implementation’s failure. From this perspective, the instruments are supported by a legal 
framework to achieve a specific goal that concerns to a certain population. These mechanisms provide or 
constrain a resource through enhancing or limiting the freedom of the group of people. During their 
implementation, the community can take an active role in the achievement of the goal or can remain 
inactive, depending also in the role of the government. All the instruments involve a risk for the 
government that designs and implements them, as the reactions of the population might be against the 
policy.  
 
II. 3.1.2 Instruments for their instrumentalities 
From the perspective of the theory of instruments understood as instrumentalities or, to put it 
differently, by their nature, instruments are diverse and need to be careful coordinated to achieve the 
expected results or the purpose of the policy. This theory overlaps in many ways with the first one, because 
some authors start form the point that instruments are tools, as it will be seen. In other words, it 
constitutes an extension of the previous theory. The theory of instruments understood by its nature has 
been developed by authors like Hood and John. 
For this perspective, instruments are presented as a toolkit (Hood & Margetts, 2007; John 2006, 2011), 
as they are indeed tools. Nonetheless, in order for these tools to be clearly understood, they suggest a 
classification by its nature. On one hand, Hood and Margetts (2007) propose a classification structured as a 
dichotomy: instruments for detecting and instruments for effecting. As the name implies, the detectors are 
meant to identify and get information, while the effectors seek to make an impact. In other words, some 
instruments recognize and uncover the data from the environment while the others are responses and 
consequences from an action. Here we can find a difference with Hood’s (2007) first perspective of 
instruments as tools, as in this case instruments are analyzed according to the role of the state. 
On the other hand, John (2006; 2011) distinguishes three different natures of the instruments: top down 
(legal instruments or laws and regulations and financial like public spending and taxation), internal to the 
state (the organizational aspect of the government like bureaucracy, public administration and institutions), 
and non-standard (personal instruments like information, deliberation and networks). To explain it 
differently, the author describes the mechanisms into three groups: those that direct the people’s actions, 
encouraging or penalizing their behaviors, those who structure the power to excerpt influence in the way of 
acting, and those who persuade to achieve a desired objective. 
 
II. 3.1.3 Instruments as institutions 
Authors like Foucault, Lascoumes, and Le Galès have developed the theory of instruments understood 
as institutions. The conception of instruments as institutions is part of the philosophy of Foucault, whose 
work in the analysis of the relationship between the state and its population is the forerunner of this 
theory. For Foucault (1988) the relationship between the state and its people becomes systematical, as it is 
molded throughout the perceptions, both positive and negative, that the people build from their 
experiences and from the historical information they have of the government institutions. In other words, 
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the technologies for governing or the instruments develop through and from this relationship between 
actors, where shared values and perceptions get attached. This systematization becomes important as it 
builds a correlation among society members: policymakers and people, and it is the main instrument 
needed to carry out the state’s intervention when solving a problem. Instruments are fundamental for 
reorienting these behaviors and perceptions. 
Starting from Foucault’s philosophy, Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007) understand policy instruments as “a 
device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those 
it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries” (p. 4). In other words, policy 
instruments are more than mechanisms or tools because they encompass the values and the perceptions of 
both the state and its target population.  
Thus, Le Galès (2011) also sees policy instruments as the mechanisms that direct the relationship 
between a government and its population. They are also a source of power that influences these 
relationships. In this sense, it is important to acknowledge that they might privilege a group of people while 
constraining another group. To put it differently, policy makers might pick a problem to solve, over another 
that is more important because it might be more convenient to their own purposes. Hence, instruments are 
undoubtedly knowledge, or to be more precise, knowledge about how to control a social group when 
exercising the power. As Lascoumes and Simard (2011) conclude, instruments are institutions that seek to 
reinforce the power of the authority. 
In contrast with the other theories, for this perspective, the way power is executed and its relationship 
with the population are the criteria for identifying the different instruments. Instruments involve values 
and perceptions they cannot be picked from the toolkit box as the previous authors suggest; on the 
contrary, each of them is particular and corresponds to the characteristics of the power relationship of the 
particular context. Thus, international and national actors play an important role in the selection of the 
instruments. 
In summary, instruments, seen as institutions, are a combination of different elements and not only an 
isolated technical device. They are institutions that enable the execution of the policy to achieve the 
expected purposes. Instruments, hence, are more complex as they result from the relationship of power 
between the policymakers or government leaders and the people, to ensure the order of the society. They 
are dynamic and not static. 
 
II. 3.1.4 Contrasting the different theories 
As can be seen, the conceptualization and classification of the public policies’ instruments is diverse, and 
depends from the perspective the author takes to make the analysis. There are countless other 
classifications, however, it is believed that the previous work presents the necessary basis to understand 
the instruments that the regulations represent. 
The following Table 6 “Classification of instruments according to the different perspectives” comprises a 
comparative synthesis of the previous analysis. The terms used by the authors are reflected in the chart, as 
well as it is important to mention that the role of the state is based on the classification of Le Galès (2011), 
although the competitive state is added to understand the other authors’ classification, and John’s (2006; 
2011) comparison of facility of introduction and effectiveness are included, adding the information to the 
classification that is not considered by the author. 
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Table 6. Classification of instruments according to the different perspectives 
 
 
State’s role 
Perspective from which instruments are understood 
Example of instruments 
Degree of 
coercivity 
Degree of 
effectiveness 
Facility to 
introduce 
As tools As institutions As instrumentalities 
Linder and 
Peters (1989) 
Howlett 
(2009) 
Le Galès (2011) 
Hood and 
Margaretts 
(2007) 
John (2006; 2011) 
Social 
guardian 
Regulations Legal 
Legislative and 
regulatory 
Authority 
Top 
down 
Legal 
Legislation, laws, rules, 
regulations, tariffs, fines, 
imprisonment, licenses, user 
changes, quotas, court rulings 
+ Coercive 
Weak High 
Redistributive 
state 
Expenditure  
Economic and 
fiscal 
Treasure Financial 
Public spending, taxation, 
grants, subsides, transfers, 
loans, funding plans, land 
allocations 
 Weak Medium 
Competitive 
state 
Public 
ownership 
State’s 
organization 
 Organization 
Organizational or 
internal to the 
state 
Public administration, 
bureaucracy 
 
Medium Medium 
Pensions, social security, 
unemployment insurance, 
and rent controls 
High Weak 
Corporations, institutions and 
public enterprises 
Market state  Market 
Best practices 
and standards 
  
Contracts, subsides, auctions, 
taxes, downsizing, penalties, 
deregulation, and 
privatization 
 Medium Medium 
Audience 
democracy 
Exhortation  
Agreement and 
incentive based 
 
Non-standard or 
personal 
instruments 
Advice, training, reports, 
education, surveys 
 
Medium High 
Information and 
communication 
Information 
Information, deliberation, 
speeches, conferences, 
advisory, and research 
 
Network 
system 
  
Networks, associations and 
services 
Weak Medium  
Private     Self-regulation - Coercive High  
Table elaborated by the author based on the information presented above. 
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From the table it can be seen that even though names vary from one author to another, they coincide in 
most of the instruments’ classification, according to the roles the sate plays. The first major group, to which 
all the authors refer even from different perspectives, is the legal one, which is precisely the one where the 
regulations correspond. Although the terminologies are diverse and constantly overlapping, it can be 
observed that this kind of instruments is precisely where the authors agree that the state excerpt the most 
authority, as their degree of coercivity is the highest. Hence, this implies that sanctions are used when not 
complying with the government’s will, because, as noted, some examples of instruments are fines and 
imprisonments. Other examples of instruments are laws and rules, meaning that there is a legal framework 
or collective contract that indicates the desired behavior and the sanctions that follow if it is not met. 
Also, an interesting point concerns to the effectiveness and the facility of introduction of the 
instrument. In this particular case, it can be seen that these legal instruments are very easy to introduce, in 
comparison with other instruments like the institutions, but their effectiveness tends not to be very strong; 
that is, its impact can be questioned, as sometimes they can be ineffective. 
The analysis of the rest of the table will not be carried out at this moment because it is not the topic of 
this investigation, but it is available to the reader to interpret it. The table delivers an introduction to the 
subject of regulations in order to proceed next with a detailed analysis of them. However, before moving 
on, it is important to conclude that instruments vary according to the interpretation that the different 
authors make of them. Policy instruments are influenced by different actors, goals, networks and issues 
that take place in a specific territory, as well as by the political system that has been established (Linder & 
Peters, 1989). They vary from one country to another (Howlett, 2009), change over time (Lascoumes & Le 
Galès, 2007), and interact among each other, resulting on a very hazy mix (Howlett, 2005; 2009). Therefore, 
all these aspects allow and increment the interpretations that have been made to the conceptualization of 
the instruments letting see that they are an essential element that is fundamental to policy design. 
Consequently, the quid is how these instruments are coordinated in the system to achieve the desired 
objectives and to solve the problems for which they are being implemented, as their application depends 
directly on the authority that selects them. 
 
II. 3.2 Regulations as a type of instrument 
As has been said before, regulations are a particular kind of policy instruments used by governments to 
impose a mandate11. Since the rise of the regulatory state, as Gilardi and Maggetti (2011) and Malyshev 
(2002) mention, regulations have become even more relevant than before in the study of politics as they 
have turned out to be one main form of governance. 
Regulations are a normative device characterized for being highly coercive, as it is through them the 
state excerpts the most authority. Regulations are described by Howlett (2009) as the use of a legal 
authority to assure there is compliance. In other words, regulations are supported by a legal framework. 
Hence, in many cases, they are often accompanied by financial sanctions or even imprisonment (Lowi, 
1985; Bresser & O’Tool, 1998; Howlett, 2011). Namely, regulations impose obligations that have to be 
fulfilled by the target population, and they involve sanctions if there are not followed.  
 For this reason, for both Bresser and O’Tool (1998) regulations are directive or coercive mechanisms, as 
the objective of the government is to control the behavior of a specific sector of the population, limiting 
their freedom. Regulations indicate a way of acting, based on the government’s objectives (Howlett, 2011). 
                                                     
11 Usually, governments combine these instruments (Le Galès, 2011). 
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For the author they are commands that control a population’s actions. To put it differently, the state 
determines a compulsory manner of conducting for target populations, aligned to its objectives, and uses 
regulations to assure the corresponding actions. In many cases a penalty is endorsed to ensure the 
behavior. However, despite the sanctions, regulations are based on respect and cooperation, as Selznick 
(1985) mentions. Therefore they are not intended to be hostile, but to safeguard a common interest. Thus, 
they are, in a way, more an intentional intervention than a banning (Koop & Lodge, 2017); a direct 
involvement where standards are set, actions and compliance are monitored, and sanctions followed when 
the law is violated. To say it with another words, regulations are acts of protection, and therefore, they are 
always present, even though sometimes one might no be completely aware of them. 
Regulations are a set of rules that aim to influence behaviors while constraining other ways of acting 
that are considered undesirable. For Cohn (2011) laws are the essence of the regulatory policy, they are the 
“apex of the regulatory pyramid” (Fielden, 2008, p. 9); in other words, they are a central part of the 
regulations. Laws regulate in many single ways; they establish procedures for opening new businesses, they 
structure formal work relationships, and they delimit power, among others, to control organizations 
(Bernasconi, 2011). However, not all legal frameworks are a regulation, as Selznick (1985) points out, nor all 
the ways of social control exercised by the state. Black (2002) even mentions that regulations are “less than 
law” (p. 23), meaning that the law or the rules are only an instrument for the regulations, but they are also 
“more than law” (p. 25) as regulations are broader than a set of rules. Nonetheless, the clearest distinction 
between both terms is made by Cohn (2011) when asserting that regulations can be voluntary while the 
law must always be obeyed. 
In other words, regulations are not just rules, they refer to different mechanisms that intend a specific 
and directed control, relatively permanent over a period of time, that might be either voluntary or 
mandatory; they consist on different tools, like incentives and contracts that are applied and guarded by a 
specific state authority (Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, 2012; Selznick, 1985). Hence there is a specific body that 
ensures that the regulation is followed, and different mechanisms are used to regulate the diverse actions. 
Regulations, then, are established by the government, generally by one of the Ministries, by a recognized 
body or by an independent agency, whose authority has been granted by the state, in a delegation of a 
particular task. 
In this sense, this research is centered on this regulation, the state’s regulations because, as Black (2002) 
points out, even though most research has been done at the state level, regulations take place at different 
levels, going beyond the state’s scope. To put it differently, the regulations can either be at an internal level 
or at an external (Higher Education Commission, 2013), meaning that the private sector internally also 
regulates itself. 
At the state level, the regulatory bodies might combine actors from the government or from the society, 
as Black (2002) asserts, who work together and intertwine their actions for the achievement of the goals. In 
other words, regulations involve two sides, or a power relationship as Koop and Lodge (2017) identify. On 
one hand, the regulatory body exercises the power, while on the other hand, the regulated population 
complies. However, the regulatory body is not exclusively formed by state workers; on the contrary, in 
some cases, self-regulatory associations have an important role in helping the state regulate the system. 
Thus, roles vary from one situation to another, according to the aspect that is being regulated, but 
interactions are always interdependent.  
From another perspective but in a similar way, Dunsire (1993) defines regulations as instruments used 
by the government to correct a deviation. Therefore, if the actions of the target population were not 
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rectified, the objectives established by the policymaker would not be met. Then, regulations are issued to 
ensure that the proscribe way of acting is being followed. To say it with other words, in some cases the 
desired behavior would not be followed voluntarily and therefore the regulation is needed to assure the 
coveted action.  
In short, up to this point it can be said that regulations can be understood as focused state interventions 
that are framed by legal norms and that use different tools to assure compliance, with the aim of 
controlling specific behaviors of the society. Nevertheless, in a more positive way, the Higher Education 
Commission (2013) of the United Kingdom, perceives regulations not only as mechanisms to assure 
compliance or enforce of behaviors, but as tools that encourage improvement, driving or directing actions 
to best practices. Namely, regulations lead the way into the most effective way of action, from which the 
most possible positive results will emerge. Similarly, Floud (2005) asserts that regulations today, in market-
economy driven countries, pursue the purpose of granting more power to the people. To put it differently, 
regulations are not meant to constrain but to indicate the best way of acting that, in the long run, benefits 
society the most. Once again, regulations are meant to protect. 
As can be seen, one aspect for which regulations are understood in different ways derives from the 
diverse objectives that the government has when implementing a regulation. Regulations, in many ways, 
are issued to protect consumers from the failures of the market (Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, 2012) or for 
distributing the risk (Black, 2002). This means that they are prescribed to avoid monopolies, to refrain 
businesses from taking advantage of consumers, to protect quality, to promote information flow, but 
foremost and most important, to safeguard public goods and human rights, like it is the case of higher 
education.  
 
II. 3.2.1 Different regulatory mechanisms 
Regulations can be found in many different fields like the economical, the legal, the political, the 
organizational and the social and the personal ones, and they operate too, in different levels. Nonetheless, 
they are also, at the same time, a mixture of economical, legal and managerial principles as Malyshev 
(2002) mentions. Both Howlett (2011) and Koop and Lodge (2017) distinguish, for instance, between the 
direct government regulation and the indirect regulation. However, Howlett (2011) explores it in detail. For 
the author, the direct government regulations clearly constrain and control; to put it differently, they are 
commands imposed by the government that are precise and sharply established. These include legal 
instruments and independent regulatory commissions. On the other hand, the indirect government 
regulations are mechanisms where control is pursued through means where the government does not 
interfere, or its intervention is very slight and almost unperceivable.  These include the delegated 
professional regulation and the voluntary regulation. 
Table 7 “Classification of regulatory mechanisms” compares the most common instruments that are 
used today to regulate. The table is based on the findings of Howlett (2011), Cohn (2011), Gilardi and 
Maggetti (2011), and Malyshev (2002) but it includes some analysis points suggested by Koop and Lodge 
(2017), like the regulator. The table starts from the nature of the intervention, based on the role the 
government plays in each mechanism, and analyzes the four main types of regulatory instruments 
mentioned above. Also, the table shows that these instruments are intertwined and that, although the 
application of all is not needed at the same time to operate efficiently, operating by themselves would 
hardly lead to reach the desired objectives. In other words, two or more regulatory mechanisms are usually 
coordinated for the successful public policy implementation. 
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Table 7. Classification of regulatory mechanisms 
Nature of 
intervention  
regulatory 
instruments 
Types of 
regulatory 
instruments 
Description Instruments Regulator Costs Efficiency  
Direct Legal 
instruments 
Laws and rules that direct 
behavior. In other words they 
establish the rights and the 
obligations of a particular 
population or segment of the 
population. 
N
at
io
n
al
 
Constitution Public 
  
 
Low costs when 
the law is 
emitted, but the 
implementation 
costs can be 
expensive. 
Depends of the people’s good will 
and the level of legitimacy of the 
body that issues the law.  
Hence, usually need reinforcement 
to work, like agencies, patrols, 
guards, police, and courts. 
Statutes 
Ratified international agreements 
Secondary legislation: orders and decrees 
Contracts, treaties, licenses, franchises 
Judicial decisions  
In
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 Transnational conventions and agreements 
International law 
International court judicial decisions 
Independent 
regulatory 
commissions 
Many different specialized 
bodies established and 
administered by the government 
by issuing a status that 
delineates their power and 
responsibilities.  
Ministerial departments Public Expensive Depends on the level legitimization 
of the commission. Efficiency 
declines if the commission has 
been associated with corruption or 
other scandals.  
More transparency, more 
efficiency. 
Ministerial agencies 
Independent advisory bodies 
Independent regulatory authority Ex: industry, 
commerce and trade, consumer protection, food, 
finance, etc. 
Indirect Delegated 
professional 
regulation 
Different bodies composed by 
representatives of a profession, 
to whom the government has 
transferred authority to regulate 
aspects related to a discipline or 
a practice. 
Many different bodies, according to the 
professional fields. The number varies from 
one country to another. Some examples: 
layers, doctors, etc. 
Private or 
semi-
public 
Low costs They enjoy a higher degree of 
legitimacy so they tend to be more 
efficient. Nevertheless, they can 
also be surrounded by corruption 
scandals, hurting their efficiency. 
Voluntary 
regulation 
Self-regulation. Regulation 
without the need of creating 
agencies, as it is mainly market 
based. 
Compliance plans Private Low costs Difficult, it depends on the 
government’s capacity to persuade 
a population to conform. There is a 
degree of government intervention 
needed in order for these 
mechanisms to work. 
Regulatory exemption programs 
Government-industry negotiated agreements 
Certification 
Challenge programs 
Design partnerships 
Standards auditing and accounting  
Codes of conduct 
Table elaborated by the author based on the findings of Howlett (2011), Cohn (2011), Gilardi and Maggetti (2011) and Malyshev (2002). 
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At a first glance, the table gives the impression that the legal mechanisms are the most explored and 
diversified ones, a fact that could be due to being considered, by excellence, the traditional regulatory 
mechanisms. In fact Cohn (2011) mentions that there is a belief that regulations were, at first, only 
composed by laws. Although the table does not allow it to be appreciated, the role of the legal framework 
in regulations has been commented on repeatedly in this research, to such an extent that authors such as 
Selznick (1985) and Black (2002) have made the distinction between both: the regulation and the law. This 
fact clearly gives the impression that these instruments tend to be the most used by the governments 
when controlling a behavior. Nevertheless, what the table does allow is to have a clearer understanding of 
this regard. On the one hand, it is observed that they are low cost instruments, without considering their 
implementation costs, since they only need to be written by the legislative body or be dictated by the 
judicial authority. On the other hand, it is appreciated that they constitute the basis or support of other 
regulatory bodies, as they tend to be inefficient if they are applied alone. That is, the legal instruments 
provide the bases, structure, operating rules and the justification of existence of the other regulatory 
mechanisms. In other words, other instruments are required to enforce and execute the law, as well as to 
sanction when their authority is violated. 
The table also allows contrasting and comprehending two regulatory mechanisms that are partly similar 
but that indeed have notable differences: the independent regulatory commissions and the delegated 
professional regulation. The nature of the government’s intervention in both mechanisms is different, 
meaning that authority is shared by both the government and the private sector, but both instruments 
appear to be similar by the fact that the government delegates authority to regulate. In the first case, the 
independent regulatory commissions, authority is delegated to an independent group that, even though it 
depends economically on the government, it has a certain degree of autonomy in its execution and 
administration, in order to protect from political and private interests. To put it differently, the 
independent regulatory commissions are intermediaries between the government and the target 
population that is being regulated, while in the second case, the delegated professional regulation, the 
authority is completely delegated to the experts in the topic, letting act with a high degree of autonomy. 
For its nature, as this last group does not depend entirely on the government, the costs that it generates 
are lower.  
On the contrary, the creation, implementation and execution of the independent bodies represent a 
considerable expense for the government, since all expenses are made with public money. From their 
degree of effectiveness it is observed that both are highly effective as long as they are transparent and 
accountable, because the corruption scandals damage their authority affecting the legitimacy of the body. 
In many occasions, and especially in the case of the independent regulatory commissions, these are 
established to achieve the legitimacy that the government has already lost, and that is needed to be able to 
regulate an issue. However, governments have recently increased dramatically the number of these 
commissions as they have turned out to be an easy solution to the problem, affecting the legitimization and 
credibility of this regulatory instrument and losing its efficiency. 
Regarding this issue, it is interesting to note that their decision making power has become relevant 
today politically speaking, as the number, of independent regulatory commissions has tended to increase 
(Gilardi & Maggetti, 2011; Malyshev, 2002). This means that decisions are taken, more than ever before, by 
a group of people that has been appointed by the government officials, and not by democratized elections. 
On a later stage of this research it will also be seen the impact of the delegated professional regulation in 
the Mexican private higher education landscape and their repercussion aggravating the problem of the 
proliferation of low quality institutions. 
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In a most recent way, Malyshev (2002) mentions that some countries have already established central 
oversight bodies, which regulate regulators, oversighting the good implementation of the regulatory policy. 
This has not been included to the table, as they operate in the different countries at diverse levels and with 
different power attributions making it difficult to generalize. 
Finally, the mechanisms that vary the most are those of self-regulation that, although it is seen that by 
their nature they do not need further support, they are not always followed by the population. In other 
words, the fact that they are voluntary affects their efficiency. It can be seen that the negotiations 
constitute an instrument of these regulatory mechanisms that might be well followed by both sectors 
because several things might be at the stake for both if not followed; but above all, certification is the 
mechanism that would like to be highlighted now, due to its relevance to the topic of higher education, 
where, it is commonly used to assure quality. In many contexts, but specifically the case of Mexico, quality 
assurance is a voluntary regulatory mechanism, that generates low costs for the government, but whose 
efficiency is also not what is desired (Cuevas, 2011b; González, 2012). This topic will be explored later, but 
mentioning it now helps to begin drawing and understanding the particular Mexican situation. 
In short, the instruments seem to be simpler than they are, but deep down they are not so simple, as 
can be seen. Each one has particularities that serve different purposes but, at the same time, they are 
intertwined; therefore, a healthy regulatory system needs the combination of these mechanisms in a 
strategically way, in order to achieve the objectives for which the public policy has been implemented, and 
to efficiently protect the public good and the human rights. 
To add complexity to the matter, regulations take place at the federal or regional level, depending on 
each country’s decisions (Fielden & Varghese, 2009), and are also influenced by the different actors, goals, 
networks and issues that take place in a specific territory, as well as by the political system that has been 
established in a particular time (Linder & Peters, 1989; Hall, 1993; Howlett, 2009; Lascoumes & Le Galès, 
2007). Therefore they vary from one country to another and change over time. Before, they used to be 
more functionalist; today they are mainly used to increase the capacity of governments to govern or guide 
(Mayntz, 1993).  
As can be seen, for a regulatory instrument to work, a large number of elements must be conjugated, or 
it must have certain specific characteristics that are often difficult to achieve because the results vary from 
one context to another, making it difficult to predict what is most of the times unpredictable. The intention 
of the policymaker can be good when trying to solve the problem, but in many cases the policy might turn 
inefficient or immeasurable, or even unfair in the practice, or it simply leads to a greater inequality in the 
distribution of some specific good, making the policy fail and leading to having to re-create another policy. 
However, considering these criteria while designing the policy helps avoid some problems. 
 
II. 3.2.2 Failure of regulatory instruments 
Bresser and O’Tool (1998) and Linder and Peters (1989) agree that many times policy instruments do 
not contribute to reduce or eradicate the problem for which they were created. Sometimes, as Hall (1993) 
mentions, unplanned events occur overpassing the dealing capacity. That is to say, that in many occasions 
there are events that could not have been planned at the time of making the public policy, and that can 
interrupt or damage the execution of the policy. Therefore, the expected results are not obtained. To 
mention an example, a natural disaster might have a great effect in a policy instrument. 
Notwithstanding, for Bresser and O’Tool (1998) policy failure is due to the fact that policy instruments 
are usually chosen according to the politicians’ favorite kind of instruments instead of their effectiveness 
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and capacity to be implemented, or they choose them to hide certain objectives that the elites want to 
achieve and otherwise would not be accepted, as Le Galès (2011) points out. Also electoral objectives take 
part in the choices of instruments as Lascoumes and Simard (2011) explain. In other words, many times the 
one that should be the main objective of a policy, like the preservation of a pubic good or a human right, 
goes below the personal interests of the politician who makes the law. Therefore, the design, 
implementation and monitoring of a public policy are left apart running in a superficial way, which often 
only contributes to aggravating, in the long term, the social problems. 
Also, when deciding on regulations, there are many assumptions as Dunsire (1993) and Elmore (1987) 
suggest that can lead to the failure of the policy. Elmore identifies (1987) these assumptions: first it is 
assumed that the behavior, without the regulation, will be contrary to the one that is desired; therefore, 
the establishment of a framework that regulates the conduct is needed. In this sense other policy 
instruments that are more persuasive are discarded, since they are perceived as insufficient to modify the 
behavior (Hand, 2012). Second, it is assumed that everyone for whom the regulation is created should 
comply with the policy instrument. Third, it is assumed that the target population has all the information 
needed to act accordingly. And fourth, that the existence of a sanction assures compliance.  
These assumptions, often done without thinking, determine the turn of a public policy, as it will be seen 
later in the case of higher education in Mexico. The policy may be well stated and justified, but the target 
population lacks the complete information it needs to follow it, to such degree that it cannot dimension 
why its compliance is necessary or the consequences of not complying at all. In other words, in many cases 
regulations are made from the perspective of policymakers without considering the opinion and the 
knowledge of the population in question and the experts in the subject, leading to undesired results. 
Nevertheless, on more technical issues, for Linder and Peters (1989) policies fail because there is a lack 
of understanding of the instruments that are chosen to reach the goals. In other cases instruments are 
chosen according to the resources that are available at the moment, despite they will be effective or not 
(Bresser & O’Tool, 1998). This could have derived, as it has been mentioned before, from considering the 
instruments merely as an option from a list, without understanding them in depth and having carried out a 
detailed analysis at the time of making the decision. Instruments need to be analyzed before deciding on 
them, considering all their possible consequences of their implementation, and if there are no convincing 
options creativity can be used to develop new instruments that could be closer to achieving the objectives. 
Also, another technical aspect is mentioned by Le Galès (2011) who points out that policy failure is 
closely related to the numerous actors that interact at the different levels of governance. That is, the 
actions and responsibilities of the actors are not entirely clear and they overlap, as it will see in the case of 
Mexico. Another issue is the lack of authority during the implementation process (Hall, 1993; Baldwin, Cave 
& Lodge, 2012) because, as it has already been seen, the lack of legitimacy of the body that executes the 
policy affects, to a large extent, the success of public policy. In other words, the good perception of the 
regulatory body is essential for the policy to succeed as well as the degree of transparency in all the 
implementation process. Here it is important to remember that policies are not only about designing them 
but also about implementing and enforcing them; that is to say that, for a favorable outcome, the 
diagnosis, planning, execution and evaluation require the same attention and follow-up from policymakers 
and policy executors. 
Finally, Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012) comment that a failure of the regulatory system might also 
derive from an overregulation or from an under regulation. Namely, overregulation refers to the excessive 
regulatory instruments implemented on a system that depletes the target population and it does not yield 
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the desired results. On the contrary, under regulation means that the regulatory system is so loose that 
undesired actions escape the constraint without any serious consequences. Thus, it can be seen that no 
extreme pole is good, but a balance in policy and regulatory instruments is needed for a successful 
intervention. 
In short and to put it differently, Dunsire (1993) suggests that polices are, in general, difficult to 
implement, as they are not natural, but a source of power (Le Galès, 2011). To remember, regulations are 
an intervention in order to protect a public good or a right, where there is a regulated-regulatory power 
relationship, for this reason they are, per se, complex. Hence, Howlett (2009) points out, that instrument 
choices should be carefully planned and assessed because there are crucial factors that affect the failure or 
success of the policy. Deciding on policy instruments, and more specifically on regulatory instruments, 
takes time, as analysis and reflection on their implications on each of the daily dimension is needed. 
Therefore, it cannot be rushed. 
 
II. 3.3 Regulatory instruments in higher education 
Despite the fact that higher education regulation is not a particular topic of interest for researchers in 
regulations (Black, 2015), it can be easily concluded that the regulation of higher education has different 
objectives and styles around the word. In other words, regulatory instruments in higher education vary 
from one country to another. According to Fielden and Varghese (2009) regulations begin with allowing the 
private sector to create a campus, and continue with approving its operation, authorizing their study 
programs, assuring its quality, monitoring their performance and collecting their taxes. All of the above to 
avoid fraudulent providers, protect naïve students, avoid the detriment of quality, and create a balance 
between private investment and public interest. To put it differently, control of what is happening in higher 
education is important to balance the market orientation of private providers as a country cannot base all 
its higher education system solely on the fields that are commercially attractive.  
Similarly, the Higher Education Commission (2013) agrees that regulations in higher education are 
needed to assure the sustainability of the system, the student’s experiences, the quality of the system, and 
future investments. Hence, higher education systems are regulated to protect the human right to tertiary 
education, ensuring the quality of the system and the collective interests, that may be displaced when the 
system is oriented only by the interests of the market. 
As the role of the sate has changed from provider to regulator, the legal frameworks of the countries 
have been strengthen (Mok, 2005). Therefore, the role of the state as a regulator has been emphasized, as 
previously has been seen, giving priority to its responsibility of controlling and monitoring, rather than 
granting education. In this sense, Hood (2004) classifies the different regulatory approaches used in higher 
education into four categories, while Lodge (2015) offers examples regarding the field of higher education: 
1) Oversight: monitoring and directing individuals, which in higher education can be seen in the reports 
the institutions have to deliver to the authorities, the inspections by the authorities to the 
institutions, the evaluation process that include quality assurance, and appointments done by the 
ministries. 
2) Mutuality: confronting individuals to horizontal relations, like peer review, and collegiate decision-
making. 
3) Contrived randomness: unpredictable processes like reviewing the processes of the higher education 
institutions, setting new evaluation criteria, and circulating staff. 
4) Competition: refers to actions that foster rivalry. In higher education these include rankings, and 
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competing over grants or students. 
 
As can be seen, the state carries out all these different tasks when regulating the system, as they 
complement each other. However, each country prioritizes differently each of these activities, bringing with 
them different advantages and disadvantages. While some countries exercise more the role of monitors of 
the system, others seek to regulate it through the national and international rankings that have gained 
worldwide relevance in recent years. Despite this fact, the oversight approach has become the most 
relevant in the last couple of years, as governments have tended to exercise their power through 
supervisions and inspections generating an audit explosion (Lodge, 2015). In higher education this has 
especially happened with the increase in quality assurance mechanisms, which also involve some mutuality 
activities. 
 As will be seen later, in the case of Mexico, oversight and mutuality are the roles that the state plays 
the most. These different approaches will help to understand, in a better way, the regulatory mechanisms 
used in higher education, since the approach that each country follows is decisive for the choice of 
instruments. 
Having said the above, Fielden and Varghese (2009), Floud (2005), and the Higher Education 
Commission (2013) enumerate the different elements of the higher education regulatory framework: 
1) Legislation: norms and rules that contain the obligations, rights, and minimum requirements for the 
higher education providers. 
2) Procedures for establishing private institutions: processes for temporary recognition, registration 
and accreditation. 
3) Quality assurance process. 
4) Grants and loan schemes: instruments used to attach conditions with financial resources. 
5) Procedures for reporting performance: assessment. 
 
If we contrast these mechanisms with the regulatory instruments, as it can be seen in table 8 “Specific 
regulatory mechanisms used in higher education by their classification”, most of the instruments used to 
regulate higher education are legal but, as it has been seen before, it makes good sense since they are the 
base that structures and grants power to the other mechanisms. It can also be seen that most of the 
instruments are meant for the government to exercise direct control over the system.  
 However, it is also appreciated that the quality assurance instrument exercises indirect control. This has 
been classified, at the same time, as delegated professional regulation and as voluntary regulation. On one 
hand, as delegated professional regulation because, in most cases, it is the professionals of the different 
disciplines that carry out this process. In the specific case of Mexico, as will be seen, there are several 
institutions, but all of them use the discipline-based approach to perform the task. On the other hand, as 
voluntary regulation because, generally and reiterating the case of Mexico, the quality accreditations are 
voluntary processes that grant a certificate, which provides distinction and prestige to the institution, 
increasing its legitimacy, but that are not needed to operate. 
In addition, the specific mechanisms used in the regulation of higher education can also be seen in the 
table. Hence, it can be seen that each of the umbrella instruments: legislation, financial (loans and grants) 
and quality assurance, materialize in different ways. It is observed from the table, once again, the 
predominant role of the legislation in the regulation of higher education. In other words, when it comes to 
private education, they are essential for determining which organizations are meant to be private and  
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Table 8. Specific regulatory mechanisms used in higher education by their classification  
Nature  Types of regulatory 
instruments 
Instruments Regulatory 
instruments 
used in HE12 
 
Specific mechanisms 
Direct Legal instruments 
N
at
io
n
al
 
Constitution 
Legislation 
Constitution 
Ratified 
international 
agreements 
Ratified international agreements 
General laws 
Statutes 
Decrees 
Secondary 
legislation: 
orders and 
decrees 
Specific 
norms and 
procedures  
For establishing 
institutions 
Temporary permissions or 
provisional registrations 
Registrations 
Licensing 
Authorizations 
Basic 
requirements 
checklists 
 
Infrastructure 
Resources 
Equipment 
Staffing 
Activities 
Curriculum 
Basic safety standards 
Mechanism for establishing and 
recognizing programs 
Accreditation and recognition as 
higher education institution 
Administrative procedures acts 
For carrying on 
activities 
Established guidelines 
Approvals 
Validations 
Confirmations 
Restrictions 
Ceilings 
For reporting 
performance 
Management reports 
Statistical reports on performance 
Reauthorizations  
Audits 
Accountability mechanism 
For assuring 
quality  
Recognition of degrees 
Supervision 
Contracts, 
treaties, 
licenses, 
franchises 
Grants and 
loans 
Basic funding or funding formula 
Performance based funding 
Funding schemes 
Research funds 
Vouchers 
Subsidization 
Taxes 
Independent regulatory 
commissions 
Not generally used for regulating higher education 
Indirect Delegated professional 
regulation 
Discipline-based 
professional bodies 
Quality 
assurance 
Internal quality 
assurance 
Self-regulations 
Voluntary regulation Certification 
External quality 
assurance 
Internal audits and self reports 
Peer review 
Table elaborated by the author. 
                                                     
12 Higher education. 
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which are meant to be public as Bernasconi (2011) points out. Hence, in this part of the legislation, the 
predominance of the constitutions over the other laws is appreciated, being in each country the supreme 
rule that guides to the other norms. Then international treaties are also observed, because they have 
become relevant in the field of education, influencing the systems. Specifically in Europe, the Bologna 
Process has laid the path towards which the educational policies of each country in the region are being 
oriented, in order to establish an integrated Higher Education Area. Afterwards, general education laws of 
each country are located, where the regulations for higher education can also be found. These refer to the 
specific set of rules that structure and guide the particular actions on the field of education and higher 
education. Also as a part of the legislation, the decrees issued by the executive branch, the judicial power 
or autonomous regulatory institutions, play an important role regulating higher education, as they are 
express authoritative orders or dispositions that must be complied to. 
More specifically, within the legislations, the procedures for establishing, operating, and reporting the 
institutions are found, especially when private investment is involved. As can be seen, within the 
procedures for establishing the institutions mechanisms such as temporary or provisional registrations, 
authorizations, basic requirements checklists, instruments for creating new programs, accreditation and 
recognition criteria for the institutions, and administrative procedures acts, are used. These mechanisms 
mainly concern to the administrative part, except for the creation of the new programs and the 
accreditation of the institution, which focus more on the quality, or at least that is the impression they give 
since, as will be seen later, it is not always the case. However, because they are located in the legislative 
part, it makes sense that they refer, instead, to the list of processes and requirements that must be met to 
establish an institution of higher education, indicating the respective sanctions in the case of breaking the 
law. In addition, in this part of procedures, as already mentioned, there are also the accountability 
processes that, as seen, generally take place through administrative reports, audits, and performance 
reports that monitor the daily duties and accomplishments of the institutions. Here it is important to 
mention that the procedures are materialized in diverse ways depending on each country. In the specific 
case of Mexico they are called Agreements.  
Regarding the financial regulatory instruments, these are executed through contracts and therefore also 
have legal support. Nevertheless, in this classification they have been separated from the legal mechanisms 
for a better understanding, although it must be remembered that the instruments are always intertwined, 
especially the legal ones that provide the sustenance of most of the others. Hence, the financial 
instruments mainly used in higher education are the grants and loans, and these are supported by three 
main mechanisms for allocating funds: basic funding or funding formula, performance based funding or 
funding allocated according to the achievement of set criteria, and funding schemes where negotiations 
between regulator and regulated take place. Most funding granted to private higher education institutions 
use this last mechanism, the funding scheme, as resources are given indirectly through research funds, 
scholarships, and vouchers in most of the systems. 
Finally, the quality assurance instrument takes place on two levels: inside the institution that depends 
on the internal regulations and quality parameters that are established inside, and the external evaluation, 
where an extrinsic body certifies the institution. External quality assurance accreditation is, generally, 
carried out by a delegated professional regulatory body, which requests an internal report on the quality of 
the institution based on standards previously established by the agency. This report is later reviewed on-
site by professionals of the same discipline, in a peer review scheme, to check its veracity and to finally 
decide the verdict consisting on accrediting or not the institution. 
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As it can be seen, the mechanisms used for regulating higher education are varied but not extensive; 
that is, that there are really a small number of tools which are quite similar or resemble in particular ways, 
especially the legislative ones. Although this does not interfere on its efficiency, the above is noted from 
the table’s landscape portrayal. The efficiency, as has already been mentioned depends on the adequacy of 
the instrument to the particular situation and the execution of the policy. Lastly, it is important to make the 
distinction that both financial and quality assurance instruments operate in different ways in the public and 
private sectors, not to mention that all instruments’ design and implementation varies from one country to 
another and differs according to the way they are connected to each other. 
Also, it is fundamental to mention that higher education institutions can be regulated by more than one 
system as Kogan and Hanney (2000), and Anderson and Johnson (1998) point out. Here the focus has been 
mainly on the government’s regulation, as it has been insisted throughout this research. Nevertheless, it is 
worthy to remember that higher education systems are regulated by both the governments and academics. 
The governments regulate through policy and bureaucracy, through the mechanisms already mentioned, 
while the academics regulate through the invisible hand and their own internal framework that sets the 
rules of the game. This internal regulation goes beyond internal quality assurance parameters 
corresponding to the whole self-regulatory process, which, according to Mayntz (2006) has become more 
popular with time, as the governments have implemented a deregulatory policy. Self-regulation, as the 
author describes, implies a constant negation between the involved actors, whose interests vary and may 
be opposed, to reach agreements that are of public interest. In this case, the state’s role is the one of 
supervisor. Hence, self-regulation is always regulated at the end. 
Concluding, regulating a higher education system is a complex task because it involves different edges, 
actors, tasks and perspectives, which in reality have been little studied by literature as it has been 
previously discussed. However, its study, analysis and understanding is essential to guide and develop 
healthy systems that really ensure the educational quality while preserving the public good and the human 
right that is education. As Buendía (2016) has asserted, a higher education system that lacks the proper 
regulations causes the appearance and proliferation of different types of institutions whose objective is, in 
many cases, far from the human improvement, the production of knowledge, and the extension of culture, 
the essential tasks of higher education.  
 
II. 3.4 The specificity of the regulatory policy for the private higher education  
If it has been said that regulation on higher education has not been explored in the literature, less is the 
case on the private higher education13, where a conceptualization and a framework have been missing and, 
instead, the topic has been analyzed using a methodology of case studies to understand the particular 
situation of a particular country or region, as the regulatory policy depends properly on the context and 
place of design and application. The lack of an analytical framework might be due, on one hand, to a 
generalize lack of regulatory policy, as the sector actually began developing with no restrictions from part 
of the states (Levy, 2011).  
But on the other hand, it is not distant from reality that, in many cases, the public and private sectors 
are treated in the same way, as Bernasconi (2011) asserts, as the public sector repeatedly tries to exercise 
control over the private sector in the same way as it does it to the public one, for lacking the knowledge 
and the experience on controlling this sector. Derived from the above, the state has had an important 
                                                     
13 Not to confuse with the general topic of the distinction among public and private higher education where research is more 
extensive. 
  
 
43 
impact in molding the private sector. In words of Geiger (1988), “the state also to a considerable extent 
molds the conditions of existence for private controlled institutions” (p. 700). Hence, the pressure exerted 
by the state through the regulations undoubtedly shapes the system and, in particular, the private 
institutions, generating that they become similar to the public ones. 
Therefore, it cannot be denied that the private sector, over the years, has imitated the public 
institutions, voluntarily or involuntarily, tending to isomorphism. In many cases there is a dual coercive 
tendency, on one hand from the governments, but on the other hand from society who pushes the 
institutions to look and act like the public sector in order to become legitimate (Levy, 2012). In fact, 
Bernasconi (2011) studied the differences and similarities between both sectors in the context of Latin 
America from the perspective of the legislation, to find out that even though they do not differ 
substantially, private higher education institutions suffer more constraint than public autonomous 
institutions. 
Table 9 “Differences between public and private higher education institutions from the legislative 
framework” compares both sectors according to the findings of the previous author. As can be seen from 
the table, the mission, the activities, and general requirements for both admission and graduation 
processes, are merely the same for both private and public sectors, and the Ministries of Education, federal 
and local, play an important role in the coordination of the system as a whole. In contrast, the autonomy 
capacity represents the attribute where both sectors differ substantially. Autonomy, as has been seen 
before, allows institutions to govern and organize themselves under their own criteria, making their own 
decisions about the use and the distribution of their economic and human resources, and determining their 
pedagogical action. It can be seen from the table, than being a public autonomous institution represents an 
advantage in this area, since the state tends to exert less control, specifically when it comes to the 
academic autonomy where there are more restrictions as private universities, in general, cannot grant their 
own degrees and need the authorization of the public authority for opening new programs. Constraints on 
these aspects, as Geiger (1988) mentions, include the curriculum, the degree requirements, and sometimes 
even the way the class is conducted. In other words, the academic content and the didactical methodology 
are subject to the authorization of the sate’s authority. However, the organizational autonomy, specially 
referring to deciding the way of arranging the leadership structures, suffer less constraints for private 
institutions, who can freely select their administrative design. 
To add on, as the investment of this sector is mainly private, it becomes even more difficult for the state 
to intervene and exert control as it does in public institutions where the allocation of funds depends on the 
fulfillment of the established parameters, which in many cases are oriented towards the quality of the 
system (Levy, 2011). Research funds and scholarships, which are the main means by which the state grants 
financing to private universities, do not actually lead to sufficient pressure and control, especially when 
institutions are oriented mainly towards the professionalization of the labor market rather than to 
research. In this way, financial mechanisms are rarely used in the regulation of higher education, as they 
are not as efficient as the government would like them to be. Nonetheless, Geiger (1988) points out that 
even though private institutions seem to be less restricted in the financial aspect, the fact that most of the 
times they have to be constituted as non-profit organizations represent a major limitation, specially in 
today’s world when every time the needs are greater and life is more expensive. To put it differently, with 
the specialization of knowledge, facilities and preparation and formation of academics have become 
increasingly demanding, for which in many cases the money obtained from the tuition fees is not enough to 
maintain the quality and compete with public universities, especially, when they are restricted from doing 
other activities to obtain resources, and they have to limit their options for collecting money from the 
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tuition fees and the philanthropy. This strict regulation is only meant to protect consumers. Namely, these 
constraints are meant to protect students, but sometimes can create a challenging situation for the 
institutions. 
 
Table 9. Differences between public and private higher education institutions from the legislative 
framework 
Legislation Public Private 
Mission Mission does not differ from on sector to another. Generally the mission includes: 
professionalization of the labor market, research, dissemination of knowledge, 
extension of the culture 
Activities Both sectors have to carry out the same activities: teaching, research, and the extension 
of culture 
General admission 
requirements 
Secondary studies are required to study in both sectors 
 
Graduation requirements Do not differ substantial from one sector to another, but do vary from one country to 
another. Thesis is the most common graduation requirement 
Autonomy Organizational More freedom in establishing own rules In general, even though they create 
their own rules, these need to be 
approved by the state’s authority and 
they need to be based on the ones of 
the public institutions 
A collegiate governances is expected Their form of governance is decided 
completely by the institution’s owners 
Academic Capacity to grant own degrees There are restrictions on granting 
degrees, unless full autonomy is 
achieved by the institution 
No need for approval when opening new 
programs 
Need of approval when opening new 
programs, except when full autonomy 
is enjoyed 
Organization of the system Mostly the Ministries of Education are in 
charge of the higher education system but, in 
some cases, autonomous federal universities 
can exert also some control over the system 
Corresponds to the Ministries of 
Education, either federal or local 
levels.  
Table elaborated by the author based on the findings of Bernasconi (2011). 
 
As has been seen, the amount of autonomy may not vary between sectors, public and private, but the 
form and what is restricted is different as Levy (2012) has rightly asserted. In the next section of this 
research, the relationship between autonomy and regulations will be explored in greater depth. However, 
before deepening in that subject, Levy (2011) also explores the regulations in the different types of higher 
education institutions that have already been mentioned: elite (including religious-owned institutions) and 
demand absorbing. For the two sectors, the author concludes that, in general, there is a lax regulatory 
policy, commonly engaged in the policy of laissez faire, and once again, one of the main reasons why this 
happens is precisely the weight that university autonomy has on the systems. This means that both elite 
and demand absorbing institutions are regulated in the same way, and autonomy represents the main 
constraint to increase the regulations. 
Additionally, the author points out that sometimes, the groups that own the private higher education 
institutions exercise great political, economic, social and moral power in the country in question, as may be 
the case of some religious congregations that have educational institutions, representing a great challenge 
to regulate. Namely, the same society and the control that these groups exercise over the government, 
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generates greater permissiveness that, although the institutions owned by these groups are recognized for 
their quality, the situation causes a conflict with low quality institutions which advocate for a similar 
treatment because, to their perception, is fair. This has resulted in a single regulatory policy despite the 
diversity of the system, where quality suffers the most. 
In other cases, governments prefer to keep loose regulations to promote entrepreneurship, and 
consequently job creation and the circulation of economic resources, not to mention that private education 
helps alleviate the pressure exerted by the high demand for tertiary education that governments have not 
been able to satisfy due to a lack of resources. 
Thus, most regulation to the private sector tend to be low (Geiger, 1988), mainly consisting on basic 
requirements regarding safety conditions and minimal pedagogical issues in the search of a decent quality 
system, and hoping that the market, itself, regulates the system in a better way. However, as Levy (2011) 
suggests, the market regulations have tended to fail as demand absorbing institutions keep on growing 
even despite the dubious quality, the lack of transparency and the little legitimization of the institutions in 
general. 
Based on the research that has been done, it can be concluded that the regulations to the private higher 
education institutions do not depend on the type of institution (elite/demand absorbing). However, when 
comparing with the public sector, similarities and differences can be found. First, the legislation barely 
differs between the public sector and the private sector, except from the specific norms and procedures for 
establishing a private institution, opening new academic programs and granting degrees, where private 
higher education suffers the most constraints and has to comply with a list of basic requirements in order 
to operate. Second, regarding the financial resources, it has been said that the private sector is mainly kept 
afloat by private investments, and specifically tuition fees, hence it is less regulated than the public sector, 
but it is mostly limited to the constitution of non-profit organizations. Third and finally, the quality 
assurance mechanisms commonly represent a regulatory instrument used in private higher education more 
than in the public sector as, in many countries, public institutions exercise their own measures to control 
the quality. 
Lastly, it must be mentioned that the regulation of private higher education has turned out to be 
complicated and expensive, due to the multiple dimensions and the immense variety of the sector. This 
makes it difficult for it to be analyzed from a general perspective, since it depends properly on the context 
and place of its design and application. For this reason, in this research it will be addressed exclusively, at a 
later stage, the design and implementation of regulations for the Mexican private higher education system. 
 
II. 4 Regulations and autonomy in private higher education institutions 
Throughout the years, researchers, academics and politicians have tried to find the good balance 
between autonomy and regulations (Fumasoli, Gornitzka & Maasen, 2014), between the state’s 
intervention to protect the human right to higher education, and the capacity of an institution to make its 
own decisions in order to carry on their task in the best and most appropriate possible way. Nevertheless, 
as the authors point out, the perfect balance does not exist. 
From the academics perspective, more autonomy improves the performance. Therefore, in the last 
couple of years, reforms towards the increase of autonomy have taken place, as the state has assumed a 
role of supervisor and has implemented New Public Management reforms, as has been mentioned before. 
In some cases, the states have been surpassed by the grown of the system, which has forced them to 
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delegate some specific tasks. In other cases, institutions have been very good at negotiating more 
autonomy. In some counties, institutions have played a determinant role for which, throughout the years, 
their autonomy has been consolidated, while in other countries, market demands have helped increase the 
autonomy of its institutions. 
Raza (2009) and Fielden (2008) suggest three different ways in which governments have delegated these 
administrative responsibilities. First, some governments have decided to delegate control to local 
authorities. Second, governments have delegated control to specialized bodies. And third, governments 
have delegated control to the academic institutions. Nevertheless, none of these three ways are free from 
government intervention (van Vught & de Boer, 2015), but the nature of the intervention has changed to 
be more indirect.  
Namely, institutions have gained more independence and autonomy in making internal decisions for 
their organizations, but also the governments have increased their control over the outcomes and the 
responsibility of the institutions. Hence, this has demanded new forms of accountability, for which 
regulations have changed over the years, exerting control over the institutions in different ways than 
before. Therefore, in contrast with the highly centralized control exercised by the government before, 
where there was a “detailed planning and a strict control” (Amaral & Magalhães, 2001, p. 10), the 
regulations toady have tended to oversight instead; to monitor and supervise instead of imposing, leading 
to more responsibilities for the institutions and more administrative work for academics. 
Quality assurance processes, new financial schemes and administrative tools, like reporting, have been 
used to monitor the system, to the extent that academics worry about their recent increase (Huisman & 
Currie, 2004; Henkel, 2005; Nybom, 2008; Volkwein & Malik, 1997). Even in some cases, as Huisman and 
Currie (2004) found out, these new accountability mechanisms, that have been implemented to regulate 
the system, have been perceived as bureaucratic and inefficient inside the higher education systems, while 
the support the institutions used to receive has declined over the years (Knott & Payne, 2004). 
Enders, de Boer and Weyer (2013) have called this phenomenon regulatory autonomy, where there is a 
perceived increase on the autonomy, but in reality, the state has used this autonomy as a tool to exercise 
more control over the institutions, aiming to align more closely the higher education objectives to the 
countries’ goals. For Berdahl (1990) the increment of the accountability has led to the decrease of 
autonomy. Hence, undoubtedly, both the autonomy and the regulations have been redefined in the last 
years and, even if in the first glimpse autonomy seems to have been favored, this might not be the case. On 
the contrary, in many cases it has decreased with the recent reforms to the regulatory policy. 
As a consequence, the states still influence higher education institutions in multiple ways, and even 
though institutions have been granted more institutional autonomy, the “freedom is [limited] only to act 
according to the wishes of the government” (Maassen & van Vught’s, 1988, p. 68). Therefore, governments 
delimit institutions’ actions, and make sure that they comply with the goals they have established through 
mechanisms as supervision and monitoring. As de Boer and van Vught (2016) assert, based on Maassen and 
van Vught’s findings, higher education institutions enjoy autonomy as far as the state allows them. In words 
of the authors 
 
Institutions take decisions in the shadow of hierarchy. In the new planning system, a biannual dialogue, 
institutions must respond to the government agenda, indicating that the government largely sets the 
direction of the system […]. Funding becomes conditional on the institution’s mission and strategic plan […]. 
Quality control and evaluation systems will be developed and become mandatory (p. 26). 
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In this sense, funding mechanisms have been precisely an instrument used to achieve more control over 
the system, with an over quantification of the performance of the institutions. To alleviate this tendency, 
quality assurance mechanisms have been implemented to increase, precisely, the quality of the systems, 
but these have also tended to bureaucratization and quantification, which does not necessarily improve the 
systems, and to the standardization of both private and public sectors. 
The following table 10 “Regulatory mechanisms by the dimension of the autonomy they constrain”, 
illustrates the different regulatory mechanisms used for each dimension of the autonomy, accordingly to 
the degree of the autonomy that has been granted to a system. Hence, it represents the two contrasts 
between the highly regulated systems, where the government exerts a central control, and the lowly 
regulated systems where the state oversights the higher education institutions. A distinction between both 
private and public sectors can also be found. 
A centralized government control refers to the situation in which the state concentrates the power, as it 
possesses all the knowledge of the objet it is regulating, while in the oversight control the power is 
delegated, as it is assumed information is missing for regulating the object (van Vught & de Boer, 2015; de 
Boer & van Vught, 2016). Hence, in the centralized control, the decision-making process and the 
implementation of the policies are carried out directly by the government, while in the oversight control 
there is more room for different actors to participate, as there is decentralized power. In this type of 
control the government establishes the rules and monitors the system mainly through incentives and 
contracts. Of course, nuances are found between these two poles, according to the autonomy’s 
conceptualization and the country’s specific situation and traditions, leading to centralize more some 
dimensions of the autonomy than others. Therefore, the table is just a generalization of the most drastic 
scenarios. 
From the table, it can be seen that similar mechanisms are used in both types of government’s control 
(centralized and oversight) but, while lowly regulated systems tend to accountability through reports, 
audits, and supervisions, highly regulated systems include these and also add, external confirmations and 
approvals, ceilings, restrictions, impositions, and the need to follow more precise norms and guidelines, 
among others. In few words, lowly regulated systems tend to post regulatory mechanisms or instruments 
that regulate the outcomes, while highly regulated systems tend to ante and post regulatory mechanisms, 
controlling a priori and a posteriori the educational act. A classification of a priori and a posteriori 
mechanisms is found in the table, where a priori instruments include those that condition the pedagogical 
experience before it actually takes place, while a posteriori mechanisms include those who are meant to 
make sure that the compliance actually takes place, after the educational act has occurred. 
As it have been said before, both private and public sectors include a mixture of this a priori and a 
posteriori regulatory mechanisms, and are more regulated in some dimensions of the autonomy than in 
others, but tending to an increase of the a posteriori ones. In other words, there is a tendency to the over 
sighting control rather than the centralized control, as it used to be in the past (Amaral & Magalhães, 
2001).  But this control has turned out to be a bizarre hybrid, as Maassen and van Vught (1988) have stated, 
where, on one hand, the state tries to keep a tight control of the system while, on the other hand, it pushes 
it to self-regulation and market regulation. 
As a result, different studies have been carried out to understand how this apparent increase of 
autonomy, throughout the changes in the regulation, impacts the higher education systems. Volkwein and 
Mailik (1997) found out no relation between academic and financial autonomy with the quality of the 
institutions, but in contrast Knott and Payne (2004) argue that the way the governance of the system and 
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Table 10. Regulatory mechanisms by the dimension of the autonomy they constrain 
Autonomy 
Mechanisms used in 
highly regulated systems: 
central control 
lowly regulated systems: 
over sighting control 
Public higher education Private higher education Public higher education Private higher education 
A priori A posteriori A priori A posteriori A priori A posteriori A priori A posteriori 
Organizational  Authorizations  
Established 
guidelines 
Basic safety 
standards 
Legal 
instruments 
Reports 
Audits 
Reauthorization 
Approvals and 
validations of 
decisions 
External 
confirmations 
Authorizations  
Established 
guidelines 
Basic safety 
standards 
 
 
 
Reauthorization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic safety 
standards 
Legal 
instruments 
Accountability 
mechanism 
Performance 
reports 
Supervisions 
Audits 
 
 
Basic safety 
standards 
Legal 
instruments 
 
Financial Basic funding or 
funding formula 
Established 
guidelines  
Restrictions  
Salary ceilings 
Reports 
Audits 
 
Restrictions   
 
 
Funding 
schemes  
 
Performance 
based funding  
Audits 
Funding 
schemes 
evidence 
 
Funding 
schemes 
 
Funding 
schemes 
evidence 
 
Staffing Basic 
requirements 
checklists 
Established 
guidelines 
Restrictions  
Ceilings 
Labor laws 
Approvals 
 
Basic 
requirements 
checklists 
Established 
guidelines 
Labor laws 
 
 
Labor laws Performance 
Reports 
 
Labor laws 
 
 
 
Academic Set external 
quality 
assurance 
agency 
Mechanisms for 
establishing and 
Supervisions 
External quality 
assurance 
agency 
Set external 
quality 
assurance 
agency 
Mechanisms for 
establishing and 
Recognition or 
validation of 
degrees 
Supervisions 
External quality 
assurance 
Negotiated 
contracts 
Basic safety 
standards 
Norms on 
facilities, 
Performance 
reports 
Supervisions 
External quality 
assurance 
agencies 
Basic safety 
standards 
Norms on 
facilities, 
equipment and 
resources 
Supervisions 
External quality 
assurance 
agencies 
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Autonomy 
Mechanisms used in 
highly regulated systems: 
central control 
lowly regulated systems: 
over sighting control 
Public higher education Private higher education Public higher education Private higher education 
A priori A posteriori A priori A posteriori A priori A posteriori A priori A posteriori 
recognizing 
programs  
Registrations 
Licensing 
Basic 
requirements 
checklists 
Negotiated 
contracts 
Established 
guidelines 
Set admission 
criteria 
Restrictions 
Imposed 
curriculum / 
curriculum 
requirements 
Basic safety 
standards 
Norms on 
facilities, 
equipment and 
resources 
Guidelines on 
activities 
recognizing 
programs  
Registrations 
Licensing 
Basic 
requirements 
checklists 
Established 
guidelines 
Restrictions 
Curriculum 
requirements 
Basic safety 
standards 
Norms on 
facilities, 
equipment and 
resources 
Guidelines on 
activities 
agency equipment and 
resources 
 
Table elaborated by the author based on findings of table 8 “Specific regulatory mechanisms used in higher education by their classification”, the chart 1 “The 
dimensions of the autonomy” and the ANNEX 1, table 14 “Autonomy according the type of the institution”. 
. 
 
  
 
50 
the regulatory mechanisms are designed, is essential for granting more opportunities to higher education 
institutions to develop and excel in their activities. Berdahl (1990) has also asserted that a state that 
intervenes and restrains the academic autonomy damages the higher education system, while similarly, van 
Vught and de Boer (2015) suggest that a highly control system can affect the quality, as academics might 
constantly feel frustrated of not being able to pursue their professional interests freely. In short, most of 
the studies have found out that the academic autonomy is precisely the one that has the most influence in 
the performance and quality of the institutions and, interestingly, is the one that suffers the most 
constraints in the private higher education sector. 
While the academic autonomy faces the most restrictions, it has also been pointed out, throughout this 
research, that private higher education institutions tend to be less regulated than the public ones in the 
organizational and staffing autonomies, and that both elite or demand absorbing institutions are regulated 
in similar ways or even in the same way, as a multiple regulatory policy for the varied private sector would 
be costly and not feasible. As Levy (2011) has pointed out, the whole private sector is regulated in the same 
way, as it is thought that “one size fits all” (p. 391), even though the sector has highly diversified over the 
years.  
The slightly differences between the elite and demand absorbing are basically in the constraints to the 
financial autonomy, as recently, in some countries, the legal framework has been modified to allow the 
establishment of for profit institutions. This means that these for profit institutions, generally demand 
absorbing, are now less restricted in the use of their resources, as they are now being able to keep their 
surpluses, invest in financial markets and decide their sources of revenue. Additionally these institutions 
are less likely to receive research funds, to put an example, for which other funding schemes use to 
regulate the system cannot be used to regulate this dimension of the autonomy in the private sector. 
However, less regulation does not mean necessary more autonomy. Levy (2012) asserts that the degree 
of autonomy in private institutions is not necessarily higher, as autonomy can be restricted in many 
different ways and by different groups of power, not only the government. To put it differently, the market, 
the consumers, the owners of the institutions (religious or businessmen), and the lack of an academic 
tradition and profession can exert also restrictions affecting the institution’s autonomy.   
From the table, it is also interesting to point out that, the regulatory mechanisms seem to be mainly a 
priori for the private sector: norms, guidelines, approvals, and authorizations, for which the nature of the 
regulation is different than for the public sector. While the public sector tends to accountability the private 
sector is slightly oversight. Norms and guidelines are given and must be complied with, but supervisory 
instruments seem to be lacking or are constantly missing, as can be seen in the table 10. Therefore, even 
though sanctions might be included in the legislations for punishing actions when violating the law, few 
mechanisms seem to make sure that there is actual compliance and accountability, giving place to low 
quality institutions and diploma mills. This might be due, as have been said before, to the fact that other 
regulatory mechanisms are more costly. Therefore, formal and implemented regulations are different, 
especially in the developing world, as Levy (2011; 2012) and Geiger (1988) point out, and might also varied 
according to the political, economical and moral authority of the owner of the institution. 
As Huisman and Currie (2004) acknowledge, most mechanisms used to regulate education can be 
described as “soft” instruments as they are not meant to sanction. In other words, as the tendency of 
increasing autonomy has taken place, the governments have found more difficulties in exercising the role 
of evaluators of the performance. Hence, even though there is an emphasis on the outcomes to justify the 
degrees of autonomy, the hard task of evaluating the capacity, the achievements and the accomplishments 
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of the institutions leads to focus mainly on parameters that can be quantified, which represents a challenge 
when it comes to assessing the quality because, is quality the number of graduates or the number of 
scientific publications?   
Therefore, it becomes a very arduous duty applying the sanctions, especially because most instruments 
are not properly linked with the incentives, reducing the compliance. In other words, as it has been seen 
before, regulatory instruments in higher education tend to be legislative, being their efficiency relatively 
low as other mechanisms to assure compliance are needed at the same time. As Raza (2009) mentions, 
linking mechanisms with incentives is essential to assure consistency. Nonetheless, also designing a system 
where the tools for applying the policies are coordinated, and that includes different types of mechanisms 
is essential to assure there is adherence to what is established by the authority. Hence, sanctions and 
rewards are fundamental for assuring conformity.  
Moreover, as van Vught and de Boer (2015) point out, in the specific case of higher education, the 
academic profession has to be acknowledged first. Academics possess a highly specialized knowledge 
enabling them to make different decisions, especially those concerning to the development of higher 
education. However, academics tend to operate in fragmented specialized groups where their main 
concern is the advancement of their discipline and their self-interests, making the institution difficult to be 
managed. Autonomy inside autonomous institutions undoubtedly represents a challenge when trying to 
regulate the system to the extent that the authors above mentioned have claimed that “the fundamental 
characteristics of higher education institutions suggest that these institutions can only be externally 
controlled if the organizational variety is greatly reduced and if the professional autonomy is largely 
restrained” (p. 47), which would imply loosing the very essence of higher education. 
In this sense, turning into a more over sighting state control allows a greater internal autonomy at the 
moment of decision making when operating and administrating the internal work of the organization, 
generating a feeling of ownership of the processes and results. But, as private higher education providers 
tend to increase, it would be irresponsible to let the system regulate itself without any constraints, opening 
the doors to providers whose interests might not be solely grant education but to earn some profits, 
lowering quality standards. Hence, regulations and autonomy can never be dissociated; both a priori and a 
posteriori mechanisms need to be coordinated in a system to assure the proper regulation.  
In the next stage of this research, the development of the regulatory policy for the private higher 
education in Mexico will be analyzed in depth, as well as the mechanisms that are used today to regulate 
the institutions. Also, the degree of autonomy they enjoy will be explored, in order to understand how 
these regulations constrain or enhance the institutions’ capacities and explore their role in the proliferation 
of low quality institutions.  
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III. Methodology 
III. 1 Basic qualitative research or exploratory qualitative inquiry 
The purpose of this study is to analyze in depth the nature of the private higher private education in 
Mexico and the current mechanisms that regulate the sector, as well as to explore the different degree of 
the autonomy that they enjoy in their several dimensions, in order to understand how these regulations 
constrain or enhance the institutions’ capacities and explore their role in the proliferation of low quality 
institutions. For this reason, it has tried to analyze in depth the historic development of the private higher 
education and the characteristics of the autonomy it enjoys, as well as the current mechanisms that exist 
for its regulation, in order to create an analytical framework that serves as a basis for the discussion in the 
further steps of this research. Now, to address the specific topic of this research, the methodology that was 
used is the qualitative method, as its purpose is to understand how reality is interpreted (Merriam, 2009; 
Flick, 2007). 
In other words, this study, rather than identifying causes and effects to predict future similar 
phenomena, sought to discover the meanings the involved actors give to the reality where they take part. 
As the same Merriam (2009) describes, qualitative research is an inductive process characterized by 
focusing on understanding the meanings. Hence, this study was characterized by being primarily 
explorative and descriptive. 
A qualitative research is based on the assumption that there is no single reality as it is socially 
constructed throughout the different interpretations given to diverse events. Therefore, its basis lies in the 
philosophical perspective of the constructivist paradigm. Constructivism assumes that there are multiple 
realities as each person interprets reality in a different way (Crotty, 1998; Merriam, 2009; Flick, 2007). Thus, 
the main objective of this paradigm is to understand the meaning of a person’s experiences, and then the 
complex reality that surrounds a phenomenon, rather to narrowing them down to few assumptions or 
conclusions. In order to describe, comprehend, and understand the phenomena, the constructivist 
paradigm listens carefully to the experts’ interpretation and experience, as multiple participants’ meanings 
are considered. The constructivist paradigm is very helpful for developing a historical and social 
construction of the reality (Creswell, 2003). 
Therefore, Merriam’s (2009) characteristics of the qualitative methodology guided this research. First, 
the perceptions of different actors that take part of higher education in Mexico were explored, as data 
collection was made through in depth interviews. Second, the research focused on understanding the 
perceptions that these actors give to the specific reality of private higher education in Mexico. Third, the 
researcher was the main instrument for data collection, reviewing the literature, conducting the interviews, 
and analyzing the information. Fourth, the research was inductive, as the purpose was to explore a 
phenomenon rather than to test a specific theory. And fifth and finally, it intended to be richly descriptive 
by deviling into perceptions and experiences. 
Correspondingly, based on Merriam’s (2009) classification of qualitative research, this study was 
designed according to the exploratory qualitative inquiry approach or the basic qualitative research, which 
focuses on understanding the contextual meanings of those involved in the phenomenon and their 
interpretations of the phenomenon according to their experiences (Crotty, 1998). Therefore, a basic 
research approach was used in this investigation for a better understanding of the regulatory policy from 
the perspectives of those actors involve in the higher education system in Mexico. Subsequently, 
structuring the research according to the basic research approach satisfied the interest of extending the 
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knowledge on this particular topic, hoping that this research, in the future, can help improving the reality. 
In other words, that policymakers in Mexico find this research useful for improving the regulations to the 
private higher education institutions.  
In a basic research, data is generally collected through interviews, observations, and the analysis of 
documents, comparing and contrasting this information to find commonalities and discrepancies and to 
identify the connections among each other. As Creswell (2009) understands the process, the findings, 
which are usually descriptive and analytical, are coded or categorized into different groups usually labeled 
according to the participant’s language, to at the end, establish how these are related. 
As for this reason, qualitative research is usually considered to have an emergent design. This means 
that although a general research design is planned at the beginning of the quest, it takes shape as the 
information is collected and analyzed. Following, the participants will be described, as well as the data 
collection and analysis processes, and the validity and reliability of the research. 
 
III. 2 The participants 
The participants of this study are part of the higher education system in Mexico, playing different roles 
in the field. The sample was selected deliberatively or with a purpose, in order to achieve the particular 
goal of this research, and to obtain information that allows a better understanding of the current 
regulations to the private higher education institutions in Mexico, the degree of autonomy they enjoy, and 
their need and the system’s need to issue recommendations to the current regulatory policy. For the 
selection of the participants Merriam’s (2009) criteria was considered: 1) the participants were experts in 
the field, 2) the sample was varied, 3) recommendations regarding who to interview from other 
interviewees were considered (snowball technique), and 4) the interviews were carried out until finding 
redundancy. The above with the purpose of exploring different perspectives of the phenomenon (Creswell, 
2009), or more specifically with the aim of discovering multiple understandings of the private higher 
education in Mexico. 
Hence, nine interviews were carried out from which seven participants work at private higher education 
institutions, one works at a public higher education institution, but has also worked in the past at the 
subdivision of higher education of the Ministry of Education, and finally, one works at a quality assurance 
agency dedicated to assure the quality of higher education programs. This diverse sample was chosen to 
collect a wider perspective of the phenomenon that was being studied, considering public and private 
institutions (both elite and demand absorbing), different regulatory bodies, diverse positions of power, 
various roles in the system, and the accessibility to the researcher. Some participants were already known 
by the researcher, but others were contacted using the snowball technique. 
The following table 11 “The description of the participants” summarizes the profiles of the participants 
that were interviewed for this study. It is important to point out, that the numbers are not meant to be 
added, since the trajectory of the participants is very varied, and over the years they have occupied 
multiple positions and worked in different institutions. The table, therefore, shows the area of experience 
of the participants. For that reason, it could give the impression that a greater number of participants were 
interviewed, but what in fact shows is the profile of the nine interviewees. The detailed profile of the 
participants is included in ANNEX 2. 
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Table 11. The description of the participants 
By type of 
university 
Private sector 8 Elite 7 Autonomy by presidential 
decree 
1 
Administrative simplification 7 
Demand absorbing 1 Regular autonomy 1 
Public sector 1     
       
By 
professional 
trajectory 
Full time professors 7     
Professors 2     
Administrative staff: Servicios Escolares  2     
Research professors 3 University researcher 1   
SNI affiliation 1   
International affiliation 1   
Directors of academic programs 2     
Deans 2     
Rector 2 Elite 1   
Demand absorbing 1   
Governing bodies 3 Elite public / private 2   
Demand absorbing 1   
Quality assurance agencies 2 President 1   
Evaluator 1   
Ministry of education 1 Subdivision of HE 1   
Academic journal 3     
       
By years of 
experience 
More than 30 2     
Between 20 and 30 4     
Between 10 and 20 3     
 
III. 3 The data collection 
As this was an exploratory qualitative inquiry research, data was collected though interviews, and the 
analysis of documents. The interviews that were carried out were in-depth, open interviews. As Patton 
(2002) mentions, interviews give direct quotations of a person’s experiences and perspectives. Hence, 
selecting a purposeful sample concedes the opportunity to explore the richness of the topic in depth. On 
the other hand, the documents that were analyzed included different studies from the experts in the field, 
the legal documents, records and official publications. 
The interviews. Interviewing, as Merriam (2009) acknowledges, is probably the most important tool for 
collecting data in a qualitative research, as the researcher engages with the expert on the phenomenon in a 
meaningful conversation. Interviews help understand the points of view of the actors involved in the 
phenomenon, and help access to information that is not directly available (Patton, 2002). While there are 
different types of interviews, for achieving the purpose of this study, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted.  
A semi-structured interview is characterized by being less structured than the structured interview and 
more structured than the unstructured one. That is, that a semi-structured interview is based on some 
predetermined questions, but has the flexibility to add or omit questions, or to change the order, according 
to the fluency of the interview. Therefore, a list of questions was prepared in advanced, before the 
interviews of this research were carried out. Semi-structured interviews gave the possibility to explore new 
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topics that the interviewees addressed that had not been considered before, and that helped expand the 
research. It also allowed adding new questions or making some modifications to the interview’s guide, as 
more interviews took place. 
The participants were contacted by e-mail, where the research’s purpose was explained and the 
interview was requested. A sample of the e-mail is included in the ANNEX 3, in both the original language, 
Spanish, and the corresponding translation to English. As the participants accepted the interview the time 
was set.  
As the researcher is studying abroad, the interviews were online, using different electronic platforms. In 
most of the cases, eight interviews out of nine, Google Hangout was used as the platform. This tool allowed 
the researcher to see the participants while carrying out the interview, having a more lively interaction. 
Whatsapp was also used for one of the interviews, but in this case it was only a voice call. 
General questions were asked to all the interviewees. However, as their experiences and expertise vary, 
also different questions were asked to get the most out of each one’s particular experiences and 
knowledge. All the interviews were recorded, with previous consent of the participants. As the interviews 
took place at different times, it was possible to transcribe each one of them before the next one took place. 
That allowed modifying the interview’s question guide, making the necessary adjustments as one went 
deeper into the subject. The final version of the interview’s guide is presented in ANNEX 4 in both Spanish 
and English languages. 
Approximately, the nine interviews lasted around one hour, and were conducted in the Spanish 
language. All of them were recorded with prior consent of the participants, and have been transcribed one 
by one, as soon as the interviews finished. All of the participants received a letter of confidentiality 
explaining, once again, the purpose and the scope of the research, as well as the way their information 
would be used. The letters explain that the information was recorded with their consent, and that it would 
be used for the thesis research. Recording the interviews was essential to make sure the exact words of the 
interviewees were preserved in the further analysis of the information. Nonetheless, additional notes were 
taken during the interview to track down the main aspects that have been covered. Also, to assure 
confidentiality, the participants decided under which name they wanted to be quoted so that they cannot 
be linked with the research. Likewise, some information that can directly identify them was omitted. 
The interview questions were designed to collect information about their perceptions regarding their 
experiences in the higher education system. The first questions can be classified as knowledge questions 
and had the purpose of getting factual information, but they also had the goal of establishing rapport with 
the participants so they could feel confident and share later their perceptions. Other questions included 
questions to find out the interviewees’ opinion on a topic, interpretative questions for getting to know their 
interpretation of the topic, devil’s advocate questions to challenge the interviewees about controversial 
topics, and ideal questions to find out the respondents’ ideal situation. Multiple questions, leading 
questions and yes/no questions were avoided. The interview guide interview’s question guide is included 
in ANNEX 5, in both original language (Spanish) and in English. 
Interviewees seemed very open to respond, sharing their insights, beliefs, opinions, perceptions and 
experiences. The researcher, who also has worked on the private higher education sector in Mexico, tried 
to avoid leading questions. However, as Creswell (2009) acknowledges, the researchers experiences tend to 
influence the interpretation of the data. In this sense, all interviews have been aware of the researcher’s 
position in relation to the topic, and have been encouraged to share all their insights, emphasizing the 
interest on their experiences and knowledge, as they are experts on the field and have been selected for 
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that reason. Finally, there was a followed up with the participants for clarification of the information when 
needed.  
The Document Review. Reviewing documents is another source for collecting information in a qualitative 
research as Merriam (2009) and Wolcott (1994) point out. Document review gives a better understanding 
of the phenomenon and has a great place in this investigation, as one of the purposes is to comprehend 
how the private higher education institutions in Mexico are regulated and the degree of autonomy they 
enjoy to govern themselves. Therefore, the history of the regulations to the private sector was analyzed 
from the documents and contributions that other authors have made over time, and also the policy 
documents were examined (The Mexican Constitution, The General Law of Education, The Law for the 
Coordination of Higher Education, the Agreement 243 and the Agreement 17/11/17) which are the axis and 
the support of the regulations to the private sector in Mexico. The review of these sources was essential for 
the study of the topic. 
 
III. 4 The data analysis 
As Creswell (2009) recognizes, the process of analyzing the data consists in giving sense to the 
information that has been collected. Merriam (2009) mentions that in a qualitative research data is 
simultaneously being analyzed as it is been collected, as it has an emergent design. In other words, the 
author describes the process as “inductive and comparative” (p. 175). 
The first step to analyzing the collected data was transcribing the audio after the interviews had taken 
place. In this step, the interviews were cleaned from these words like “uh”, “um” and “right?”, as they hold 
no significance in the interpretation of the findings. Later, it was followed Creswell’s (2009) and Merriam’s 
(2009) process for analyzing the information. Hence, the analysis begun with the identification units of 
meaning, which are words, phrases, or “meaningful or (potentially meaningful) segment of data” (Merriam, 
2009, p., 176), that contain relevant data for answering the research questions. This process is called by 
Creswell (2009) open coding. The criteria that was followed to select the units was first, that the 
information was relevant to the research and that helped answer the research questions, and second that 
it was information that stood by itself as no more information was needed (Merriam, 2009). 
Then, these units were coded into subcategories, and later they were grouped into categories. Coding is 
the process of organizing the collected data, or now the units, and labeling them usually using the 
participant’s own words (Creswell, 2009). Categories are  “abstractions derived from the data and not the 
data themselves (Merriam, 2009, p. 181). The initial subcategories of this research included types of 
regulations, perceptions of the degrees of autonomy, and the needs of both regulations and autonomy, 
among others. 
Later, after creating the codes, these categories, as Creswell (2009) and Wolcott (1994) mention, were 
positioned within the theoretical framework that has already been researched, into the axial or analytical 
coding. For this axial coding, the coding takes place around the essential aspect of the category, exploring 
the conditions of the phenomenon. For example, in this research, in the category problems of the 
regulatory policy, general problems of the regulatory policy, problems of the a priori mechanisms, 
problems with a posteriori mechanisms, and problems with the enforcement of the regulation, have been 
included among others. 
Finally, after having all the categories, hierarchies and connections were established among them, to 
identify the results of the study, based on the participants’ perspective. This process is called by Creswell 
(2009) selective coding, as the objective is to explain how these categories are connected. To show the 
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relation of these study’s categories, a scheme is presented in the corresponding section of “Results”, 
showing how they are connected. Grouping the information into categories helped to have a more fluid 
discussion between the literature review and the interview results, as well as to evidence the findings of 
the study while answering the research questions. During this process the information was interpreted. 
 
III. 5 Validity and reliability 
Presenting valid and reliable information is a concerned of every researcher (Merriam, 2009). Therefore, 
to achieve this purpose, this research was carried out with rigor and in an ethical manner. Merriam (2009) 
suggests that validity and reliability are “approached through careful attention to a study’s 
conceptualization, and the way in which the data are collected, analyzed and interpreted and the way in 
which the findings are presented” (p. 210). In this sense, providing a rich description is essential in a 
qualitative research so that the findings make sense to the reader.  
More precisely, reliability or consistency refers to the fact that the study convinces the readers, the 
researches and the experts in the field because it has been carried out with rigor (Merriam, 2009). In other 
words, for Creswell (2009) it means that its findings are consistent with the work of other researchers. To 
achieve the reliability of this research the following actions were carried out: 1) the research was carefully 
planned; it began with a proposal that took shape as the research emerged. 2) It presented a detail 
theoretical framework that guided the research. 3) An exhaustive literature review of the topic was carried 
out. 4) It took care of the way the information was collected, analyzed and interpreted. 5) The transcription 
of the interviews was double checked and contrasted again with the audio to avoid misinterpretations of 
the information. 6) It aimed to present the findings in the most clear possible way. 
Validity or credibility and transferability means that the study is congruent with reality as it shows its 
holistic and multidimensional perspective (Merriam, 2009). Validity was achieved in this study through the 
triangulation of the information. In addition, to having the participants review the transcription of their 
interviews. 
Triangulation. Triangulation is the first and most common strategy to achieve validity. As Denzin and 
Lincoln (1998) identify, there are multiple types of triangulation. Hence, in this study, documents were 
reviewed and analyzed, and interviews were carried out to have multiple methods of data collection. 
Regarding document analysis, multiple sources of data were consulted. These included written documents, 
mainly articles from academic journals, academic books, policy documents, reports and laws, in order to 
have a better understanding of the regulations and the degree of autonomy at the Mexican private higher 
education institutions. This allowed having different sources of data. Concerning to the interviews, these 
meaningful conversations with the experts helped find out more precise answers to the research questions 
that were formulated and that guided this research. 
Respondent validation. To assure validity, before analyzing the interview’s information, the participants 
were asked to read the transcriptions, to make sure that everything they meant was captured precisely and 
to avoid misinterpretations. The transcriptions of the interviews were sent via e-mail to the participants 
and they all confirmed that they had received the document. None of the participants requested to modify 
the responses. In addition, one of the interviewees was contacted furtherly to clarify some of his answers. 
The clarifications were added in the transcription document. 
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III. 6 Cross cultural research 
One of the main concerns of this research was precisely that is cross-cultural. This research studied the 
reality of the Mexican private higher education sector, and seeks to be helpful for policymakers in the 
country. However, it was prepared to be presented in the English language to the Finnish and international 
academic community in Finland. 
As for this reason, one of the most important challenges that this research faced was translating the 
interviews preserving the meaning and the spirit of the participants, as translating the interviews literally 
most of the times lead to meaningless phrases. For this issue, and as the interviews were carried out in the 
Spanish language, the coding process was done as well in Spanish. Nevertheless, for the international 
academic community to have accessibility to the data, the selected units of information presented in the 
findings of this research were translated carefully into English by the researcher. The units are only 
presented in the English language in order not to exceed the limit number of pages of the thesis work. 
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IV. The Mexican private higher education system 
Before going deep into the topic that concerns us, the regulations of the private higher education 
institutions in Mexico and the degree of autonomy of the institutions, it is important to understand in 
depth the system of private higher education existing in this country, which is impossible to comprehend 
without knowing its historical development. For this reason, this first section explores the process of 
establishment and expansion of the private sector aiming to becoming aware of the role the state has 
played for it to happen in such a way. Also in this first section, after concluding with the historical 
development, it will be sought to understand the current status of private higher education today, studying 
its characteristics but, above all, analyzing its diversity and heterogeneity.  
 
IV. 1 Historical development of the Mexican private higher education 
Private higher education began in Mexico from the hand of the creation of the colonial structures, as the 
Spanish missionaries established several institutions to teach arts, philosophy and education to the 
population, and later religious congregations like the Jesuits, established schools for the education of the 
aristocracy (Olivier, 2007; Buendía, 2016). However, due to the development of institutions and subsequent 
events, the beginning of the private higher education is located until the early 1910’s as the private sector 
saw the opportunity of granting education away from the government’s ideology (González, 2012), which 
had been characterized by a constant fight between liberals and conservatives throughout all the 19th 
century (Bolaños, 2000).  
In fact, public higher education had been unstable since Mexico had won its independence from Spain in 
1821 (del Arenal, 2011) as the struggles to govern the country led to a century of political instability where 
these two major forces fought for the power (Bolaños, 2000). Hence, the colonial institution of the 
university, represented mainly by la Real y Pontifícea Universidad de México (the Royal and Pontifical 
University of Mexico)14 suffered the ravages of this struggle, weakening and fracturing over the years. 
La Real y Pontifícea Universidad de México indeed was a deeply Medieval institution that for two 
hundred years cared little about renewing its knowledge, keeping aloof from the revolutionary ideas of 
enlightenment that were rapidly gaining popularity in the colonial Mexico (Marsiske, 2006). This fragile 
institution continued to weaken with the constant struggle for power engaged in a two-party system whose 
alternation as the controlling force resulted in continuous constitutional modifications and expeditions of 
laws in such short periods of time that resulted impossible to keep up (Bolaños, 2000). While the 
conservatives supported the role of the Church in the higher education system, conservatives fought 
against it reducing the legitimacy of the institution15 (Villalpando, 2012; Tanck, 1984; González, 2012).  
As a consequence the Real y Pontificea Universidad de México closed its doors several times by 
presidential decrees (Tanck, 1984), engulfed by an ideology that perceived it as “useless, irreformable and 
pernicious” (Carrancá, 1969, p. 39), to finally remained close since 1867 when the liberals took over the 
control of power, and drove the Church away from the public institutions. Other higher education 
                                                     
14 La Real y Pontificea Universidad de México was established in 1553 based on the mandate issued by the King Charles V in 
1551(Cervantes, 2003; Sánchez, 2002; Díaz, 1987) with the purpose of granting education to all, Spanish and indigenous, in the 
Catholic Faith and other disciplines (El Rey, 1551). Later on, in 1595 the Pope Clement VII granted the pontifical status to the 
university (Marsiske, 2006; Delgado, 1993). The university was a key institution for the development of culture and science in the 
colonial Mexico, preparing colonial leaders for the government and the Church (Bolaños, 2000) 
15 José María Luis Mora, one of the most important liberal politicians of the time (Burke & Humphrey, 2007) emphasized the need 
of “tearing off the education from the hands of the clergy” (Bolaños, 2000, p. 34), since for him the Church holding the power was a 
retrograde symbol that evoked the colonial era. 
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institutions established by the Church in the colonial times were taken away from the Church’s hands 
(Olivier, 2007) and became professional disciplinary schools where positivism was the main ideology 
(Rangel, 1979; Larroyo, 1983; Acosta, 2012). 
The discontent caused by these decisions and by the lost of the humanist ideology in the public 
education, led to a fight for a more integral education similar to the one that which had been granted at 
the colonial university (Betancourt, 2014; Olivier, 2007). As a result, the Universidad de México (University 
of Mexico) was established by the government in 1910 (Quintana, 2010), but the beginning of the 
Revolutionary war that same year, and the fragility of this new institution, was not enough to satisfy the 
population. Therefore a group of private investors decided to establish the first private university in the 
country (González, 2012). 
This first private institution established in 1912 in Mexico City, and that obtained the government’s 
recognition, was the Escuela Libre de Derecho (Free School of Law), institution founded by a group of 
professor and students (Acosta, 2012; Aguilar, 2003). Other similar institutions attempted the same goal, 
but had to close their doors due to the lack of recognition (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011; González, 2012). 
Therefore, it took more than 20 years for the private sector to be officially born, as it was until the second 
half of the 1930’s when the first expansion of the private sector finally took place.  
On one hand, the political conditions of the country were pretty stable, as the Revolutionary war had 
ended in 1928 with the creation of the national party who will dominate the country’s power for 71 years 
(Serrano, 2012; Aguilar & Serrano, 2012). On the other hand, the economic boom contributed to the 
population’s growth and thus, for an increasing demand of higher education by the upper and middle 
classes (Martínez, 2012; Rangel, 1979). 
In addition, the relationship between the government and the people, especially higher education 
students, was very complicated as the government constantly tried to impose ideologies that differed with 
popular values, and mainly with those of the Catholic religion16 (Acosta, 2005). One of these main 
ideologies that was tried to impose was the socialist doctrine (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011), but the lack of 
understanding of the Marxist and Leninist principles (Guevara, 1980; Ortiz-Cirilo, 2015), and the pressure of 
conservative political groups, generated several confrontations between the university students and the 
government (Marsiske, 1982; Olivier, 2007), to such a degree that autonomy to the main public institution 
was granted by the state in 1929 (Mayer, 2007), with the purpose of separating itself from the conflicts of 
rebellion that were inside the university (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1929).  
The university, at this time, was seen by the government as a place of “sterile, idle and destructive 
agitation” (Orozco, 1993 p. 28), increasing the society’s pressure of demanding a higher education that met 
its needs and that was consistent with its principles (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011; Olivier, 2007; Rodríguez, 
2008c). To this demand, the vision of a group of Spanish immigrants joined (Martínez, 2012; Rangel, 1979); 
intellectual and businessmen that had left Spain due to the Civil War became the greatest supporters of the 
development of the private higher education over the years (Pla, 2001). 
Therefore, the Mexican Constitution was modified in 1934, allowing the private sector to grant 
education, as long as it was secular. The Mexican State was in charge of authorizing new private providers 
of higher education (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1934 as amended 1917), laying the groundwork for what 
would later be the Recognition of the Official Validity of Studies (Blanco, 1994), and the Ministry of 
                                                     
16 Here is important to remember that the government tried several times to suppress the Catholic religion and create its own 
Church ruled by the hands of the state, similar to the case of England. This conflict led to the Cristeros war (Silva, 2014). 
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Education exerted the main power, granting the authorization or restricting it, as well as supervising these 
institutions (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011). However, the law did not specify the mechanisms for regulating 
these new institutions (Olivier, 2007). Also, as Rodríguez (2008b) mentions, during the 30’s the Universidad 
Autónoma de México (UNAM), or the country’s main public university, established a norm to recognize the 
studies carried out in private institutions that were incorporated. Hence, at this point, three mechanisms 
existed as options that could be used by investors to create a private university (Rodríguez, 2008c): 1) 
presidential mandate17, 2) through the incorporation to UNAM18, or 3) recognition by the Ministry of 
Education at either federal or local level. 
From 1935 to 1959 seven different private higher education institutions were established around the 
country, but mainly in the bigger cities of Guadalajara, Monterrey and Mexico City19 (Acosta, 2005; 2012), 
led by Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara20 (Guadalajara Autonomous University), which preserved a 
religious orientation (Silas, 2005a; Baptista & Medina, 2011; Buendía, 2016). These institutions either were 
founded by a group of businessmen or by a religious organization like the Compañía de Jesús or the Jesuits 
in reaction to the government’s policies (Levy, 2009). Institutions founded by businessmen, sought to train 
professionals with a new mentality in the economic, technical and administrative fields that will lead the 
country to development. These institutions’ main objective was the preparation for the elite population 
that will run the companies. The institutions from the Church, had similar interests but reflecting the 
Catholic ideals in their formation, for professional ethics (Olivier, 2007; Silas, 2005a). Most of the 
institutions established during this period were secular (González, 2012).  
Once again the 3rd article of Constitution was modified in 1946, slightly changing the conditions for the 
private sector to grant higher education. Higher education was separated from the other levels of 
education (primary, secondary, normal education, technical and rural) and was classified as non-restricted 
education meaning that the RVOE was the only condition needed to grant higher education (Poder 
Ejecutivo Federal, 1946 as amended 1917; Blanco, 1994). At this point, the role of each state became 
relevant in determining the necessary requirements to grant the recognition (Olivier, 2007).  
With this modification, and after this first success of the private higher education institutions already 
operating, between the 1960 and the 1980, 13 more private establishments opened their doors21 (Acosta, 
                                                     
17 In fact, the Universities that had been established so far had won legitimization through presidential decrees. These were 
(González, 2012): Escuela Libre de Derecho (1912), Escuela Libre de Homeopatía (1930), and Escuela Libre de Enfermería y 
Obstetricia (1931).   
The universities that have been granted the authorization by presidential mandate throughout the years are (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 
2011): Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores (1952), Colegio de México (1962), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México 
(1963), Universidad Anáhuac (1918), Universidad Iberoamericana (1981), and Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara (1982). 
18 According to Rodríguez and Ordorika (2011) this option has turned out to be the least appealing for private higher education 
institution, for which since the 80’s it has not been really used. These might be because then these institutions have to follow the 
rules of the university to which they are incorporated, as well as respecting their supervision and control mechanisms (González, 
2012). 
19 These universities are: Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara in 1935, Universidad de las Américas in 1940, Instituto Tecnológico 
de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey in 1943, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México in 1946, Universidad de las Américas-
Puebla in 1947, Universidad Iberoamericana in 1954 and Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente in 1957 
(Acosta, 2005; 2012). 
20 Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara was born from the conflicts between the main university of the state, Universidad de 
Guadalajara, and the governor. Hence, a group of professors decided to establish their own university (Olivier, 2007) as they were 
against of incorporating the socialist ideology that was imposed by the government (González, 2012). 
21 These universities include (Acosta, 2005): Universidad del Valle de México (1960), Universidad del Valle de Atemajac (1961), 
Universidad La Salle (1962), Universidad Tecnológica de México (1966), Universidad Panamericana (1967), Universidad de 
Monterrey (1969), Universidad Regiomontana (1969), Universidad Cristóbal Colón (1969), Centro de Estudios Universitarios (1970), 
Universidad Popular del Estado de Puebla (1973), Universidad Intercontinental (1976), Universidad de Valle del Bravo (1976) and 
Universidad del Noroeste (1979). 
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2005), in which became, according to Baptista and Medina (2011), Aguilar (2003) and Acosta (2012), the 
period of most growth. Although most of these institutions started from the same principles as the 
previous ones, this expansion also opened the door to three universities established to absorb the demand 
of the middle class22, which in the absence of spaces in public universities lost the opportunity to study 
tertiary education (Aguilar, 2003; Acosta, 2005; Álvarez, 2011). By this time, private higher education had 
achieved legitimization by both the government and the society (Olivier, 2007), reaching a success that 
later will affect the laxity of the regulatory framework (Kent, 2004; Buendía 2016). Olivier (2007) mentions 
that the private universities established so far “responded to the diverse interests of the national elites. The 
most important private higher education institutions arose during this period and, in effect, they became 
selective establishments” (p. 58). González (2012) also supports this thesis when mentioning that private 
institutions arose in the country to keep the elitism that have been lost with the massification of the higher 
education, and as Acosta (2012) points out, to preserve the moral values this social group considered 
essential for their formation of their children. 
As Acosta (2005) points out, in the subsequent years, the growth of enrollment of the private sector 
reached a 528% while the public sector’s one only grew by 40%. However, the public sector remained 
larger than the private (Kent & Ramírez, 1999; Buendía, 2016). The fact is that although private higher 
education had multiplied exponentially, the situation of the country did not contribute to the growth of the 
public sector either. Although socialism had been set aside and democracy and capitalism were adopted 
(Guevara, 1980), there was a detriment in the quality of higher education. On one hand, there was little 
investment on the tertiary level as the baby boomers phenomenon had demanded to concentrate efforts 
and resources in the elementary level, leaving the other educational levels behind (Urquidi et al, 1967). On 
the other hand, when this generation reached the higher education level a quick investment was made in a 
massive hiring of teachers and administrative staff that led to a bureaucratic problem (Marsiske, 2001). 
The public sector during these years was characterized by low completion rate, high number of 
dropouts, inefficiency, poor teacher training, little research and high politicization (Fuentes, 2010; Larroyo, 
1983; Kent, 1986; Gieger, 1986; González, 2008; Luengo, 2003; Kent & Ramírez, 1999; Baptista & Medina, 
2008; González, 2012; Buendía, 2016). To which were added students’ strikes (68 Conflict23, El Halconazo in 
197124, 1999-200025), administrative and academic staffs’ strikes in 1972, 1973, 1977, and 198526 (Gonzalez, 
2008; Martuscelli, & Martínez, 2013), internal conflicts of the institutions27 like the students taking over the 
rectory buildings preventing the authorities from performing their functions (Hernández as referenced by 
González, 2009), and the cut of the public budget due to the economic crisis of the 70’s and 80’s (de Garay, 
2013) and to the 1985 earthquake which generated a massive destruction of the capital city (Ordorica & 
Prud’homme, 2012). These events, which marked the instability and uncertainty of the sector, certainly 
pushed the development of the private sector. 
                                                     
22 Universidad del Valle de México opened in 1960, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla in 1973, and Universidad 
Intercontinental in 1976 (Acosta, 2005).  
23 The 68 Conflict led by students of UNAM, and was joined by students from various public institutions of the capital city, which led 
to the closure of the institution (Moctezuma, 2008) and a struggle between the higher education sector and the government 
(Moreno, 1998) that ended in the Massacre of Tlatelolco. Although authors like Moreno (1998) doubt that the events have 
occurred as the university students narrate, other authors such as Guevara (1978) and Moctezuma (2008) reaffirm it. 
24 Student strike, from public institutions, that took place in 1971, in an attempt to resume the struggle that had guided the conflict 
of 68 (De la Garza, Ejea & Macías, 2014; Gómez, 2003; Medina, 1972). 
25 Students were against the new legal framework of the institution, which included the increase of tuition payment (de Garay, 
2013). 
26 The public higher institution’s staff went on strikes several with the objective of pressuring the authorities to sign a collective 
agreement (Martuscelli, & Martínez, 2013), or to increase their salaries (De la Garza, Ejea & Macías, 2014; Ordorika, 2006) 
27 Two students had died during internal clashes (Ochoa, 1976). 
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Hence, students from the middle and upper classes easily preferred to invest in private education28 
rather than to venture into the doubt of whether they would finish their studies one day. Private 
institutions that so far, most of them, were considered elite institutions (Levy, 2009) inside the country, as 
quality was better taken care off than in the public sector. Also, many academics from public universities 
decided to step out from the highly politicized and instable environment founding their own universities 
(Kent & Ramírez, 1999). Thus, by 1980, 180 private higher education institutions existed in the country 
(Acosta, 2005), number which kept on rising by the establishment of branches by the most successful 
institutions in the different states29 (Rodríguez, 2008c; Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011).  
However, this instability, added to the fact that the state had been relatively absent in the regulation of 
the private sector (Luengo, 2003; Álvarez, 2011; Muños & Silva, 2013; Buendía, 2016), opened the door to 
the establishment of institutions oriented to satisfy the demand of the sector of the population that was 
left outside the public system30 (Kent & Ramírez, 1999), beginning the process of stratification and 
diversification of the sector (Olivier, 2007; Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011; Acosta, 2012). This process 
multiplied with the signing of the North America Free Trade agreement with the United States and Canada 
in the 1992 as, in order for it to operate, Mexico had to under go a major reform to liberalize its economy 
(Villareal & Ferguson, 2015).  
Following the advice of World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the country adopted the 
neoliberal policies in order to be more competitive. This new economic and political model promoted the 
reduction of the state intervention and the cut of the public expenses with the aim, at least in theory, to 
achieve macroeconomic stability through the liberalization of markets (Torres, 2011; Klees, 2008). 
Privatization of public higher education institutions did not take place, but new private institutions were 
established, as the legal framework was reformed to incentivize private investment (Olivier, 2007) through 
deregulation (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011; Buendía, 2016). Also, the diversification of the offer was 
persuaded by the government (Rodríguez, 2008a).  
Accordingly, the 3rd article of the Constitution now clearly defined the Recognition of Validity of Studies 
(RVOE) as the mechanism to regulate private education (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1993 as amended 1917), 
and this could be granted by the President, the Ministry of Education (federal or local) or by an 
autonomous public higher education institution (Rodríguez, 2008d), as it had used to be. The RVOE 
constituted the “act of the educational authority, by virtue of which it is determined to incorporate a plan 
and program of studies that a private provider grants to the National Education System” (Secretaría de 
Educación Pública, 2015) and, even though institutions can operate without it, as Rodríguez (2017a) 
mentions, having the RVOE is the only way in which the student can get the professional license or cédula 
professional, document needed for exercising some professions31. Lacking the RVOE means that there is no 
public authority that supports the program as Aguilar (2003) asserts. However, still the institutions can 
issue diplomas. 
                                                     
28 As Silas (2007) mentions, private higher education becomes a popular option when the return on the investment is clear and 
visible. 
29 For instance the Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey has 32 campuses along the country, combined with 33 campuses known as 
Tec Milenio, making it the most extended institution. Universidad Anahuac ,10 (without adding their subdivisions), Universidad 
Iberoamericana, 8, Universidad La Salle, 15, and Universidad Panamericana, 3, among others. All these above mentioned 
institutions are oriented to the elites. Universidad del Valle de México has 37, but this institution was established to absorb the 
demand (De Garay, 2013). 
30 In many cases the spaces to public universities are overcrowded by low achieving students that come from the university’s high 
school institutions, that enjoy an automatic access to higher education despite their grades and performance (Gil, 2005). 
31 The professions vary from one state to another, but to name some examples, nor a medical doctor nor a layer can work without 
the professional license (De Garay, 2013). 
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As neoliberalism took place, it is also important to mention that the country went through a new 
economic crisis in 1994 cutting once again the budget destined to higher education (Martínez, 1992). So, 
more than ever, the growth of the private sector represented a relief for the government while demand for 
tertiary education continued to increase along with the population at that school age, and the strikes in the 
public sector continued32 (Ordorika, 2006; Rosas, 2001; Muños & Silva, 2013). According to Kent and 
Ramírez (1999) by 1995 there were 9.4 million Mexicans on the tertiary school age (between 20 to 24 years 
old, but only 13% could make it to higher education. Therefore, between the year 2000 and 2001, higher 
education institutions that aimed to absorbed demand incremented by 40% (Silas, 2005a), as many families 
preferred to spend their money in these new private institutions of dubious quality rather than nebulating 
their children’s future career for not having a university degree (Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la 
Universidad y la Educación México, 2002; Gil, 2005). Hence, by 2010 the total number of private institutions 
reached the number of 1,339 (de Garay, 2013), and 1,800 by 2011 according to Álvarez (2011). However, 
this author mentions that if the institutions are counted by each campus or franchise individually, the 
number raises up to 2,815. 
To reduce the problem of the proliferation of low quality institutions, the government implemented a 
new regulatory policy, the quality assurance process, which became voluntary options for private higher 
education institutions. This quality assurance regulation was primarily an initiative pushed by the elite 
higher education institutions (Kent & Ramírez, 1999; Rodríguez, 2004a), and aimed to increase competition 
and quality (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011). Correspondingly, the National Evaluation Commission or 
Comisión Nacional de Evaluación was created in order to assess Higher Education Institutions throughout 
three main actions: self-assessment, the evaluation from experts, and peer review. In its first attempt to 
evaluate the institutions, the Commission failed due to the lack of participation and interest of the 
academic community. For this reason, it almost disappeared in 1996 (Rubio, 2007). Nevertheless the 
Council for the Accreditation of Higher Education (COPAES) was created the year 2000, for accrediting 
accreditation agencies, to support the Commission and the evaluation processes (Luengo, 2003). In 
addition, the Federation of Private Mexican Higher Education Institutions33  (FIMPES) assumed a quality 
assurance role in 1992 (Baptista & Medina, 2008; Luengo, 2003).  
Despite this complicated start, pressure from international organizations, as well as the increasing 
competition, helped quality assurance become important (Hernández, 2006). However, as it is voluntary, in 
less than 16 years, only 30 institutions have been accredited by COPAES (Consejo para la Acreditación de 
Educación Superior, 2015), and from this only around 10 are private institutions (Rodríguez, 2017d), despite 
the more than 2,000 that the author has identified in a previous work (2017c). In other words, only 26% of 
the programs have received the accreditation (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011). In words of Luengo (2003) the 
results of the quality assurance policy have been “variable and sometimes diffuse” (p. 12). 
As quality assurance remained voluntary in 1998, the Agreement 243 was issued, in order to indicate 
the basic requirements needed to grant private education. Subsequently, the Ministry of Education began 
working on a regulatory framework specifically for the tertiary level (Rodríguez, 2008d). The author 
mentions that the already created in 1981, FIMPES, read the first draft and described it as overregulated, 
beginning a process of negotiation between the two institutions (FIMPES and Ministry) that ended up in the 
                                                     
32 Among other things, the strikes of 1999 sought to eliminate the recent established tuition fees and the admission exam to the 
public sector, for students that have studied in a high school incorporated to the national university (Rosas, 2001). 
33 FIMPES was created to increase collaboration between private higher education institutions among each and communication 
among these and the Ministry of Education (Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011) 
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Agreement 279 in 2000, which, as Muños and Silva (2013) point out, details the requirements for granting 
and getting the RVOE for a private higher education institution. 
In addition to this, and hoping institutions will regularize their situations, according to Álvarez (2011), 
Rodríguez (2004a; 2006; 2008a) and Rodríguez and Ordorika (2011), several institutions that have fulfilled 
over time the requirements established by the law, and specially the new criteria of the Agreement 279, 
and that were affiliated to FIMPES, were granted the status of Record of Academic Excellence (Registro de 
Excelencia Académica) or commonly know as administrative simplification, which allowed these institutions 
to obtain the RVOE without needing to hand in the plans and study programs when carrying out the 
procedure34. FIMPES’s quality assurance process was approved by the government in 2002 (Rodríguez & 
Ordorika, 2011), and became the only evaluator for private higher education institutions according to 
Aguilar (2003). However, this initiative did not yield the expected results, since the expected isomorphism 
did not occur; on the other hand, it opened more the door to the proliferation of low quality institutions 
better known in Mexico as universidades patito35 or ugly duckling universities. As Rodríguez (2006) points 
out, here it is important to mention that before this initiative was crystallized in the law, some private 
higher education institutions already had this simplified regime since the 90's36, and even some of them 
had already received more academic autonomy.  
Also, starting from 2005, a series of actions were carried out to reinforce the RVOE. Among them, the 
recognition of 22.1% of the programs was denied, and more than 4,000 sanctions were carried out for non-
compliance with the law (Álvarez, 2011). Similarly, in 2007 an agreement was signed between local and 
federal authorities to improve the coordination of the process of obtaining the RVOE because, since as it is 
administered at the same time by the different instances, responsibilities are not clear (Rodríguez, 2006; 
Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011). As Rodríguez (2006) asserts, the degree of compliance with the law lies in the 
ability to exercise an effective control in the quality assurance process. 
In 2012 the Ministry of Education established a program to increase and promote the quality of private 
higher education institutions that were granted by this instance the RVOE (Buendía, 2016). The program 
was named Programa de Fomento a la Calidad en Instituciones Particulares del Tipo Superior and included 
an evaluation of the programs that enjoyed this type of RVOE in order to be classified into different levels, 
and with the purpose of carrying on the recommendations proposed. 
Over the years, the Ministry of Education has tried to increase the regulations to private higher 
education institutions. Nevertheless, Rodríguez and Ordorika (2011) mention that FIMPES, worried about 
the over regulatory policy that was tried to be implemented, has opted to negotiate its quality assurance 
mechanisms instead to align it to the Ministry’s requirements. Undoubtedly, the characteristics of the RVOE 
and the deregulation policy have contributed to the proliferation of diploma mill institutions (Rodríguez, 
2004a). 
In 2017 new rules for the RVOE were proposed in the Agreement 17/11/17 which substitutes the 
Agreement 279 (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a), but this only referred to the regulations of the 
                                                     
34 Up to 2017, a total of 37 institutions enjoyed the administrative simplification status (Rodríguez, 2017c). 
35 Universidades patito makes reference to low quality institutions, but as Rodríguez (2008a) points out the term mainly began to 
be used by politicians implying a denial of the failure of the government to control and assure the quality of the institutions. The 
author suggests other terms like illegal, fraud or deceit institutions, but those terms imply the responsibility of the state, by 
evidencing its role in their proliferation. 
36 This universities included (Rodríguez, 2006): Universidad Iberoamericana, Universidad la Salle, Universidad de las Américas, 
Universidad Anáhuac, Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara, Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Instituto 
Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Occidente y la Escuela Bancaria y Comercial. 
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open system and online education, and the administrative simplification as Rodríguez (2017a) has pointed 
out. The open system and the online education certainly have grown considerably since the year 2000 
when the Agreement was issued. Hence this proposal sets an amount of academic hours needed to be 
fulfilled by the program, and details new requirements when summiting the study program37 (Rodríguez, 
2017b). Concerning the administrative simplification, it opens the doors to institutions to be accredited by 
other agencies, in addition to FIMPES, to get the special status. It also establishes new requirements for an 
institution to reach the level 3 of this administrative simplification, which to date, can only be fulfilled by 
two institutions (Rodríguez, 2017d). Not more significant changes are included in the proposal. 
In summary, the flexible and low regulatory policy towards private higher education in Mexico 
undoubtedly has contributed to the proliferation of low quality and low cost institutions (Acosta, 2011; 
Cuevas, 2011a; de Garay, 2013; Muños & Silva, 2013; Buendía, 2016, Álvarez, 2011; Instituto de 
Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la Educación México, 2002; Silas, 2008). Surprisingly, these 
institutions either operated without the RVOE or with a partial recognition in some of their programs 
(Aguilar, 2003; de Garay, 2013). The Ministry of Education recognizes only 20,861 programs with RVOE 
belonging to 1,799 institutions (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a). Hence, Acosta (2011) and Muños 
and Silva (2013) suggest that the problem with the regulatory policy is that the RVOE does not really assure 
quality. Olivier (2007) also notes that there are incongruences among the regulatory policies. 
 
IV. 2 The Mexican private higher education system today 
Undoubtedly, as can be seen in the previous section, the Mexican state has played an important role in 
the multiplication of the private higher education in the country mainly because it has assumed a distant 
and permissive role. However, also the challenges of coverage, and the preferences of some stratus of the 
population to enroll in these institutions have helped the sector developed (Rodríguez, 2008f). 
 Although in the beginning private higher education was associated with high quality standards, over the 
years it has extended its market and has taken advantage of the state's inability to grant education, as well 
as internal conflicts that public education has crossed (Kent & Ramírez, 1999; Kent, 2004; Levy, 2009; de 
Garay, 2013). Silas (2007) and González (2012) agree that this transformation of the private higher 
education system from elite to demand absorbing has mainly occurred following the demands of the labor 
market, which everyday seeks more and more professionalization of the employees, promoting the 
commercialization of the knowledge. Therefore, today we can find very diverse private higher education 
institutions in Mexico, from 100 students to 10,000, and from being founded more than 100 years ago to 
those that have just been established recently (Batista & Medina, 2011; Acosta, 2012). 
Álvarez (2011) has estimated a total of 2,815 higher education institutions, considering the different 
branches, and 1,800 universities without counting the other campuses, while de Garay (2013) identifies 
1,339 and Rodríguez (2017c) more than 2,000. This discrepancy is better explained by Rodríguez (2008c), 
who mentions: 
 
How many exactly? Who knows. As the Ministry of Education has recognized in several occasions, the lack of 
a national census of institutions of upper and upper secondary level is one of the elements that explains the 
dynamics of patito schools. […] the diversity of the forms of ownership and control over the establishments 
that are part of the private educational system, makes the census even more difficult [to take place].  
                                                     
37 This new requirements include: the pedagogical model, the didactics and the learning platform, among others (Rodríguez, 
2017d). 
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What the Ministry of Education does have in its website is a list of programs that have been granted the 
RVOE and of those that do not enjoy it any more (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017b). It is worth 
mentioning that the list of programs with RVOE is greater than that of those that have been revoked, and 
among those that do not have it any more, at the federal level, out of 174 pages of information, only the 
last 29 pages include the programs that have lost the RVOE due to a sanction, the other programs’ RVOE 
was withdrawal upon request. 
In this growing market of private higher education, several authors (Kent & Ramírez, 1999; Instituto de 
Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la Educación México, 2002; Álvarez, 2011; Muños & Silva, 2013; Silas, 
2005a; 2007) have tried to make a comprehensive classification of the institutions that today exist in the 
country, as there is no official classification, and institutions vary from massive system of campus to those 
who barely have an academic infrastructure and can be questioned as universities (Kent & Ramírez, 1999). 
In addition, according to Álvarez (2011) the distribution of the private higher education institutions in 
Mexico is very unequal while 94% of the municipalities in Mexico City enjoy the presence of these 
institutions, in Oaxaca, to mention an example, they are only present in the 2%. In fact, Serrano (2008) 
mentions that 60% of the higher education institutions in Mexico City are private38. However, as the author 
points out, that even though the private sector has helped increased the access to the tertiary level of 
education, higher education is still not enough for Mexico’s population in this school age. 
The following table 12 "Classification of private higher education institutions in Mexico" summarizes and 
contrasts these classifications in order to get an overview of the private sector. As can be seen, the 
classifications are constantly overlapping, but the variety of the sector remains high, generating challenges 
for regulation. 
In conclusion, it can be seen that the universe of private higher education in Mexico is very diverse and 
heterogeneous. It is clear that education as a good that can be consumed, is clearly accepted in the 
country; however, its growing development towards small and low quality institutions, focused only on 
economic gains and in the needs of the market, requires the study of regulatory instruments. The new 
complexity of this subsystem of higher education seems to indicate that the RVOE has been insufficient to 
guarantee quality, and that the role of the state, passive and lax, must be rethought. As Buendía (2016) 
mentions regulatory policies seem to be missing and are indeed needed to promote the integration of the 
system. 
Therefore, in the following section, the regulatory policy of higher education in Mexico will be analyzed 
carefully and thoroughly, studying each of the instruments that are currently used, in order to understand 
why the dynamics of this sector have taken place in this way, and subsequently make recommendations to 
avoid the future proliferation of these institutions of dubious quality, and to strive for the integration of the 
system. 
 
                                                     
38 Despite this fact, public institutions in Mexico City still have enrolled more students (54%), as their size is larger (Serrano, 2008). 
However, this varies from entity to entity; in some states, the public institutions have enrolled even the 96% of the students 
(Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la Educación México, 2002). 
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Table 12. Classification of private higher education institutions in Mexico  
Instituto de 
Investigaciones 
sobre la 
Universidad y la 
Educación 
México (2002), 
Luengo (2003) 
Kent & Ramírez (1999) Characteristics 
defined by: Aguilar 
(2003), Rodríguez 
(2004), Silas (2005b; 
2008) Cuevas 
(2011b) 
Baptista & Medina 
(2011) 
Muños & Silva 
(2013) 
Levy (1986) de Garay (2013) Silas (2005a; 
2005b) 
Silas 
(2005a) 
 
 
 
Buendía 
(2016), 
Álvarez 
(2011) 
 
 
Álvarez 
(2011) 
Elite Medium size -Full time academic 
staff 
-Inclusive academic 
offer 
 Consolidated 
institutions 
Private 
catholic 
universities 
Multidisciplinary 
institutions: offer 
programs in 
several disciplines 
and have more 
than 2,000 
students enrolled 
 
High profile 
institutions, 
universities 
that meet at 
least two 
quality 
criteria 
FIMPES, 
ANUIES o 
Accreditation 
agencies 
Non-
profit 
Most 
prestigious 
ones can 
charge more 
than $1,000 
dollars 
monthly  
 
 
 
Regional 
networks 
Massive 
systems 
 
Multiregional 
networks  
 
 
For profit 
Secular 
elite 
National and 
networking 
systems Demand 
absorbing 
-Market oriented 
-Focused on 
professionalization of 
the labor force 
-Professors only hired 
to teach a course 
-For profit 
-Few academic offer 
-Low degree of 
academic freedom 
-Lack of research 
-Focused on middle 
and low middle 
class 
-Professors only 
hired to teach a 
course 
-Inexpensive tuition 
fees 
-Little invest on the 
infrastructure 
-Some are owned by 
families 
Non-elite 
secular 
institutions 
or demand 
absorbing 
Disciplinary 
institutions: those 
that focus in only 
one or two 
disciplinary areas 
and have less 
than 2,000 
students enrolled 
Midprofile 
institutions: 
with only one 
quality 
criteria 
Moderate 
prestige ones 
around $400 
dollars 
Multi city 
state systems  
Small 
institutions 
Emerging 
institutions 
Low profile 
institutions 
that only 
have RVOE 
Low prestige 
that charge 
around $90  
dollars during 
the bachelor 
studies39 
Multi campus 
institutions  
Single campus 
institution  
No 
infrastructure 
Table elaborated by the author. 
 
                                                     
39 Exchange rate from US Dollar to Mexican Peso calculated based on the recently average rate: 1 USD = 20 MXN. 
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IV. 3 Regulations to the Mexican private higher education system 
As we have seen, based on Fielden and Varghese’s (2009), Floud’s (2005), and the Higher Education 
Commission’s (2013) elements of the higher education regulatory framework, the Mexican private higher 
education is regulated by: 
 
IV. 3.1 Legislation 
The Mexican Constitution (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 2017 as amended 1917) in its third article, subsection 
VI, establishes that private individuals can provide higher education as long as they are granted the RVOE. 
However, the law does not detail or explain the process or conditions to acquire it.   
The law also establishes that all education granted in the country has to develop harmonically the 
different faculties of the human being, promoting the love for the country and the values of justice, 
independence and solidarity. In addition, even though public education is secular, private education can 
have a religious orientation and thus, can be granted by religious congregations. 
 
The General Law of Education (Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 2005 as amended 1993) 
constitutes the main legal framework that regulates the private higher education sector. The law contains 
the responsibilities that refer to the three different governing bodies in Mexico (Executive, Legislative and 
Judicial Branch) and empowers local governments to develop their own laws on education, urging them to 
rely on federal law. 
 Aligned with the Constitution, in its article 1, confers the possibility for private individuals to grant 
education with authorization or the RVOE. In its article 7, the law describes the characteristics of the 
education that any institution, including private, must grant. In its article 13, it confers the power to grant 
the recognition to both central and regional governments at the same time. In its article 54, it states that 
the RVOE is attributed to each program specifically and not to the institution as a whole.  
Article 55 establishes the needed requirements to obtain the RVOE. In article 57, the responsibilities of 
the private providers are established: follow the law, teach the approved study program, grant a certain 
percentage of the profit as scholarships, and collaborate with the authority during inspections and 
evaluations. Article 75 mentions that violating article 57 will be sanctioned, but only two general sanctions 
are mentioned in article 76: that there will be fines and the revocation of the RVOE. However, the article 
does not include cause and action. Article 77 adds other actions that are to be punished like claiming they 
have recognition without having it. Article 59 only establishes that private providers that do not have the 
recognition, need to mention it when marketing the institutions’ programs. Finally, article 78 establishes 
the process to determine the sanctions, and it mentions that this will be issued according the each 
particular case, including the socio-economic conditions of the offender. 
 
The Law for the Coordination of Higher Education (Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 
1978) is a specific law for the tertiary level that establishes the responsibilities of the state at federal and 
local levels. This law recognizes the capacity of private investors to grant higher education and recognizes 
the RVOE as the mechanism to regulate the programs offer by these institutions. In its article 16 it grants 
the Ministry of Education of each state the power to confer the RVOE, while in article 17 it grants this 
faculty to public autonomous institutions, that have been selected for this purpose, to do so. In addition, in 
article 18 it establishes that the degrees from private institutions need the authentication of the public 
authority to be valid. Also, in article 19, the law mentions that after having the RVOE, the institutions need 
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to register at the Ministry of Education and failing to do so will lead into a fine of 100 thousand pesos or the 
closing of the institution. No more information regarding private institutions is contained in the law. 
 
Analysis: As can be seen from the legal framework is “the only aspect that shows the relationship in the 
constitutional authority of the state is the granting of official license” (Buendía, 2016, p. 45) to the 
programs. Moreover, as Blanco (1994) mentions, the law contains limited guarantees for private higher 
education and practically no incentives. In other words, the information contained in this law is scarce, and 
many things are taken for granted. Even though the law distinguished higher education from the other 
levels, when deepening into each point, in most of the cases, it is not specified to which level it is referring 
to, evidencing that it is difficult to regulate all types and modalities of education under the same law, even 
though that private education has been classified differently, into restricted and unrestricted. 
 In addition, many things remain said in between, demonstrating one of the assumptions the Elmore 
(1987) has identified by pointing out that policies assume that the target population has all the information 
needed to act accordingly. For example, it is mentioned that there will be sanctions, but these are not 
clearly specified as de Garay (2013) reaffirms. Only one sanction is mention in the Law for the Coordination 
of Higher Education (Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 1978) but these only refers to the 
failure to register after having the RVOE. When mentioning that there will be fines and the revocation of 
the RVOE, it is not specified which action leads to which sanction, violating the principle of proportionality. 
The principle of equality is also violated when the socio-economic conditions of the offender come into 
consideration while applying a sanction. Thus, as the discretionality of the authority that applies the 
sanction is enunciated in the law, the door is opened for abuse and corruption as Blanco (1994) 
acknowledges.  
In addition, here we can see here that it is being assumed that the existence of sanctions will assure 
compliance (Elmore, 1987). According to Hand (2012) a sanction is more likely to assure a behavior after 
weighing the costs between following the rule and not, action that the lack of information of the Mexican 
law does not allow to do so.  
Moreover, the first and fundamental responsibility of an institution is to get the RVOE to teach the 
program, but there is no detail sanction of what it happens if a program is offered without the recognition. 
As can be seen from article 59, the only visible effect is the need to let future students know that the 
program does not have the recognition. González (2012) addresses this topic when mentioning that the law 
“does not establish express obligation for private institutions to obtain the RVOE, however, individuals who 
teach studies without RVOE have the obligation 
to mention in all their advertising […] to avoid 
cheating students and parents” (p. 56).  
Tuirán, subsecretary for the division of Higher 
Education during the last presidential term 
(2006-2012), reported, at the end of his 
administration’s period (2012), that of a total of 
11,636 RVOE requested, 8,592 were granted 
while the rest, 3,044 were denied. The following 
graphic 1 “RVOE resolutions 2006-2012” shows 
this data in a visual way, evidencing the ease 
process for obtaining the recognition. As Blanco 
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(1994) mentions, one of the main problems is that it remains at the discretion of the competent authority 
to assess whether the requirements are met or not.  
In Tuirán’s (2012) report it can also be seen that although 7,084 programs were sanctioned during that 
period of time, only 921 were cancelled, which does not imply the closing of the institution. It is important 
to mention, that in the page of the Ministry of Education there is no available information concerning the 
number of programs that have been granted the RVOE. 
Another point that can be seen in this legal framework, as already mentioned is the responsibilities of 
each instance of government. However, these are not clear and overlap. In fact, Blanco (1994) mentions 
that the participation in granting the RVOE of federal and each states’ authorities, as well as the 
autonomous public institutions selected to do so, gives the possibility of having multiple diverse 
requirements to get the recognition. Rodríguez (2004a) has studied this topic and the way it has been 
portrayed in the media, specially in the year 2003, when the Ministry of Education and UNAM were 
involved in a contradictory dialogue where both institutions blamed each other for allowing the 
development of the low quality institutions as the RVOE has been granted to almost anyone who applies 
for it. Rodríguez documentation of the news bulletins clearly shows the shortcomings of the legal 
framework in the regulation of the system. The author even quotes the newspaper La Jornada, which 
mentions: “ UNAM demarcates itself from low quality universities […]. UNAM is an academic entity, not an 
educational authority, and therefore does not regulate the system of national education; the latter 
corresponds to the SEP [Ministry of Education]” (p. 17). So why then UNAM can grant the RVOE? How can 
then UNAM supervise a program?  
Additionally, it can be seen from the legal framework that the a posteriori regulation is not clear; no 
procedures and no parameters are defined. To say it differently they are only mentioned. This can, 
undoubtedly, lead to its inefficiency. 
In conclusion, the Mexican legislation assumes that private providers of higher education have all the 
needed information to fulfill the law and that responsibilities are clear for each one of the actors that take 
part of the process. However, by only mentioning that there will be a sanction, the compliance with the 
regulation cannot be assured, and there is a visible overlapping problem when carrying on the tasks of 
granting RVOE, which has lead to approving almost every study program that wants to be opened by 
private higher education institution. 
 
IV. 3.2 Procedures for establishing private institutions 
The Agreement 243 (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1998), was established by the Ministry of Education, 
and contains the general conditions and basis that the institutions (at any level of education) need to fulfill 
to get the RVOE. Here the different processes according to the level of education are detailed. The first two 
sections of the Agreement contains technical information, the third section establishes that information 
regarding professors credentials, the infrastructure and the study plans need to be presented to the 
authorities, but the only one that includes the list of documents that are needed, is the infrastructure.  
 
The Agreement 17/11/17 (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a) contains the procedures that must be 
followed to get the RVOE and ratifies the authorities that grant it (Ministry of Education at the Federal and 
local level, and some public higher education institutions). This agreement is particular to higher education. 
It defines the most important terms, and contains information regarding the formats that need to be filled 
in, the detail list of documents that need to be handed in, and the minimum requirements regarding of the 
personnel, the infrastructure and the study programs that need to be fulfilled to get the Recognition. 
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Regarding the physical spaces, it mentions that it has to comply with the conditions established by the 
Ministry of Education, or, where appropriate, decentralized bodies empowered to do so at the moment the 
request is issued; in other words, it has to have the established hygienic, security and pedagogical 
conditions to carry out the learning process. Concerning the authorization of the curriculum of the 
academic program, it needs to comply with a minimal number of credits and hours established by the 
Agreement, according to the degree level of the program, and specifies the elements it must have (learning 
outcomes, student profile and graduate profile, evaluation methods, and the content of each course). 
Finally, with respect of teaching staff and the academic fulltime staff, the Agreement classifies the staff, 
and specifies the criteria for selection (degree level) according to the level of the program, and the activities 
they must be carry on while teaching, according to the classification (teaching, researching and tutoring). In 
addition, a department of School Services (Servicios Escolares) is required to keep the records of the 
students, the legal documents, and to carry out the activities of incorporating students to the Ministry of 
Education every semester and paying the proper fees. 
The procedures to get the RVOE consist in filling in the forms included in the Agreement (format of 
application), handing in the curriculum40, and the description of the infrastructure41; the review of the 
documents by the authority and a visit to the institution to certify the veracity of the information regarding 
the infrastructure. 
The Agreement also mentions that inspections will take place, but does not detail the process; namely it 
does not include the specific objective or sanctions that might derive from the breach of the law. When 
speaking about sanctions the Agreement mentions the articles of the General Law of Education that talk 
about them and, once again, points out that they will be established according to the situation. What it is 
more detailed is the procedure to modify the RVOE, and to the removal of the RVOE in case of breaching 
the law. It also specifies that granting education without RVOE is not sanctioned, if it is properly 
communicated in the publicity. However, it also gives the Ministry of Education the responsibility to 
communicate periodically the list of programs that have RVOE and the ones that have been removed. 
Finally, the Agreement includes a new program, the Program for Improvement of the Institutions 
(Programa para la Mejora Institucional), a voluntary program in which institutions can participate by being 
accredited by a quality assurance accreditation. Briefly, the program consists in classifying these institutions 
into three groups: 1) institutions in process of being accredited, 2) accredited institutions and 3) 
consolidated accredited institutions, according to certain criteria like the percentage of accredited 
programs, the percentage of professors in the National System of Researchers (SNI) or the percentage of 
students that take the general exam for graduating. The benefits of participating in this program include, 
besides prestige for the institution, an administrative simplification in the procedures for getting RVOE’s, 
incorporating students to the Ministry of Education and the certification of the documents. 
 
Analysis: The first thing that is important to mention is that, for the nature of the Agreement 17/11/17, this 
is left to the interpretation of the state educational authorities, so it is applied differently in the 32 states of 
                                                     
40 The curriculum has to have: duration, number of semesters, profile, learning outcomes, justification of the pedagogical model, 
name of the courses, amount of hours of independent work and class time, number of credits, content, evaluation, and licenses (if 
required). 
41 The description of the infrastructure includes: legal documents of the property, special dimensions of the building, description 
the building (number of classrooms and their capacity and their conditions, number of cubicles, technological hardware, internet), 
the justification of the building, working conditions, sustainability, and the existence of a contingence plan. Most of the criteria has 
to be indicated by parameters of yes/no, good/medium/bad, and numbers. Other documents required: legal document that proves 
that the infrastructure can be used (property or rent), receipts, the documents of the legal entity, and a document that assures the 
safety of the building. 
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the Republic (Muños & Silva, 2013). This means that frequently occurs that when the federal Ministry of 
Education denies the RVOE the private higher education institutions request it to the local Ministries of 
Education, or the other way around, leading finally to the approval of the program despite its quality. 
Second, as the authors point out, it does not apply to the universities that are granted autonomy42. 
Finally, there is a third opportunity for the programs to get the RVOE throughout the recognition of the 
program by an autonomous institution.  
As for the Agreements, here it can be seen that information is more precise, especially in the 17/11/17, 
detailing the process and documents that are needed. Therefore, fewer assumptions take place. However, 
there are still things in between, or things that are not specified like the sanctions. Now, if we go deeper 
and remember Fielden and Varghese’s (2009) purpose for regulating higher education: ensuring efficiency 
and assuring quality, the regulatory legal framework for private education in Mexico falls short. We can see 
here that these instruments seem not to be carefully planned as Howlett (2009) had mentioned, and 
probably due to the lack of information that politicians had at the moment of issuing the law (Lascoumes 
and Le Galès, 2007) regarding the management and quality assurance of education.  
It can also be seen in the Agreements that the private higher education institutions enjoy complete 
freedom in deciding which programs to offer, the admission procedures and the number of students they 
enroll as Buendía (2016) comments. Nonetheless, constraints will be analyzed in the following section of 
this research, as it is in the academic autonomy where more restrictions are faced. So, even though they 
can decide which programs they can offer, the content has to be approved by getting the RVOE. As can be 
seen, the procedures and documents for getting the RVOE can be reduced to a checklist of documents and 
most of the regulation is done by a priori mechanisms.  
 
IV. 3.3 Quality assurance process 
Before detailing the quality assurance process, it is important to mention that the RVOE does not assure 
quality. On the contrary, it just assures that the minimal standards for offering an educational program are 
met (de Garay, 2013). Silas (2005b) best describes this situation when mentioning that legally, institutions 
in Mexico do not need to be accredited to assure the quality standards, but being so gives prestige and 
legitimization to an institution. In other words, as it was seen from the legal framework, quality assurance 
processes are not mandatory for private higher education institutions, but voluntary (Cuevas, 2011b; 
González, 2012). Therefore, according to the authors, their influence have been limited to improve quality, 
as only few institutions have been certified. As de Garay (2013) points out, only 17 % of the programs had 
been accredited by 2011.  
Having said this, quality assurance process and mechanisms for the Mexican private higher education 
institutions are the following: 
Council for the Accreditation of Higher Education (COPAES) (Consejo para la Acreditación de Educación 
Superior, 2015) is the legal institution that authorizes and supervises the accreditation agencies that private 
higher education institutions then hire to get accredited (Cuevas, 2011b). By 2010 (last information 
available), only 537 programs have been accredited by these organisms (Subsecretaría de Educación 
Superior, 2010), despite that some private institutions have even more than that number of programs 
(Cuevas, 2011b). The Council makes sure the accreditation agencies have indicators and standardized 
                                                     
42 However, here it is important to mention that universities that have been granted more autonomy by presidential degrees still 
need RVOE to offer a program.  By these presidential decrees they get the RVOE. 
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parameters for the evaluation. These include of the following categories: personnel, curriculum, evaluation 
of the learning process, institutional services, students, infrastructure, research, institutional collaboration, 
and management of the programs (Consejo para la Acreditación de Educación Superior, 2016). 
 
The National Association of Universities and Higher Education Institutions (ANUIES) (Asociación Nacional 
de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior, 2017) is an aggrupation of higher education 
institutions, private or public, whose main objective is to promote the improvement of the teaching, 
researching and expansion of the culture of the Mexican higher education system. ANUIES was established 
in 1950 and throughout the years has played a fundamental role in planning, elaborating, coordinating and 
evaluating the policy of the tertiary education in the country (Buendía, 2013). Nevertheless, as the author 
points out, it was until 1998 when it began to play his role as an evaluator.  
Today, as the association points out, only 187 higher education institutions belong to it, being 1.3% 
private institutions (Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Instituciones de Educación Superior, 2017). The 
association, as such, does not have the mission of certifying or accrediting the quality of the institutions, 
but being part of it gives prestige and recognizes its quality (Silas, 2005b).  
Hence, to become a member of ANUIES, according to Cuevas (2011b), the association evaluates the 
institution’s: mission, norms, planning, infrastructure, programs, evaluation methods, personnel, students, 
and financial balances. The evaluation as Buendía (2013) enlists, involves first, a self-evaluation process; 
second, a visit to the institution to corroborate the veracity of the self-evaluation report; and third, the 
results that consists either in the acceptance of the institution, which also includes rectifying its 
permanence, or in the non-acceptance. 
The author also points out that in order to be affiliated to the ANUIES the institutions have to have been 
at least operating for at least 10 years and thus, have reached both administrative and academic 
consolidation. 
 
The Federation of Private Mexican Higher Education Institutions (FIMPES) (Federación de Instituciones 
Mexicanas Particulares de Educación Superior, 2015) is an aggrupation of private Mexican higher education 
institutions who seeks to improve collaboration and communication among the institutions. FIMPES was 
created in 1981 (González, 2012), and today it integrates 109 private institutions. To be part of it, 
institutions need to go through a certification process (Federación de Instituciones Mexicanas Particulares 
de Educación Superior, 2015), which is carried out at the institutional level in contrast with the RVOE, which 
is specific to each program. Since 1992, FIMPES has assumed the role of evaluator, accrediting the quality 
of the private higher education institutions that want to be affiliated to it. As Buendía (2013) mentions, 
getting these accreditation by FIMPES means being recognized as a quality institution, increasing the 
prestige and the public image. 
The process consists first, in a self-evaluation, and ends in verification of the information provide by the 
association (Cuevas, 2011b; Buendía, 2013). Among other requirements having at least one generation of 
graduates is needed to become a member of FIMPES (de Garay, 2013). 
The self-evaluation is done based on a series of indicators, which include (Cuevas, 2011b): mission, 
personnel, resources allocation, programs, norms, institutional philosophy, organizational structure, and 
research activities. In total there are over 160 indicators. In this self-evaluation process the same institution 
reviews the above-mentioned indicators and elaborates a final self-study report (Aguilar, 2003). 
The report, as the same author mentions, is revised by a team of seven academics from different higher 
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education institutions who make sure of its veracity. Visits and observations to the institution that is being 
evaluated also take place to verify the report. Finally, a Commission, composed by nine academics gives the 
verdict: not accredited, accredited with some conditions, accredited with recommendations, accredited 
without observations, and fully accredited (Buendía, 2013). 
According to Rodríguez (2017c), only 60 private higher education institutions have been accredited and, 
from these, 26 do not have any observations or recommendations, which means they are fully accredited. 
As de Garay (2013) points out, these institutions represent more or less the 8.1% of the private higher 
education in the country. Nonetheless, as Acosta (2012) mentions being part of FIMPES today means being 
recognized as a high quality and prestigious institution. 
 
Analysis: As can be seen, all this quality assurance agencies have different methodologies, and have 
different objectives too, which are not directly related to the assurance of the quality of the private higher 
education system. Both ANUIES and FIMPES were not established to assure quality, but belonging to the 
association gives prestige and helps legitimate to the institutions (Silas, 2005b; Buendía, 2013). COPAES, on 
the other hand, certifies accreditation agencies who are for profit organisms. Silas (2005b) also points out 
that international accreditation agencies can assure the quality of private higher education institutions, but 
this was not added in the list, as it is not a national mechanism. 
In addition, it can be seen here that the policy for quality assurance is again too flexible, as it is voluntary 
to get accredited. Out of the 1,800 private institutions (Álvarez, 2011) only 27 belong to ANUIES (de Garay, 
2013) and 108 to FIMPES (Cuevas, 2011b). It is clear that the government, when issuing the policy, assumed 
that private institutions would be willing to achieve legitimization and avoid being seen as diploma mills. 
However, the Mexican academia has perceived quality as a checklist of indicators they have to fulfill 
(Buendía, 2011) as processes are mainly centered in technical issues (Silas, 2013), because there is not an 
integral policy. There is a lack of a well-planned National policy and instead, each accreditation agency 
establishes their own parameters and indicators to assess the quality of education, according to their 
criteria of how it should be. But no one evaluates these institutions, nor they are subjected to audits (Diaz, 
2005). In other words, there are no mechanisms to regulate them. 
 
IV. 3.4 Grants and loan schemes 
This regulatory mechanism, at least in Mexico, does not apply to the private sector that enjoys a high 
degree of autonomy in this aspect; this is due to the fact that there is no public capital invested on them. 
Pinto (1974) Poder Judicial (2005) and Carpizo (2002) agree that private institutions in Mexico are created 
by the will of private investors. Hence, they operate with their own resources making it impossible for the 
state to interfere in the way they use them. Therefore, the organizational structures remain also in 
complete internal control of the private investors. 
 
In summary, as Buendía (2016) mentions, regulations in Mexico facilitate competition and the 
establishment of new institutions, as barriers are minimal. Hence the student is not protected in the 
system. As it can be seen, even though there is an extensive legislation, the only mechanism to apply this 
legislation is precisely the RVOE, as other mechanisms to assure compliance either do not exist or are not 
carried out, or they are voluntary. In addition to this, the regulation takes place by program and no by 
institution, meaning that an institution can offer recognized programs and not recognized programs at the 
same time, and there are no sanctions for offering a program that lacks the RVOE, as long as it is mentioned 
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while marketing the program. Finally, as can be seen, regulations seem to focus on meeting some basic 
technical requirements that do not necessarily assure quality. 
 
IV. 4 Degree of autonomy of the private higher education institutions in Mexico  
In the specific case of the Mexican context, autonomy is a key concept when speaking about the 
universities. It has been in the public speech since the 19th century (Martuscelli & Martínez, 2013; 
Garciadiego, 1997), although it was first conferred to the National University until 1929.  
When autonomy was first granted, it gave the university the possibility to govern itself throughout its 
own structure and internal regulations, as well as to create its own academic programs and to use its 
financial resources according to its needs (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1929 as amended 1917). Of course, 
these activities were carried on with certain degree of interference from the government, but aiming, at 
the end, to achieve a complete detachment in the future from the state. Interestingly, the main purpose for 
granting autonomy to the university was not academical, but the desire of the government to detach from 
the disciplinary and the governance problems suffered by the institution due to students’ protests43 
(Marsiske, 1982). 
For González (2004) the autonomy granted to the Mexican higher education institutions has allowed the 
expansion and the diversification of the tertiary education and, therefore, of the teaching and of the 
research. As a matter of fact, the private higher education sector in Mexico began developing just after 
autonomy was granted to the main university, in the second half of the 1930’s (Martínez, 2012; Rangel, 
1979). 
According to Asociación Nacional de Universidades e Institutos de Investigación Superior (1979), over 
time, 32 public universities have been granted autonomy. Since that year and to date, only one more public 
university has received autonomy. On the private sector higher education institutions like el Instituto 
Tecnológico de México and Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara, also enjoy certain degree of autonomy 
that the other private institutions do not have (Cossío, 2006). 
The degree of autonomy that all these higher education institutions enjoy has changed over the years, 
increasing or decreasing. However, most of the research that has been done in the country focuses on the 
legal and philosophical aspects that characterize it, and it is based on the “ideal autonomy” granted to the 
national university (UNAM). 
Namely, little research has been done on autonomy in the private sector. This is largely due to a 
generalized assumption that private institutions are already autonomous from the state, as there is no 
public capital invested on them. Nevertheless, it is also due to the fact that the term autonomy is related 
specifically to the public sector. In other words, the Constitution has defined the concept of autonomy in 
relation to the public sector, for which it is claimed that private institutions cannot be considered 
autonomous, because legally they cannot be granted autonomy, as the Constitution does not allow it 
(Serna, 2006). Hence, instead of referring to autonomy on the private sector, it is addressed as the capacity 
to manage themselves, especially in the administrative aspects. 
Autonomy, for the Mexican Constitution (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 2017 as amended 1917), is granted by 
the state to certain higher education institutions giving them the responsibility to govern themselves when 
carrying on their activities of teaching, researching and spreading the culture. Autonomy therefore implies 
                                                     
43 Understanding the government, the Revolution war (1917-1928) followed by the Cristeros war (1924-1928) had just ended 
(Aguilar & Serrano, 2012). 
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that these institutions have to be accountable to the society by fulfilling their mission for which they were 
created, and by being transparent in the use of their resources. 
Then, autonomy is understood as a legal construct granted by the law, that when given, universities 
become full legal entities that are able to act without the interference from the government in its main 
activities, safeguarding the freedom of teaching and researching (Martuscelli & Martínez, 2013).  
In words or Poder Judicial (2005) autonomy in Mexico is legally understood as an  
 
Attribution of self-government that has its origin in a formal and material legislative act from the Congress or 
local legislatures, through which they [higher education institutions] are granted academic and patrimonial 
independence to determine, subject to the provisions of the General Constitution of the Republic and in the 
respective laws, the terms and conditions in which they will develop their educational services, their 
admission requirements, promotion and permanence of their academic staff and the way in which they will 
administer their patrimony (Poder Judicial, 2005, p. 9). 
 
 As autonomy is an attribute that is given, and it implies the capacity of an institution to select the 
members of its governing bodies, to establish its own study programs, and to administer its resources 
according to its needs, for Carpizo (2002) it refers only to public institutions.  
Pinto (1974) and Poder Judicial (2005), agree with Carpizo (2002) that private universities already enjoy 
autonomy and there is no need for it to be given by the state. In other words, private universities are 
created by the will of private investors. Hence, they operate with their own resources making it impossible 
for the state to interfere in the way they use them. Therefore, the organizational structures remain also in 
complete internal control of the private investors. 
Hurtado (1976) also points out that autonomy refers to independence from the head of the state 
basically, as all the higher education institutions, being autonomous or not, or private or public, need to 
comply with the legislative power of the country where they are established. Based on this definition, a 
private university does not need to be granted autonomy because it already enjoys certain degree of 
freedom, as it does not depend on the Federal government to operate. 
Indeed, private higher education institutions in Mexico are autonomous in many aspects, but they 
certainly face some constraints. For instance, according to the Constitution (Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 2017 
as amended 1917) private individuals can provide higher education as long as the state has granted the 
Recognition of Official Validity of Studies. The Ministry of Education grants this RVOE with the objective of 
assuring that the minimal requirements established by the law are met (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 
2015).  
In the Agreements 243 and 17/11/17 the conditions to get the Recognition are established. These 
conditions include (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1998, 2017): 
1) A proper physical space to carry on the educational act, in compliance with the hygiene, safety and 
pedagogical conditions established by the Ministry of Education, or, where appropriate, 
decentralized bodies empowered to do so at the moment the request is issued. 
2) The authorization of the curriculum of the study program that will be taught by the institution. The 
curriculum needs to comply with the number of credits and hours established by the law, according 
to the degree level of the program. Also, the objectives of the content, the learning outcomes, the 
methodologies, and the assessment process of each course of the program are reviewed by the 
authorities. 
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3) Competent and prepared staff. The teaching staff and the academic fulltime staff have to comply 
with the criteria established by the law. The law indicates the minimal degree that each professor has 
to have, according to the level of studies where they will be teaching and working.  
4) The approval of the internal norms and rules of the institution. The norms of the institution have to 
be aligned with the Constitution. In addition, there are some specific topics that the internal rules of 
the institutions have to consider by law like dropout causes and procedures, to give an example. 
However, although the topic must be address in the internal rules, the only case where there must 
be compliance with the parameters established by the law is the one referring to granting 
scholarships. The internal rules are reviewed and approved by the authority. 
5) The granting of 5% of scholarships, according to the total number of students enrolled in the 
institutions. Nonetheless, the institution has the freedom to select and give the scholarship to the 
students as pleases, as long as the 5% is given. Some procedures and considerations are advised for 
this process. 
 
As can be seen, the Mexican private higher education institutions suffer the most constraints in the 
academic dimension, while there seem to little constrain regarding the staffing, organizational and the 
financial ones. Concerning to the financial autonomy, the only requirement is that the institution has to 
grant scholarships to 5% of its enrolled students (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a).  
Regarding the financial dimension, most of the institutions are non-profit institutions. Nevertheless, this 
is changing, granting the possibility now to establish for profit institution. Non-profit institutions are 
exempted of paying certain taxes, expecting they invest all their profits in the institutions. However, for 
profit private higher education institutions in Mexico are not restricted to invest their surpluses in the 
institution; on the contrary, they can decide how to use them and on what to spend them.  
For profit private higher education institutions in Mexico are considered a business, and according to 
Guerra (Miranda & González, 2015) they even pay more taxes than a regular corporation. Higher education 
institutions pay between 25 to 30% of their profits as taxes, and there are no tax reductions or loans from 
the public sector. They have to pay the payroll tax, the property tax, and the participation in INFONAVIT 
and the social security of the employees. However, non-profit institutions are exempted of paying taxes, as 
they are meant to reinvest all their surpluses in the institution. 
As has been said before, autonomy is something dynamic that changes according to the particular 
circumstances of the context, and thus it is enjoyed in different degrees by the diverse institutions. For this 
reason, there are some private universities, semi-independent institutions, in Mexico that enjoy a “simplify 
regime” or administrative simplification (Rodríguez, 2004a, 2006; Buendía, 2011). This simplify regime 
means that an institution that has been operating in compliance with the law for ten years, that has been 
accredited by an agency to assure quality standards, that belongs to the recently created Program for the 
Improvement of the Institutions, and that has not been sanctioned in a period of time of three years, is 
allowed to present less documents than the required ones to receive the RVOE (Secretaría de Educación 
Pública, 2017a). Still they make the incorporations and have to present the legal documents of their 
certification in the Ministry of Education, but they are less supervised. 
Other institutions like Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México and Universidad Autónoma de 
Guadalajara enjoy even a greater degree of autonomy and can be considered independent according to 
Fielden’s (2008) classification. De Garay (2013) mentions that the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios 
Superiores de Monterrey, Universidad Anáhuac and Universidad Iberoamericana enjoy absolute academic 
autonomy when creating and implementing new study programs as the RVOE has already been granted. 
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The autonomy these institutions have received is granted, as Cossío (2006), Serna (2006) and de Garay 
(2013) point out, by a presidential decree outside the Constitution, and its degree differs from one 
institution to another. González and Guadarrama (2009), after analyzing the Constitutional Controversy 
102/2003 by the Minister Cossío, conclude that private institutions in Mexico receive only legal autonomy, 
which refers to the administrative procedures needed to operate, while public universities are granted with 
constitutional autonomy. This legal autonomy is materialized through a particular agreement between the 
institution and the authority. 
Serna (2006) clarifies that these two autonomies are very different. The constitutional autonomy refers 
to the organization of the public administration. Nonetheless, as private institutions are outside the public 
administration, and they enjoy all the rights established by the law, they need to comply with it. In other 
words, the principle of legality contained in the Constitution constrains the possibility of determining new 
rights and obligations in favor of private education (Blanco, 1994).  In fact, public institutions are not 
regulated by the same laws, as the General Law of Education excludes them, while it does apply to the 
private sector.  
Hence the legal autonomy of private institutions is defined according to the law (Serna, 2006); in other 
words, this autonomy is defined in relation to the power that the authority exerts, especially in its capacity 
of the state to influence the curriculum. Therefore, the presidential decrees give the selected institutions a 
vote of confidence for the creation of their own curriculum. 
In short these institutions have been granted more academic autonomy than the semi-independent 
ones, meaning that they are the least constraint in the system. These independent institution, enjoy 
specifically more academic autonomy than regular semi-independent private institution. 
 
IV. 5 The results  
This study started with the questions: How is private higher education perceived in Mexico? To what 
extent private higher education is regulated in Mexico and what level of autonomy does it enjoy in its 
several dimensions? How are regulations and the existing level of autonomy related to the proliferation of 
the low quality institutions? 
To summarize the analysis of the documents table 13 “Degree of autonomy of the private higher 
education institutions (semi-independent) in Mexico and the regulations that constrain it” has been 
elaborated. The table shows the level of autonomy enjoyed in each dimension, by the semi-independent 
private higher education institutions in Mexico, as well as the regulatory instrument that constrain it. The 
table takes the dimensions of autonomy from the chart 1 "The dimensions of the autonomy", as well as the 
parameters to define the level of autonomy that are presented in the subtitle II. 2.4 "The specificity of 
autonomy for the private higher education". In addition, it takes the regulatory instruments from those 
presented in Table 8 "Specific regulatory mechanisms used in higher education by their classification" and 
the a posteriori and a priori parameters of Table 10 "Regulatory mechanisms by the dimension of the 
autonomy they constrain". Finally, the information contained in the table regarding the specific case of the 
autonomy and the regulations for private higher education in Mexico is taken from the previous analysis 
that has been carried out in section IV "The Mexican private higher education system". 
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Table 13. Degree of autonomy of the private higher education institutions (semi-independent) in Mexico and the regulations that constrain it 
Dimension Activity Degree of 
autonomy 
Regulatory mechanisms 
A priori mechanisms A posteriori mechanisms 
Type of 
mechanism 
Mechanism What is indicated Type of 
mechanism 
Mechanism What is indicated 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
 
Keep surplus  Medium    Taxes 
- Payroll tax   
- Property tax 
- Participation in 
INFONAVIT 
Pay regular taxes of any business. 
However, non-profit institutions 
are exempted from property tax 
Borrow money High       
Own buildings  High       
Charge tuition fees High       
Determine tuition fees High       
Invest in financial markets High       
Decide expenditures High       
Determine sources of money High       
Grant scholarships Medium Specific norms Agreement 17/11/17 - 5% to scholarships     
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
Determine legal status High       
Define internal rules and 
procedures 
Medium Specific norms 
Agreement 17/11/17 - Aligned to the Constitution 
- Inclusion of some specific topics 
   
Approval 
Select members of executive 
board and academic bodies 
High       
Establish criteria and durability 
of leadership positions 
High       
Dismiss the university’s head High       
Select external members in the 
governing bodies 
High       
Determine structures Medium Specific norms Agreement 17/11/17 
- Have certain departments like 
School Services, and a library 
   
Create a legal entity High       
Decide the orientation of its 
governance bodies 
High       
Decide mission and goals Medium Specific norms 
Agreement 17/11/17 
- Aligned to the Constitution    
Approval 
St
af
fi
n
g 
Recruit and select academic 
staff 
Medium Specific norms 
Basic requirements checklists 
at Agreement 17/11/17 
- Degree level 
- Activities that must be carried out 
   
Recruit and select 
administrative staff 
High       
Determine salary scales High       
Establish staffing policies Medium 
Specific norms Federal Labor Law -Regular working conditions 
   
Dismiss staff Medium    
Promote staff High       
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Dimension Activity Degree of 
autonomy 
Regulatory mechanisms 
A priori mechanisms A posteriori mechanisms 
Type of 
mechanism 
Mechanism What is indicated Type of 
mechanism 
Mechanism What is indicated 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
Decide the number of students High       
Determine academic profile High       
Open/close programs  
 
Medium 
Legislation 
Constitution 
General Law of Education 
Law for the Coordination of 
Higher Education 
- Need to have the RVOE for being 
part of the National System of 
education but can operate without 
it 
For 
assuring 
compliance 
 
Supervision 
 
Ordinary and extraordinary visits 
to the institution to assure that 
the requirements are met. The 
authority decides when and how 
many 
Specific norms 
and 
procedures 
 
Agreement 243 
Agreement 
17/11/17 
Mechanism 
for 
establishing 
and 
recognizing 
programs  
- Recognition of Official Validity of 
Studies granted by the Ministry of 
Education at both Federal and local 
levels, and by some public 
autonomous universities 
Basic 
requirements 
checklists 
- Need to fulfill requirements to get 
the RVOE: infrastructure, 
resources, equipment, activities 
and curriculum 
Design curriculum and content Medium 
Specific norms 
and 
procedures 
Agreement 
17/11/17 
Approval 
- The program and the fulfillment 
of the requirements are reviewed 
by the authority in order to get the 
RVOE 
Establish admission 
mechanisms 
High       
Design and implement quality 
assurance mechanisms 
Medium    
Voluntary 
external 
quality 
assurance 
Internal audits 
and self reports 
-Fulfill requirements established 
by private accreditation agencies 
(FIMPES, accreditation agencies 
recognized by COPAES, or 
international agencies) and 
present the evidence. Or by 
ANUIES which is a non 
governmental organization 
Peer review 
Make research decisions High       
Select language of instruction High       
Award degrees Low    
For 
assuring 
quality 
Recognition of 
degrees 
Authentication of the degree is 
needed for it to have validity, and 
the granting of the professional 
license (Only programs with 
RVOE) 
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Next, the findings of the interviews are presented. In addition to corroborating the questions that have 
already been answered, the interviews have been useful to understand how the actors involved in the 
Mexican higher education system perceive these regulations and their constrains, as well as the degree of 
capacity they enjoy to govern themselves. In addition, they have been useful to get to know and to 
comprehend the problems that derive in the regulatory policy between the action or inaction of the state 
to control the private higher education system, and the degree of freedom exercised by institutions to self-
direct and self-determine. From this previous reflection, some recommendations have emerged to improve 
the regulatory policy for private higher education in the country. 
In this way, first it is presented a diagram that shows the relationship of the categories that have been 
found in this research, in which it will be deepened later. Chart 3. “The research findings” presents the ten 
categories found in this research. As can be seen, private higher education in Mexico is formed by four 
operational dimensions: academic, staffing, organizational and financial, which are placed according to 
their different degrees of autonomy. The academic dimension is placed at the top, next to the  + sign of the 
current regulations, meaning that is suffers the most limitations. On the contrary, the financial dimension is 
placed at the bottom, closer to the + sign of autonomy, which means that it enjoys a higher degree of 
autonomy. It can be seen that the line from current regulations is shorter than the one from autonomy 
because, as it has been said before, in general private higher education institutions enjoy high degrees of 
autonomy. It can also been seen that both lines are clashing, meaning that they are constantly in tension 
leading to the problems of the regulatory policy. However, as there is a need of regulating the system, 
some proposed recommendations emanate to improve the regulatory policy without the detriment of the 
autonomy. 
 
Chart 3. The research findings 
 
Having analyzed the relationship of the categories that have been found, each category will be explained 
to detail: 
 
IV. 5.1 Private higher education in Mexico 
Private higher education in Mexico is conceived by the participants in a similar way. This category 
includes their conceptualization and the different types of institutions that the participants perceived in the 
sector. 
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Conceptualization. As Levy (1986) has mentioned, even though that the legal framework of an institution is 
the main element used to distinguish private from public ones, the ownership and the sources of the 
financial resources are the clearest and most frequent parameters used to make this distinction. This can 
clearly be seen as the participants of this study used these terms to classify the Mexican higher education. 
Therefore, the private higher education is conceptualized, by the participants, as the education that 
continues after high school and it is not granted by the state. In other words, for the participants, the main 
element that distinguishes the private higher education institutions from the public ones is the ownership 
of the institutions. Participants used different terms to describe this, such as “not managed by the 
government” and the ones that “does not belong to the state”. For example, Fernando clearly mentions: 
“higher education is the one that takes place after high school, and it can be granted by the state or not. 
The one that is granted by the state is public, and the one that is not, is private”. 
Another characteristic of the private higher education institutions in which the participants coincide, is 
that the financial resources invested in these institutions come from private investment and not from the 
state. Participants use the following expressions to point this out: “financed by private investment”, 
“private capital invested”, and “do not receive money from the government”. In this sense, participants 
agree that private higher education in Mexico does not receive money from the federation or from the 
states, as its expenses are not included in the public budget; in other words, the money comes from private 
resources. Benito better describes this when he mentions: “it is an education that it is financed, basically, 
by persons or associations that have nothing to do with the state in economic terms”, and if Levy’s (2007; 
2009; 2011) and Altbach’s (2005a; 2005b; 2005c) findings are remembered, these institutions are usually 
owned or affiliated to different groups as religious congregations (Silas, 2005a; Baptista & Medina, 2011; 
Buendía, 2016; Levy, 2009; Olivier, 2007), businessmen (González, 2012) or families.  
However, some participants also acknowledge that tuition fees play an important role in the subsistence 
of these institutions. “Students have to pay” and they “charge a tuition fee for their services” are some 
phrases that point this out, but this cannot be used as the only parameter as Altbach (2005a) has glimpsed, 
because in many countries students pay tuition fees in public education, and such is the case of at least 
UNAM, in Mexico, where even if it is minimal, a fee is charged. 
Another distinction, pointed by some participants and authors like Levy (1986; 2007; 2008) and Dittrrich 
and Weck-Hannemann (2010) is that private institutions have mainly focused on the professionalization of 
the labor force. Thus, participants agree that most private higher education institutions in Mexico are 
focused on forming people for the labor market. Their perceptions include: “focused on forming 
professionals” and “higher education for the labor market”. For example, José Manuel mentions: “it seeks 
to prepare people to work in the business sector”. Nevertheless, one of the participants acknowledges that 
a private institution has the responsibility of not only teaching, but also carrying out research and extending 
the culture: “its purposes, of which they are a part of, are research, teaching, and cultural extension” 
(Isabel). This coincides with the findings of Duderstadt (2000), Rhodes (2009), and Brennan, King and 
Lebeau (2004) on the role of higher education in the society, and with the findings of Bernasconi (2011) 
who mentioned that both public and private institutions have to carry out the same activities of teaching, 
researching, and extending the culture. 
 
Reason of existence of private higher education institutions. Private higher education has developed for 
multiple reasons around the world. These include the separation from he Church and the state (Levy, 
2007), the reaction against imposing ideologies (Levy 1986, 2009, 2011; Acosta, 2005; Rodríguez & 
Ordorika, 2011; Olivier, 2007; Rodríguez, 2008c), the formation of the elites (Altbach, 1998b; Olivier, 2007; 
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Silas, 2005a; González, 2012), and the massification process and the state’s inability to grant higher 
education to all (Altbach, 2005a; Levy, 1986; Aguilar, 2003; Acosta, 2005; Álvarez, 2011; Kent & Ramírez, 
1999). In Mexico, it has been seen that it does not only correspond to the massification process.  
In this sense, the participants recognized different reasons. On one hand, it emerged as a response to a 
social need, as the society decided to grant higher education because they felt unsatisfied with the one that 
was being granted by the state. But, on the other hand, the private sector also expanded because the 
public sector lacked the spaces to satisfy the demand of all those who wanted to study this level of 
education. Hence, it can be seen that the first wave of higher education institutions began as a reaction 
from the elite population against the ideologies taught by the government in the public institutions, but 
they expanded and proliferated because of the lack of spaces in the public institutions as the population 
that demanded higher education grew. José Manuel, for example, addressed the first reason when he 
explains that private institutions emerged as a response from the society as the state was failing to satisfy 
their needs: 
 
They respond to the private needs that the state is failing to satisfy, regarding the economic development, 
and the professional development of the people. Then they are a response to something they consider the 
state cannot do by itself or that it is not doing well enough. 
 
On the other hand, participants like Carmen recognize that the private sector has expanded because the 
public sector lacks spaces to satisfy the demand of all those who want to study this level of education. She 
says: “private institutions emerged because the public ones were unable to satisfy the demands of access”.  
 
Typology of private higher education institutions. All the participants of this study recognize that there are 
different types of private higher education institutions in the country, as diverse characteristics can be 
identified. This study began presenting a broad classification based on Levy’s (2009) findings of elite and 
demand absorbing institutions. Most of the participants coincide with the author that these parameters 
can be used to describe the universe of private higher education institutions in Mexico. However, some 
presented other parameters that reflect the multiple classifications that have been carried out in the 
country. Other major dichotomies of classification that the participants mentioned are: high and low 
quality; and for profit and non-profit. 
Elite, high quality and non-profit institutions seem to overlap in the description made by the 
participants, as well as the demand absorbing, low quality and for profit. In the first dichotomy, the terms 
“elite universities”, “elite religious universities” “demand absorbing universities” were frequent, coinciding 
with the classifications made by Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la Educación México 
(2002) and Luengo (2003). Most participants agree that these elite institutions are the ones with the 
highest tuition fees as Buendía (2016) and Álvarez (2011) had foreseen. For example, Karla says: “the elite 
ones are the expensive institutions”.  
Also, some participants clarified that this classification of elite and demand absorbing is more extensive. 
In this regard, Pilar mentions that inside the demand absorbing institutions, there are many different types: 
 
Inside the demand absorbing universities, there are some we can say they are consolidated, as they have a 
certain educational project; there are others that aspire to become elite; and finally others that definitively 
can be considered using the derogatory term of patito universities, garage universities, that they only seek to 
make money. 
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Patito universities are perceived by the participants as the lowest quality institutions in the country. 
Participants emphasize that the government permits these institutions to exist, but their quality is 
questionable and the graduates’ preparation dubious. Some graduate professionals “in two years, one year, 
they finish” as Carmen mentions. All of the participants acknowledge that these institutions are not 
recognized by the government, but have proliferated because there is a clear need of higher education and 
a lack of access to the public system. 
 They are described by participants as “mediocre”, “bad and insufficient”. Participants also consider that 
they “do not have anything”, referring to the lack of the RVOE and the lack of infrastructure, and they agree 
that they “cannot be called universities”. All the participants mention that they “take advantage” of the 
students, while they make profit out of them. José Manuel summarizes this perception: they “simply 
establish a small business in which they play with the dreams of many people without assuring quality and 
taking advantage of the need that exists of higher education”. 
In the second dichotomy, participants distinguish between the high quality and the low quality 
institutions, coinciding with Silas’s (2005a; 2005b) classification. Participants use the terms “high quality 
universities” and “patito universities” to distinguish these two categories, and they also use quality 
assurance mechanisms to identify high quality institutions as “belong[ing] to ANUIES”. Participants agree 
that low quality institutions help satisfy demand, and that there are some institutions that are trying to 
improve their quality: “there are many institutions in between those two, that are trying to achieve quality” 
(Margarita). However, they also recognize that there are some whose only interest is the economic benefit 
without caring about the quality. 
Thus, this classification overlaps with the third dichotomy, the for profit and non-profit classification, or 
according to their legal entity, which has also been studied by Silas (2005a). For the participants, for profit 
institutions are mainly interested in making money. They tend to associate non-profit with “doing things 
well” and for profit with “business” or with focusing “only in the enrollment numbers”. However, some 
recognized that not all for profit institutions are low quality, as there are some elite institutions, interested 
in granting a high quality education. In this regard, José Manuel mentions:  
 
Among for profit higher education institutions, we can find those who focus on doing things well, so, even 
though they are a business, they care about the quality, and others that simply are looking forward to making 
money with the minimal quality standards just to keep the business afloat. 
 
As we can see, these different ways of classifying the private higher education in Mexico seem to 
overlap. Elite institutions are usually high quality and expensive, even though not all of them are non-profit, 
while demand absorbing institutions are less expensive and usually for profit, and their quality levels vary 
from good to low. Isabel points out some characteristics of these middle and low quality demand absorbing 
institutions, emphasizing that their purpose, above everything, is to make money:  
 
What it is important there, is only the enrollment numbers. They relatively pay professors very good, but they 
are not allowed to do anything. It is very massified. Everything, everything has to be like, too much lineal, and 
there is no academic freedom, neither the opportunity of innovation and creating different courses. 
Professors have to align, and that is everything. They are focused on a segment of the population that is the 
biggest, in the medium socioeconomic level and lower medium, and they are teaching to this sector but 
without quality. I think this happens because they do not have a clear definition of what a university is. 
 
Reasons why low quality institutions proliferate. As could be seen, most of the private institutions are for 
profit and demand absorbing. The participants explain why these institutions have expanded considerably 
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in the last couple of years, admitting that there is a societal need for studying higher education that is not 
being met, as the public sector lacks the possibility to grant access to all the students that apply to it. This 
coincides with the findings of Altbach (2005a), Levy (1986), Aguilar (2003), Acosta (2005), Álvarez (2011), 
Rodríguez (2008f), and Kent and Ramírez (1999), who identified massification and the lack of access to the 
public sector, as the main reason for the proliferation of private higher education institutions, but contrast 
with Kent (2004), Buendía (2016), Luengo (2003), Álvarez (2011), and Muños and Silva (2013), who assert 
that the lax regulatory policy has been the cause for the proliferation of low quality institutions. 
Participants coincide that these low quality institutions help “solving a social need” of “access” to higher 
education, and represent an “option to study” for young people that lack the resources to access to elite 
private institutions and that, at the same time, have been denied a space in the public sector. In this sense, 
most of the participants agree that the lack of access helps the proliferation of the private institutions, as 
they help satisfy this need. Benito explains better this situation, as he emphasizes the important role of 
private higher education in the development of the country. He says:  
 
Unfortunately, there are many complex social and political phenomena. One is access. In Mexico, as you well 
know, the percentage of access to higher education is extremely low. […] and you have to expand the access; 
of course, you have to expand it. And today, private higher education in Mexico grants education to more 
than the third, to a little more than the third part of the total coverage in higher education. And yes, we are 
far away; and that needs… private higher education plays an important role in the development of the 
country. 
 
Carmen also adds that, in the country, having a university degree is everything because, if not, you are 
not perceived well in the society: “also in Mexico, if you don’t have an academic degree you are not well 
seen by the society”. This has contributed to the proliferation, because then it is preferred to have a degree 
from these institutions than not to have it at all. In short, low quality institutions proliferate because there 
are many people that seek to study the tertiary level and the state has been unable to grant access to all of 
them. 
From this first category, private higher education in Mexico, the following can be concluded: first, 
private higher education is the one that does not belong to the state and uses private investment to finance 
itself; second, it exists because there are social needs that have not been met by the state’s education, 
either in professional preparation or the education in some values, or because there is a lack of access to 
the tertiary education; and third, there is an extensive classification of private institutions that, in some 
cases, overlaps, but in broad terms there are high quality, elite and expensive institutions, middle quality 
demand absorbing institutions, and low quality, inexpensive institutions, that are also called patito 
universities, whose purpose is to make money. 
 
IV. 5.2 Current regulations 
Regulations are the instruments used to influence the behavior of a sector of the population, limiting 
certain actions that are considered undesirable, while indicating the best way to act. This category includes: 
instruments that regulate private higher institutions in Mexico, authorities that regulate, differentiated 
regulation, and perceptions regarding the regulations. 
Instruments that regulate private higher institutions in Mexico. Regulations to higher education are 
composed by different instruments as Fielden and Varghese (2009), Floud (2005), and the Higher Education 
Commission (2013) have pointed out, and as Table 8 “Specific regulatory mechanisms used in higher 
education by their classification” shows up. In this regard, participants of this study acknowledge that there 
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are diverse mechanisms that regulate private higher education. The first one that is being addressed is the 
legislation, as the legislation represents one of the most important regulatory instruments, to the extent 
that Selznick (1985) and Black (2002) had to make a distinction between it and the regulations. Frequently, 
participants address to the legislation as the “norms”, and they mentioned the most important legal 
instruments: “the Constitution” “the General Law for Public Education” and “the Law for the Coordination 
of Higher Education”. These three legal mechanisms have been already analyzed in section “IV. 3 
Regulations to the Mexican private higher education system”. 
Participants agree that the Mexican Constitution is the main legal instrument that regulates private 
higher education, and they comment that the request of the RVOE is expressed in the General Law of 
Education, as the authority grants the authorization for private individuals to grant education through it 
(Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 2005 as amended 1993). For all the participants, the 
RVOE is the mechanism that grants validity to the studies. Hence, they concur that it is considered the main 
regulatory instrument. They also explain that this is granted by program, not by institution: “this regulation, 
among other things, requires that all the programs have the Recognition of Official Validity of Studies”  
(Pilar). In other words, the RVOE is granted to each program specifically, so one institution can have as 
many RVOEs as programs it teaches. 
All the participants agree that the RVOE only requests certain credentials for the professors, like the “CV 
of the professors”, to fulfill certain requirements regarding the curriculum or the academic program, like 
“the number of credits by course”, and the “total number of credits of the academic program” according to 
the degree, and to fulfill some infrastructure requirements. This coincides with the information contained 
in the Agreements 243 (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1998), and Agreement 17/11/17 (Secretaría de 
Educación Pública, 2017a).  
Some participants also mentioned other instruments used by the Mexican government to regulate the 
private higher education. The most recurrent were the supervisions. For example, Isabel also mentions that 
inspections are a mechanism used to make sure that what has been approved, actually takes place in 
reality; but by her comment it seems that these are not very common, as she states that “if by any chance 
an inspector appears”. The full comment says:  
 
The thing is that if you are going to open a program, [Isabel], you have to fulfill all the requests. Everything, 
because if by any chance an inspector appears, that he might or might not appear, and finds something 
wrong, he closes it. That is that he [The Ministry of Education] might close your study program. 
 
In this sense, participants also mention that when the law is not complied, sanctions are used to assure 
the future compliance. Remembering, sanctions were an important aspect of the regulations as Lowi, 
(1985), Bresser and O’Tool, (1998), and Howlett (2011) had pointed out. 
 
Authorities that regulate. In Table 7 “Classification of regulatory mechanisms” based on the findings of 
(2011), Cohn (2011), Gilardi and Maggetti (2011), and Malyshev (2002), different regulatory authorities 
were identified both public and private. Consistent with these findings, and with the findings of Rodríguez, 
(2004a; 2008c) and Blanco (1994), participants of this study recognize different authorities when it comes 
to the regulation of private higher education institutions in Mexico: the Federal Ministry of Education, the 
local ministries of education located at each state of the Republic, and the public autonomous universities, 
not to mention the accreditation agencies which are voluntary mechanisms and which will be addressed 
later. In this respect, José Manuel indicates:  
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There are three models of getting the Official Validity of Studies […] or four, if you want to call it that way. By 
the Federal Ministry of Education, that is one. The Ministry has the possibility of reviewing all the RVOEs that 
are incorporated to it. It has a lot of power. Then, the Ministries of Education of each state; they have less 
[RVOEs]. And then the public universities, the big ones, that incorporate some other universities and 
recognize their programs as if they were their owns. And then there are other universities in the states like 
UDG or the Politécnico Nacional [National Polytechnic] that also incorporate programs. 
 
Participants also allude that, sometimes, the President has granted RVOEs too. However, they concur 
that most of the programs are regulated by the Ministry of Education, as the regulation by public 
universities, specifically UNAM, is more bureaucratic and grants less autonomy. Participants describe this 
regulation by public universities as “mores jealous” or as “excessive administrative bureaucracy”, because 
they perceive that it pretends to “control everything” because there “everything is regulated”. Hence they 
recognize that, today, most private higher education institutions are incorporated to the Ministry of 
Education in order to be less constrained and to enjoy more autonomy. 
Regarding the quality assurance agencies, participants perceive these organizations as an aid to the 
regulation of the system. For the participants, the quality assurance agencies help regulate the quality of 
the system. For example, Karla explains the differences between the regulation from the public authority 
and the regulation from the private accreditation agencies. She mentions: “the Ministry of Education gives 
you the opportunity to teach a program, it recognizes it, but then there are institutions that measure how 
you are achieving your institutional goals”. However, here it is important to mention that these are still 
voluntary. 
 
Differentiated regulation. Participants of this study mention that mechanisms employ to regulate private 
higher education are the same; however, they point out that the number of procedures and the degree of 
supervision varies if you have already been accredited by FIMPES or other accreditation agencies, as 
authors like Álvarez (2011), Rodríguez (2004a; 2006; 2008a; 2017a; 2017b; 2017d) and Rodríguez and 
Ordorika (2011) have also asserted when explaining the Record of Academic Excellence (Agreement 279) or 
the Program for the Improvement of the Institutions (Agreement 17/11/17: Secretaría de Educación 
Pública, 2017a), commonly known as “administrative simplification”. The Program for the Improvement of 
the Institutions has also been explained in the analysis of the autonomy enjoyed by the Mexican private 
higher education institution in section “IV. 4 Degree of autonomy of the private higher education 
institutions in Mexico”. 
Consistent to those findings, participants agree that the differentiated regulation consists on different 
“degrees of supervisions”; in other words, it depends on the amount of inspections and control exercise by 
the authority. Participants perceive these different degrees of supervision in a positive way. For them they 
mean “trust”. This is explained by Pilar when she mentions: “they will not need to supervise you so much 
because they already know you do things right”. Similarly, for Karla, this grants the regulatory authority the 
possibility to regulate more those who need it the most. Hence, she states that this helps focus the efforts 
in institutions that need it the most: “other institutions might require more attention than these ones in 
their operations, because the level of development of the institutions is different”. 
 
Perceptions regarding the regulations. Several of the studied authors like Rodríguez (2004a), Silas (2008), 
Acosta (2011), Cuevas (2011a), de Garay (2013), Álvarez (2011) and Buendía (2016), have concluded that 
the regulations to the Mexican private higher education institutions are very flexible. Nevertheless, 
participants of this study have different perceptions of the regulations. While for some of them the 
regulations do not assure quality, others claim that the policy is designed to assure the minimum quality.  
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Hence, some participants consider the regulation to be very permissive, as it focuses only on the 
technical aspects. They describe the regulation as being focused only in fulfilling requirements. These 
participants describe it as “lax”, and as a “checklist” or “control board”, where “quality is not being 
assured”. For example, Isabel mentions: “regulation focuses on the administration and the infrastructure 
[…]. Everything is fulfilling a requirement, a checklist”.  
On the contrary, for other participants, the regulations do pretend to assure a minimum degree of 
quality, but they agree that the regulation, by itself, is not enough to guarantee it. In this regard, 
participants mention: “the law aims to guarantee a minimum of quality” (José Manuel) and “the minimum 
requirements are focused on having a minimum level of quality” (Fernando). This is consistent with the 
findings of de Garay (2013). 
As there are different regulatory instruments, participants have diverse perceptions regarding those. In 
this sense, some of them agree that the problem is not the legislation, as they describe it as “excellent”, 
“very good” and “enough”. While others concur that the sanctions established in the legislation are flexible, 
which is consistent to de Garay’s (2013) and Blanco’s (1994) findings. The participants describe the 
sanctions as “lax”. However, for some participants this is understood and intentional, as it is impossible to 
consider every single situation in the law. For example, Fernando mentions: “there is no capacity for 
determining all the details of the different violations and their corresponding sanctions”. And José Manuel 
asserts that it is impossible to foresee everything: “sometimes the regulation does not foresee everything 
[…], the issue is to always have in mind that regulations have limits […]. It is not enforceable, what does not 
exist”. Here he clearly states that regulations will always have limitations because there is no capacity of 
legislating everything.  
All the participants agree that the problems are the mechanisms used to assure there is compliance with 
the law, as they are “sporadic” or practically inexistent. However, this problem will be addressed later, in 
the category “Problems of the regulatory policy”. Finally, regarding the quality assurance mechanism, some 
participants perceive it as a key factor to guarantee quality, even though it is a voluntary instrument. For 
participants, this mechanism grants a “differentiation” between institutions, as it helps institutions 
distinguish among each other, coinciding with Silas’s (2005b) findings. 
Regarding the fact that the compulsory regulation is carried out by program and not by institution, 
participants seem to prefer the way it is, by academic program and not for the institution as a whole, as 
some quality assurance agencies do. Carmen explains the reasons why the regulation is focused on the 
program and not on the whole institution, as different programs have different needs regarding professors 
and infrastructure; therefore, they need specific regulations or a regulation that takes care of those 
considerations. She says:  
 
So, if you do it [the regulation] for the institution as a whole, what I think is that maybe, we have a lot of 
professors experts in medicine but then, why might we be able to offer a doctoral program in law? […] I think 
that is why. And also, the institution, the infrastructure that each program requires. If you have many 
professors experts in law or medicine and you want to offer a program in advanced computer technology, if 
you don’t have a computer lab, you cannot offer it. 
 
In short, the regulatory policy for private higher education institutions in Mexico is mainly composed by 
the instrument of the legislation, which details the basic requirements needed for a program to be 
approved by the authority. While some participants perceive the regulatory policy as lax and technical, 
other mention that it is designed to assure minimum quality standards. Participants seem to agree that the 
problem of the policy is not the legislation, but the lack of other mechanisms used to regulate the system. 
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The system is mostly regulated by public authorities, whose responsibilities tend to overlap. Private 
agencies only regulate through the quality assurance agencies, but this remains as a voluntary mechanism. 
 
IV. 5.3 Autonomy 
Autonomy is the capacity of an institution to govern itself according to one’s own rules. This category 
includes: the concept of autonomy and the different degrees of autonomy.  
Concept of autonomy. The concept of autonomy in Mexico is primarily associated with the public 
institutions, as there is a constitutional controversy that private institutions cannot be granted autonomy. 
While some participants agree that private institutions do not enjoy autonomy, others consider they do. 
Here, it is important to mention that participants used as a reference the conceptualization of autonomy 
in public universities, to analyze the term for the private sector. Participants agreed that the purpose of 
autonomy is to avoid the interference of the state in the educational activity, as Varghese and Martin 
(2013) had anticipated. Some participants also mentioned other characteristics of public institutions’ 
autonomy that are not enjoyed by private institutions. For example, Francisco and Margarita mentioned 
that in autonomous public universities like UNAM, not even the policemen have the authorization to enter 
to the campus. They describe that autonomy is understood in Mexico as being “untouchable”. Therefore, 
some participants do agree with Pinto (1974), Poder Judicial (2005), Carpizo (2002) and Serna (2006) that it 
cannot be said that private institutions enjoy autonomy. In this respect, Pilar mentions: “I think there is no 
autonomy in private universities”.  Fernando also explains that private institutions do not enjoy autonomy, 
as they are dependable of the owner’s decisions; hence, the academia does not govern the institutions, 
coinciding with the findings of Levy (2012). Fernando mentions: 
 
But the concept of autonomy is more rigid than that. I can have different capacities of acting, but in the 
moment that there is a conflict, the owner of the capital or of the university imposes his will. That does not 
happen in a public university.  
 
However, other participants disagree and do consider that private higher education institutions enjoy 
autonomy. These participants conclude that the concept of autonomy is not well understood in the 
country. Karla, for example, after analyzing the 3rd article of the Constitution, which conceptualizes 
autonomy, concludes that higher education institutions enjoy autonomy in many aspects: 
 
I think that if we take the 3rd article of the Constitution as a reference, private higher education institutions 
enjoy autonomy. That is, we govern ourselves, we manage our resources, we establish our selection criteria. 
Which students we pick, which professors; we design our curriculum. The Ministry of Education doesn’t tell 
you to use something or apply something. On the contrary, I think we enjoy autonomy. 
 
Other participants agree that private higher education institutions enjoy autonomy, but they 
emphasized that this is mainly for their financial and organizational activities, as they still have to comply 
with the legislation in the academic activities, but such has been mentioned by Narro (2011), who asserted 
that autonomy also means complying with the law. Hence, these participants mention that autonomy in 
private institutions is “only for their internal administration” (Francisco). They also used terms as “internal 
ability” or “management autonomy”. Pilar summarizes this perception: “they could be autonomous 
because they make their own money, but for me they are not autonomous in the sense of the law”.  
 
Different degrees of autonomy. It has been mentioned that there is a differentiated regulation in Mexico 
(Agreement 17/11/17: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a; Álvarez, 2011; Rodríguez, 2004a, 2006, 
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2008a, 2017a, 2017b, 2017d; Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011), and therefore, private institutions enjoy diverse 
degrees of autonomy. All the participants coincide that the autonomy that one institution has, depends on 
how much it is regulated. So, either an institution enjoys the regular autonomy, more autonomy due to the 
simplified administration, or even more when the RVOE is granted by presidential decrees.  
Participants agree that there are many benefits from enjoying the simplified administration, which 
include less reporting, less bureaucratic procedures and less time consumption. They also coincide with 
Álvarez (2011), Rodríguez (2004a, 2006, 2008a) and Rodríguez and Ordorika (2011), that this autonomy is 
granted to the institutions that have proved over the years that they carry out transparent procedures, and 
that they comply with the regulations. Participants use terms such as “skip some processes” and “broad 
autonomy” to define the benefits, and concur that one of the main differences is the degree of supervision. 
They mention that supervision is “much more tenuous”. In this regard, Karla explains: 
 
Obviously, there are many [differences compared] with the ones that do not enjoy the simplified 
administration. There are, for example, you have to take everything like all your students’ incorporations, you 
have to take all certifications and leave them there until an official signs them, and that can take until 6 
months. That is, that is the difference with the simplified administration, between those institutions that 
enjoy it, and those that do not. 
 
Similarly, Benito also agrees that the institutions that enjoy the highest degree of autonomy, almost face 
no constraints by the regulations: 
 
Since the 279 agreement, and now with the new agreement, the Program for Improvement of the 
Institutions, an institution in the third level, which is the highest, enjoys like a 90% of self-management 
autonomy. The only thing that remains as a faculty of the state is what we call the authentication or the 
legalization of the documents. The rest, practically the state doesn’t know anything of what is happening until 
they legalize the degree. […] there is a broad, broad autonomy of management. Of course, it cannot have its 
own laws, but it has its internal regulations. 
 
However, when comparing the simplified administration with the presidential decrees, not many 
differences were perceived by the participants. Participants consider these presidential decrees as 
“something outside the legislative power”, granted by the president. They point out that these institutions 
also get the RVOE, but the conditions for it vary from one institution to another, as it depends on the 
agreement that has been done between the President of the Republic and the institution. This coincides 
with the findings of Cossío (2006), Serna (2006) and de Garay (2013). Participants agree that the benefits of 
these presidential decrees consist in enjoying more academic autonomy like the capacity of issuing their 
own academic degrees without needing the authentication from the Ministry of Education, or the benefit 
of being able to teach a program in multiple campuses without needing several RVOEs. For the other 
institutions, each program, in each campus, needs a new RVOE. Nonetheless, participants recognize that 
they still have to comply with the regulations. For example, Karla mentions: “at the end we need to comply 
with the same things”.  
In conclusion, not all participants agree that the degree of freedom the institutions enjoy to carry on 
their activities can be considered as autonomy, as the concept in Mexico seems not to be well understood, 
and takes as a reference the Constitution’s constraint that this is only granted to public institutions. 
However, going through the activities that the 3rd article refers when granting autonomy, it could be said 
that private institutions enjoy autonomy in some way. As there is a differentiated regulatory policy, some 
private institutions enjoy a higher degree of acting possibilities, as there are less a posteriori mechanisms 
used to regulate (supervisions and reporting). 
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IV. 5.4 The financial dimension 
It has already been said that the financial dimension refers to the financial self-sufficiency of an 
institution, and that private higher education institutions in Mexico are characterized by the investment of 
private resources, including the tuition fees. This category includes few regulations to the financial 
dimension, high financial autonomy and reasons for having a high financial autonomy.  
Few regulations to the financial dimension. Participants agree that the tax collector is the regulator of this 
dimension, as for profit institutions have to pay taxes. Such information coincides with Miranda and 
González’s (2015) findings. Most of them just referred to the “tax collector”, “SAT” or the “Ministry of 
Finance” as the regulatory authorities, while others differentiated between the income tax and the social 
security tax managed by the “Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social” or the Mexican Institute of Social 
Security. Some of the participants also acknowledged the responsibility of the institutions of giving certain 
percentage of the profits for scholarships, as established by the law. For example, José Manuel summarizes 
the regulations: 
 
A private for profit institution has, in addition to the income tax, the tax of the scholarships, that, even 
though the state doesn’t receive the money directly, it gives it back to the users as it is commanded by the 
state; in that sense it is like a kind of tax. […] let’s say that that is the only legal obligation, that you give the 
5% of the profit you make as scholarships, [and] 32% of tax income. 
 
This coincides with the findings presented in Table 13 “Degree of autonomy of the private higher 
education institutions (semi-independent) in Mexico and the regulations that constrain it” based on the 
analysis of the policy documents (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a). However, from José Manuel’s 
comment, we can see that he emphasizes that those responsibilities are for for profit institutions, 
distinguishing between for profit and non-profit institutions, where for profit ones have to pay the taxes. 
Regarding the non-profit he mentions: “non-profit higher education institutions, for the reason precisely of 
being non profit, they are exempted from paying taxes […], which conditions the institutions to not having 
profits, in order to reinvest all the money for the purpose that is being sought”. This coincides with the 
findings of Geiger (1998,) who had mentioned that being non-profit ties an institution to reinvesting all its 
profits in education. 
 
High financial autonomy. The participants of this study perceive a high degree of financial autonomy, as 
there are few constraints to this dimension. They use phrases as “there is freedom to administer their 
resources”, “capacity of self-determination of their resources”, and “manage” or “use economic resources 
as they please”, as long as they have fulfilled their responsibilities of paying taxes (if for profit), paying to 
their employees, and granting the 5% of the profit in scholarships. These definitions coincide with the one 
of financial autonomy presented by Grau (2013) and Estermann and Nokkala (2009).  
Participants also enumerate some activities where this financial autonomy is enjoyed: the ability to 
determine their sources of money, or being “self-sustaining” as recurrently mentioned, the capacity to 
decide on the amount of tuition fees they want to charge, the possibility of investing in the stock market, 
and the capacity of creating the legal entity. Francisco explains the benefits of being able to decide what 
kind of legal entity the investors in private higher education want to constitute: 
 
Perfectly, a university can invest in whatever it wants, first, and second, this is the most important, this is the 
most important, they have the possibility of establishing themselves as they think it is the best for them. That 
is, that a legal entity is established to create a university. And this legal entity can get its resources from the 
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people or from the stock market. That is, a group of persons can create a legal entity that can be non-profit or 
for profit, having the possibility of earning money through the stock market. 
 
Hence, comparing with the tendencies of the financial autonomy presented in section II. 2.4 “The 
specificity of autonomy for the private higher education” based on the findings of Bennetot and Estermann 
(2017), Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel (2011), Estermann and Nokkala (2009), Bernasconi (2011), Fielden 
(2008), Geiger (1988), OECD (2003), and Levy (2011), private higher education institutions in Mexico seem 
to enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in the financial activities than the trend explored.  
  
Reasons for having a high financial autonomy. As the resources invested in the institutions come for private 
investment, most of the participants perceive there should not be more intervention from the state in this 
regard. They concur that the state “shouldn’t take part” and that they should enjoy financial autonomy 
because their resources are theirs. These participants agree that private institutions are like any other 
private business and, therefore, they should be treated as so, with the general limitations that are imposed 
to these. They agree that private institutions have to carry out many activities like charging tuition fees, or 
receiving donations to earn the resources they need to survive and hence, if the money is “lawfully 
earned”, they should enjoy economic freedom. Also, one of the participants considers it is very difficult, in 
reality, not to invest in the institution, as investment is always needed to maximize the profits. 
In contrast to these opinions, for one of the participants there should be another regulation, a legislative 
instrument that assures that the minimum necessary resources are invested in the institutions, at least 
when it is established, to assure they have the minimum infrastructure required to operate. He mentions:  
 
I think that other aspects should be regulated, but in a minimal way, in a minimal way. I think that there 
should exist a law, for example, that would guarantee that you have a determined amount of economic 
resources, so you are able to cover the initial costs and have a specific infrastructure which is essential for the 
university (Francisco). 
 
To conclude the financial dimension, it can be seen that private higher education institutions suffer little 
constraints in this regard, which include the taxes and the scholarship percentage they have to grant. 
Regarding the other activities that are included in the financial dimension, they enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy. Participants seem to agree, in general, that there is no more need for regulatory mechanisms in 
this perspective. 
 
IV. 5.5 The organizational dimension 
The organizational dimension refers to the capacity of an institution to organize itself, making its own 
decisions regarding its governance and structure. This category includes the technical regulatory 
mechanisms, the high degree of organizational autonomy and the perceptions about the high degree of 
autonomy. 
Technical regulatory mechanisms. The participants of this research do not perceive many mechanisms that 
regulate the organizational dimension. They only acknowledge some departments or requirements that, by 
law, the institutions have to have like “a library” and “Servicios Escolares” or School Services, department 
that is in charge of the relationship between the Ministry of Education and the higher education 
institutions, making sure the institutions comply with the law. This coincides with the findings presented in 
Table 13 “Degree of autonomy of the private higher education institutions (semi-independent) in Mexico 
and the regulations that constrain it” based on the analysis of the policy documents (Secretaría de 
Educación Pública, 2017a). However, the participants did not point the necessity of needing the approval of 
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the internal rules and procedures, or of the mission and goals of the institution, which might lead to think 
that this is a process that is carried out when the institution is established. 
Participants agree that this regulation is meant to assure the “school management”, “the compliance 
with the law”, “the administration”, and that there is an “organizational structure” in the university. 
Nonetheless, they also point out that this structure can be adapted to the particular needs of the 
institution. In this regard, Karla mentions:  
 
To have an administrative department, to have schools, faculties, academic units; but no, there is not really 
something that constrains you from organizing your university as you want. There are some rules, of course, 
something you have to have […]. But that’s it, let’s say, the structure, you can have one staff or 10 and so on, 
it depends on the needs of your institution. 
 
This coincides with Estermann and Nokkala (2009), who assert that enjoying organizational autonomy 
means exercising institutional leadership and deciding on the leadership model. However, other 
participants as José Manuel, mention that most of the departments or positions that an institution has to 
have, derived from the constraints that any other private business suffers. He claims:  
 
In general, at the organizational level, there are no limitations other than those that are common for any 
other private institution in the country. For example, […] regarding the topic of paying taxes, well, there has 
to be a person specialized on that topic in the organization. In that sense, let’s say, the regulation creates the 
need to some positions that are intended to meet the demands that the state imposes to private institutions. 
In the same way, the School Services department is also there to satisfy the state’s regulation regarding the 
educational activity. 
 
High degree of organizational autonomy. As few limitations derive from the mechanisms that regulate the 
organizational dimension, the participants perceive that there is a high degree of autonomy. Participants 
describe the organizational autonomy of the Mexican private higher education institutions as: “they can be 
organized as they please and nobody tells anything” (Pilar), and “they govern themselves according to their 
laws and according to their governing bodies” (Francisco). This corresponds to Estermann and Nokkala’s 
(2009) and Grau’s (2013) definition of organizational autonomy. And, comparing with the tendencies of the 
organizational autonomy presented in section II. 2.4 “The specificity of autonomy for the private higher 
education” based on the findings of Bennetot and Estermann (2017), Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel 
(2011), Estermann and Nokkala (2009), Bernasconi (2011), Fielden (2008), Geiger (1988), OECD (2003), and 
Levy (2011), private higher education institutions in Mexico seem to enjoy a similar degree of autonomy in 
the organizational activities than the trend explored.  
 
Perceptions about the degree of organizational autonomy. In this regard, participants have different 
perceptions, while some agree that this degree of autonomy is necessary, others recognize that other 
regulations are needed. Participants that concur that there is no need for decreasing the organizational 
autonomy and increasing the regulation, consider that this autonomy is the one that distinguishes a private 
from a public institution. They mention that the organizational autonomy helps the institutions operate 
according to their philosophy and to solve their problems as they take place. For these participants, this 
capacity is an asset that helps the institutions distinguish between one another, and from the public 
institutions. They value the “freedom of association” that it grants. Benito’s comment clearly reflects this 
position: “I think that the internal situation of the institutions and their government, in fact, the internal 
management of the institutions, is an exclusive faculty of the institutions”. 
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On the contrary, other participants recognize a need of more regulatory mechanisms. These participants 
perceive a need for regulating the distribution of power in the governing bodies of the institutions, so that 
a person’s unique decision does not affect a whole institution. Therefore, they agree that it should be 
regulated that institutions have a “council” for making the decisions. In other words, they support creating 
regulations to assure there is a council that makes the decisions of the institution and not a single person, 
regarding the selection of the leaders and the use of the financial resources. For these participants this 
regulation would avoid: “making financial decisions that can hurt the university” (Isabel), “that the rector is 
a prestigious person, and that hasn’t committed a crime” (Francisco) and the “finger pointing” of the 
leaders (Margarita). 
In conclusion, the organizational dimension is constrained by a technical regulation that includes 
creating specific departments and positions for assuring compliance with the requirements established by 
the law. Private institutions enjoy a high degree of autonomy as they can structure themselves as they 
think it is more adequate, they can make their own decisions, and they can select their leaders. Some 
participants recognize this degree of autonomy as appropriate for the institutions to carry on their 
responsibilities, but other participants perceive that the distribution of power of the governance bodies 
needs to be regulated, as well as the probity of the people that create and govern these institutions to 
assure the good use of the invested resources. 
 
IV. 5.6 The staffing dimension 
The staffing dimension refers to the capacity of an institution to hire its own staff and to establish its 
employment conditions. This category therefore includes: technical regulation, perceptions about the 
degree of staffing autonomy and high degree of staffing autonomy.  
Technical regulation. The participants of this study agree that there are some a priori regulations that 
institutions need to comply with, which include some technical requirements specified in the Agreements 
and the “Federal Labor Law”. Relating to the technical requirements, the participants mention that they 
have to comply with the degree level. Participants use terms like “minimum degree”, “certain academic 
degree”, degree “according to the degree level where they will be teaching”, “papers” and “experience” to 
refer to the requirements needed by a professor. Participants also agree that these requirements have 
decreased over the years, especially with the new agreement, the 17/11/17, which grants more autonomy 
to the institution. For example, Benito mentions: “the professors’ requirements, today, with this new 
agreement, have been suppressed. In the 17/11/17 there is nothing left of these requirements. In fact, all 
the responsibility is given to the institution”. This coincides with the findings presented in Table 13 “Degree 
of autonomy of the private higher education institutions (semi-independent) in Mexico and the regulations 
that constrain it” based on the analysis of the policy documents (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a). 
Nevertheless, participants also make an important distinction when mentioning that these requirements 
in the regulatory mechanisms focus on the academic staff and not on the administrative one. For example, 
Fernando mentions: “the administrative personnel does not concern to me as much as the academic staff”. 
Other participants point out that quality assurance mechanisms are the ones that set up more 
requirements to be fulfilled in the staffing dimension. However, it is important to remember that these are 
not mandatory.  
 
High degree of staffing autonomy. Participants of this study perceive that institutions enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy regarding the staffing dimension, as they are able to carry out many activities without facing 
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too many constraints. They use phrases as “they have a lot of freedom” and “you are the one responsible” 
of your employees, to describe the staffing autonomy. Participants also enumerate some activities where 
this staffing autonomy is enjoyed: hire the personnel they desire, establish contractual relationships that 
benefit both parties, decide on the number of employees, and “classify their academic staff” according to 
their needs, coinciding with Estermann’s and Nokkala’s (2009) definition of staffing autonomy. For 
example, Francisco mentions: 
 
Regarding the administrative and academic staff they have a lot of freedom, also regarding the functions of 
their academics. They can classify their academic staff in different ways and they can have contracts of 
different natures with them. They can have as many employees as they want […]. They can hire the 
professors they want. 
 
Some participants also point that there is so much flexibility, that sometimes an institution does not 
need to comply precisely with all the requirements established in the agreement, as there are some other 
processes like the equivalence, that grants institutions the possibility of hiring an academic staff that does 
not have the document that certifies the degree of studies that is needed to teach in a specific level. 
Margarita explains this:  
 
There is an agreement […] that says, look: you don’t have to have your documents, you don’t have to have a 
document that says that you have bachelor’s or master’s studies, but I can make you an equivalence of 
contents. I can make an equivalence of documents and then, I can hire a professor that doesn’t have the 
document. 
 
Comparing with the tendencies of the organizational autonomy presented in section II. 2.4 “The 
specificity of autonomy for the private higher education” based on the findings of Bennetot and Estermann 
(2017), Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel (2011), Estermann and Nokkala (2009), Bernasconi (2011), Fielden 
(2008), Geiger (1988), OECD (2003), and Levy (2011), private higher education institutions in Mexico seem 
to enjoy a higher degree of autonomy in the staffing activities than the trend explored.  
 
Perceptions about the degree of staffing autonomy. The participants of this study have different opinions 
regarding the level of autonomy enjoyed by the institutions in their staffing dimension. One participant 
considers that this high degree of autonomy in selecting the staff can lead to recruit according to friendship 
rather than merits. However, most participants see the positive and the negative aspects of this regulation 
and level of autonomy. Regarding the positive characteristics, they perceive the regulations generally as 
“reasonable”, but concerning the negative ones, they consider that it is too much responsibility granted to 
the institution, and that that could be an issue when speaking about a low quality institution. Participants 
worry about institutions that “do not invest in their staff”, that “do not train them”, that “do not fulfill the 
requirements” (Karla) because the one affected is the student. In other words, they consider that, clearly, 
the regulations are designed in the way that the institutions are completely responsible for their staff, 
because the decisions the institutions make, regarding them, affect the quality of the service they grant. 
Then, if an institution is prestigious and responsible, they make a lot of sense and are appreciated, but if 
one is a low quality institution, they are not so convinced. Benito illustrates this position: 
 
It is something good, on one hand, if we speak about a serious institution […], well, it has the responsibility to 
hire its professors, but, if we talk about a university that is just a business, […], and they are giving this 
institution the responsibility of selecting its professors, well.  
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Other negative aspect that they point out, is that the regulation does not consider exceptions and, 
therefore, sometimes, in some particular cases, it can be illogical. For example, José Manuel mentions: 
“there could be a case where there could be a lot of quality, independently of the degree level that the 
professor has”, referring to the fact that a degree does not precisely guarantee the highest quality. 
In conclusion, the staffing dimension is constrained by a technical regulation that consists, mainly, on 
having a specific degree. Therefore, private institutions in Mexico enjoy a high degree of autonomy in this 
regard. Participants have mixed opinions about this degree of autonomy because, even though they 
appreciate its high degree, they worry about the quality of the teaching in the low quality institutions when 
such degree of freedom is enjoyed. 
 
IV. 5.7 The academic dimension 
The academic dimension refers to the educational act. This category includes many a priori regulatory 
instruments, perceptions of the regulations to the academic dimension, medium degree of academic 
autonomy and accreditation mechanisms. 
Many a priori regulatory instruments. The participants of this study commented that the academic 
dimension is the one that is the most regulated of all the dimensions, and they stated different instruments 
that regulate this dimension like the “legal rules”, the “individualized legal acts”, the “requirements”, and 
“the inspections”. Participants coincide that the main constraint needed to get the RVOE are the basic 
requirements, as well as the approvals. Also, most participants detail this list of requirements that the 
authority requests for getting the RVOE which include: the number of hours and the number of credits 
according to the level of the program, the pertinence and content of the program, the teaching strategies 
and the evaluation methods of the course. Margarita summarizes this information mentioning that they 
review and approve the curriculum, in addition to the personnel’s characteristics that have already been 
mentioned before. She says: “those are the things the RVOE requests: curriculum, and academic staff”.  
However, José Manuel points out that there is a general academic regulation, but for some specific 
programs, like Medicine, other regulations take place, as they are not only regulated by the Ministry of 
Education, but also by the Ministry of Health. He mentions that those regulations are much harder to fulfill: 
 
There is a core in which someone is coerced or limited particularly, this happens in all the programs. But in 
those of the health disciplines, this is more complicated, because then you not only have the academic 
regulation but also the regulation imposed by the Ministry of Health, which is stricter than the academic 
regulation; here you have interinstitutional committees that approve each program. So, sometimes, the 
Ministry of Education approves the program, but when it gets to CIFRHS, it is denied. 
 
Finally, as it has been seen before, institutions can operate without RVOE; nevertheless, the participants 
stress the importance of it, as it is the only way to get a degree that is certified by the authority and the 
professional license. Therefore, it is the only one that is valid at the end. For example, Carmen states: “it is 
worthy that it has been registered. The professional license is what it is worthy, […] the professional license, 
that is what endorses you as a professional”.  
All these findings coincide with the ones presented in Table 13 “Degree of autonomy of the private 
higher education institutions (semi-independent) in Mexico and the regulations that constrain it” based on 
the analysis of the policy documents (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a). 
 
Medium degree of academic autonomy. As it has been mentioned, there are some constraints that the 
institutions face in the academic dimension. Therefore, participants perceive mainly academic autonomy in 
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the educational process itself, where they consider institutions enjoy high degree of academic freedom. In 
addition to this academic freedom, participants enumerate different activities where the academic 
autonomy is enjoyed. These include, deciding on their educational model, freedom of expression, capacity 
to decide their teaching strategies, and the ability of selecting their own students. They use phrases such as 
“the state never tells you “and “can freely decide” to emphasis the academic autonomy enjoy in these 
specific aspects. However, participants also perceive some limitations in this dimension of the autonomy, 
especially in the creation and the structure of the curriculum. Francisco, for example, mentions: “I think 
that the academic autonomy is indeed limited in terms of content determination and, in the organization of 
the curriculum”. 
Positively, participants point out that the degree of academic autonomy has increased over the years, 
especially with this new Agreement 17/11/17. Hence, most of the participants agree that it grants more 
freedom in the creation of the curriculum of the academic programs. Karla explains that now, institutions 
have the capacity to choose the didactical model they want to follow, instead of having to comply with the 
one the Ministry of Education has decided. She mentions: 
 
The 279 was less flexible, for example, in curriculum design, because they had to be based on the behavioral 
approach. Taba, Tyler, you had to use Bloom’s taxonomy for your objectives. You couldn’t use another 
approach. […], but now, it gives you more options as to curriculum approaches. It doesn’t force you to use 
competences, or to be oriented to the learning outcomes, now you choose; you choose your goals, your 
purposes. As you wish. The only condition is that what you tell them you will be teaching, you actually teach 
it. 
 
Perceptions of the regulations to the academic dimension. The participants of this study agree on the need 
of an academic regulation to guarantee the quality of the system, and they understand that it is the 
dimension that faces the most constraints in its autonomy. For example, Francisco mentions that the 
regulations focus on the academic dimension because it is the nature of the higher education institutions: 
 
Those institutions, what do they do? They provide teaching services. So what do you need to regulate? Not 
that they have a lot or little money for establishing themselves, that might seem not important, might, might 
seem not important. What is the important thing? It is not the only one, but what is the most important 
thing? That the institution does well its job. Which one? Teaching. And what does it have to do to teach well? 
Well, there are certain characteristics, certain curriculum, and certain quality in its structure. Apparently it is 
not important, as I was telling you before, that the law regulates other things like the resources of the legal 
entity, or the quality and morality of the people that integrate the legal entity that form the university or any 
educational institution because what is really important is that they are good educational institutions. 
 
As can be seen, this coincides with the findings of Henkel (2005), Grau (2013), González (2004) and 
Neave (2012), who suggest that the academic autonomy is the core dimension of a higher education 
institution. Nonetheless, most of the participants agree that the academic regulation is focused on the 
technical aspects, failing to guarantee the quality. On this regard, they use expressions like “it doesn’t 
guarantee you anything”, “it does not guarantee quality”, “it’s very easy!” to describe the regulatory policy, 
coinciding with authors like Rodríguez (2004a), Silas (2008), Acosta (2011), Cuevas (2011a), de Garay 
(2013), Álvarez (2011) and Buendía (2016). Participants also describe the requirements like “techno-
pedagogical” and “not very difficult to achieve”. Other participants consider that the regulation is meant to 
assure the minimum degree of quality. They describe the policy as the one that “sets up the minimum 
requirements”.  
Most participants emphasize the role of the institutions, and their responsibility in not to remain in the 
minimum requirements, but always to go further to achieve high quality. Pilar asserts: “I think that a 
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university, a prestigious higher education institution, self-imposes it [quality]”. José Manuel also comments 
that the role of the persons that form the institutions, their honesty, their ethics and their engagement to 
the educational activity are key to achieve quality:  
 
Something that cannot be regulated by an external regulation, that there has to be the commitment from 
those who are there. At the end, let’s say, I have thought about it before, personal honorability is better than 
the legal regulation, and then having a personal commitment. 
 
Accreditation mechanisms. As it has been said before, most participants agree that the RVOE does not 
assure quality and therefore accreditation instruments help in this regard. Participants agree that this 
regulation goes beyond the minimum requirements, reviewing many aspects of the institutions and the 
programs, and being less flexible. They concur in describing accreditation as “stricter” than the mandatory 
instruments, as they check in detail the different operational dimensions of an institution. Participants 
mention that accreditation agencies “check you everything”, and that their indicators are based on what is 
considered a quality education. Isabel summarizes this:  
 
These national and international accreditation agencies, based on certain guidelines and parameters, tell you 
if you meet or not what is considered to be the quality in education; they do not only check the curriculum, 
but the organizational aspect; they check that there is a structure, that you have all the economic resources, 
that you have good libraries, and so on. That is, they check everything. That is, the organizational aspects, the 
academic dimension, the research structure, everything from the school or faculties is reviewed, and then 
they come to verify it. 
 
Some participants agree that accreditation is a way in which higher education institutions have 
organized themselves to regulate the quality. They enumerate the accreditation agencies: “FIMPES”, 
“ANUIES” and “the accreditation agencies of COPAES”. They describe them as auto organizations or 
associations of professionals that help protect themselves and protect the quality of the discipline, 
coinciding with the findings of Table 7 “Classification of regulatory mechanisms” based on Howlett’s (2011), 
Cohn’s (2011), Gilardi and Maggetti’s (2011) and Malyshev’s (2002) research, where delegated professional 
regulation is also a type of regulatory mechanism. Carmen, for example, describes accreditation agencies as 
a “guild” meant to protect the disciplines. Participants explain that these accreditation agencies are 
“private” organizations because they do not belong to the state. For Benito, being private agencies is the 
main reason why they are voluntary mechanisms but, for him, this is an advantage, as they are isolated 
from the perversity that the state can have:  
 
For me, that is very wise. Generally when the accreditation is mandatory, the one responsible for the 
accreditation is generally an organism from the state, then that becomes perverse. […] Accreditation agencies 
have nothing to do with the state’s structure. 
 
Starting from this, participants perceive different roles that the accreditations play in the Mexican 
society. Some consider accreditation assures that the academic programs are relevant to the society’s 
needs, and that the institutions have the capacity to grant a program. Others view it as the mechanism to 
achieve the administrative simplification and be less regulated, while they also help get the RVOE much 
easier. For example, Benito mentions: 
 
With this, you can participate in a certain degree of simplified administration, as the agreement grants it […]. 
In the agreement 17/11/17 it says that if an accreditation agency has made an analysis of the academic 
program before getting the RVOE, they don’t get the RVOE immediately, but this facilitates the evaluation 
process of the academic program and the curriculum. 
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Most of the participants also point out that they help differentiate quality institutions from the rest by 
giving prestige and distinction, as Silas (2005b), Acosta (2012), and Buendía (2013) had anticipated. This is 
pointed out by José Manuel when he mentions: “for other institutions in Chalco or Chimalhuacán that are 
accredited by FIMPES, this is a way of showing that they have a better quality than those located in front of 
them”. Margarita also explains that being accredited is essential for being considered a quality higher 
education institution. She mentions:  
 
For being considered a high quality university and not patito, you have to be in FIMPES, in ANUIES, and at 
least one of your programs should be validated by one of the accreditation agencies of COPAES. This is one 
thing, although it is not official, if you are not accredited, your university is not considered of quality. 
 
As can be seen, participants also recognize that accreditation is a voluntary mechanism. In this regard, 
they use terms such as “voluntary” and “not mandatory” to describe this policy, as Cuevas (2011b) and 
González (2012) have already pointed out. Hence, Pilar explains that the participation in the accreditation 
processes depends on the heads of the institutions: “you decide to get accredited because your leaders 
decide it”. Participants recognize that there is a low participation in the accreditation processes. Karla, for 
example, mentions: 
 
We talk about the number of universities, that there are thousands; that is, I think there are 800 public 
universities: federal, national, and from the states’ systems, plus the CONACYT centers, and adding all the 
technologic institutions, that those are around 200, and then there are 2,000 and something private 
universities. At the time I researched the topic, only 35 of those had been accredited by FIMPES. 
 
Benito also puts an example of the low participation, when giving numbers of the programs that have 
been accredited in the field of education: “there are 1,500 programs in education at the university level 
that have to do with forming professionals on education, including the normal schools. And, out of this, 
María, only 59 are accredited”. He mentions that, in many cases, this is because they are small institutions 
that do not have the proper infrastructure to get accredited: “evidently this is due to the lack of 
infrastructure, but not necessarily due to the lack of quality […]. It requires a lot of resources to be at the 
third level. A very strong institution in the academic and the financial aspects”.  
This low participation coincides with the findings of Cuevas (2011b), González (2012), de Garay (2013), 
Rodríguez (2017c) and Álvarez (2011). Some participants consider that this low participation in 
accreditation processes is due to the fact that it is not a priority in the Mexican higher education system. 
Carmen, for example, states: “there is such degree of other needs, that is the truth, that the last priority is 
the accreditation”. 
In short, the academic dimension is the most regulated by the Mexican authorities. Instruments like the 
legislation, the agreements, the RVOE, basic requirement lists and approvals are used, as it can be seen, 
and most of them are a priori mechanisms. Participants perceive the most constraints in the creation and 
the opening of new programs, and in granting valid degrees, as other activities were not addressed. 
However, they acknowledge that more autonomy has been granted recently in the creation of the 
curriculum. They also perceive accreditation as the mechanism that helps assure quality and that gives 
prestige to institutions. Nonetheless, they acknowledge the low participation of the institutions in this 
instrument, as the accreditation is voluntary. 
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IV. 5.8 Problems of the regulatory policy 
The participants of this study pointed out many problems that derive from the current regulatory policy 
and the tension with the autonomy. These include: general problems of the regulatory policy, problems of 
the a priori mechanisms, problems with a posteriori mechanisms, problems with the enforcement of the 
regulation, and responsibility of all the actors involved. 
General problems of the regulatory policy. The first problem that the participants of this study perceive, is 
that the regulations are not designed for assuring quality. The participants’ comments regarding this issue 
include "regulation is not based on quality” (Margarita), and they coincide that this is mainly due to the fact 
that quality is not yet defined. Participants mention that the problem of not assuring quality, is the lack of 
understanding of the concept, as this still has not been operationalized mainly because it is an abstract 
term. Therefore, it is difficult to be measured. The perception of the policy not focused on quality, coincides 
with the findings of Rodríguez (2004a), Silas (2008), Acosta (2011), Cuevas (2011a), Álvarez (2011) and 
Buendía (2016).   
Another general problem that the participants mention is the fact that there are multiple authorities 
that regulate the system, coinciding with the findings of Rodríguez, (2004a; 2008c), Muños and Silva (2013) 
and Blanco (1994), and with the ones of Le Galès (2011) who points out that policy failure is closely related 
to the numerous actors that interact. One participant describes this using the term “mess”. Some 
participants agree that having multiple authorities has increased corruption, because there is always one 
authority that is more permissible than others. Participants point out that this is specially a problem at the 
local levels. In this regard José Manuel mentions: “many patents [RVOE] at the states’ level are given to 
former officials who open their institutions in their entities”.  Pilar agrees with him and, especially when 
there is a friendship involved: 
 
The RVOE is granted by the autonomous university of the state and then, they have neighbors, friends, 
compadres44, etc. that make business with it. That is what is happening; it is not granted by the Ministry, the 
autonomous universities can also grant it. 
 
Problems of the a priori mechanisms. The participants perceive several problems in the mechanisms used to 
regulate private education before the educational act takes place. Some participants perceive these 
regulations as being very technical, and hence, not designed to measure the essential things. They describe 
the a priori instruments as “flexible” and “lax”, as they consider there are not many requirements needed 
to fulfill for opening an institution. Specifically one of the participants considers that this is the cause of the 
proliferation of low quality institutions. She mentions: “I think that the problem of it being so lax, the 
norms, right?, is that these inadequate institutions keep on proliferating in Mexico” (Margarita). For her, 
opening a taco restaurant is more difficult than opening a higher education institution. This coincides with 
the findings of authors like Rodríguez (2004a), Silas (2008), Acosta (2011), Cuevas (2011a), de Garay (2013), 
Álvarez (2011) and Buendía (2016). In contrast, for other participants like Benito, it is not that it is an easy 
process to get the RVOE, but the experience one gets, makes it very easy at the end to get many RVOEs: 
 
Let’s say that I don’t think it is an easy process […]. What happens is that you become an expert in the 
process, the same, there is a learning process on how to obtain a RVOE, you learn the way and then it is easy. 
 
Participants also agree that the law does not prohibit an institution from offering a program without the 
recognition, as long as it is mentioned in the publicity, as was seen when analyzing the policy documents  
                                                     
44  Mexican term used to designate a very good friend, that usually is appointed as the godfather  of one of the kids. 
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(Agreement 17/11/17: Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2017a; The General Law of Education: Cámara de 
Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, 2005 as amended 1993), and as González (2012) had pointed out. 
They agree that these institutions “are not breaking the law” (Francisco). Some participants seem to 
sympathize with this legislation and the lack of sanctions for granting a program without the RVOE, as long 
as it is mentioned to the students before they enroll. For them this is not a punishable action, because the 
institutions are not deceiving anyone. Students decide to enroll knowing the fact that their studies are not 
valid. For example, José Manuel mentions: 
 
If an institution grants an education that does not have the Official Validity of Studies and it recognizes this 
fact, it is not deceiving anyone and will grant a degree that will be endorsed by it. What validity does that 
have? The validity that other people give to it by offering or not offering a job to that person that has been 
granted the degree.  
 
However, some other participants consider that there is miscommunication in this regard. One 
participant asserts that most of the times students are not aware about the policy of the RVOE and the 
characteristics that a program has to have to really be an academic program. Therefore, students do not 
ask before enrolling to an institution if the program has the RVOE. The participants also point out that not 
having the RVOE is not only a problem of low quality institutions. Some participants acknowledge that, 
some times, institutions want to save time in the process of getting the RVOE and they began granting a 
program without having the recognition because they depend on the tuition fees to survive. Concerning 
this issue, Margarita shares her personal experience; she studied a master’s program in a prestigious 
institution to find out, when she was graduating, that the RVOE was still in process: 
 
I studied my masters at [omitted name], let’s say, it has prestige. That’s it, it is not the university around the 
corner. It has campuses all around Mexico. It has campuses in the whole world. When I enrolled to my 
masters, I never thought about asking if it had RVOE, and my masters didn’t have RVOE. […] that is, it has 
happened also to the quality institutions. 
 
Despite this fact, some participants point out that, in most of the cases, the students that study 
programs without RVOE at those low quality institutions are “retired” people that want to increase their 
knowledge in a topic in a simple educational experience. Hence, they consider that this is “valid, and that 
that shouldn’t be restricted nor controlled by the state” (Fernando).  
Most participants also recognize that the law does not contemplate many sanctions when an institution 
does not comply with it. Similarly, de Garay (2013) had mentioned that sanctions are not clearly specified 
for private higher education providers. This is a problem of the under regulated systems, as Baldwin, Cave 
and Lodge (2012) had commented, where the regulation is so loose that undesired actions escape the 
constraint without any serious consequences. In this regard José Manuel mentions:  
 
The fact is that the mechanism of incrimination, of incrimination is missing. […] If I have RVOE and I do not 
fulfill the requirements that the RVOE establishes, why is that not sanctioned? Well, on one hand, the law 
does not foresee many sanctions, and that limits the capacity to sanction. But, on the other hand, because it 
is also a political problem, that is, who will deal with the problem of closing a university. 
 
All the participants of this study agree that the main reason why low quality institutions have 
proliferated in the country is the lack of capacity by the state to grant higher education to all the 
population. Hence, they agree that low quality institutions proliferate precisely because they grant access 
to the tertiary level, and closing or sanctioning them will be a political conflict. Participants consider these 
institutions give an “opportunity” and a “possibility” to a sector of the population that, otherwise, would be 
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left out from the system. They mention that they help the state satisfy a demand, they help “satisfy these 
needs”. Therefore, participants consider that this “regulation starts from the state’s recognition that it is 
unable to grant education to all. [The system] has not grown proportionally with the increase of the 
population” (Francisco). 
In other words, they point out that the lack of access helps proliferate low quality institutions, as 
students have no more options to study a tertiary level because the high quality ones are expensive for 
them and the public system lacks the capacity to grant education to all. Participants agree that for the 
state, it is better to have those students studying there than to increase the unemployment level if it is 
unable to guarantee a job or a space in the public education system. Then the policy prioritizes the 
avoidance of this problem instead of the increase of the quality.  
Also, referring to this political strategy, one of the participants mentions that institutions are not closed 
because of the dilemma of encouraging investment, coinciding with Levy’s (2011) findings. Fernando 
claims: “we are facing two opposing values: or a high quality education that reduces the possibility of 
investing in that area of the private institutions, or lowering the requirements and making it an interesting 
area of investment”. Benito also points out that it is very difficult to revoke the RVOE, the process is long, 
and complicated, and usually the institutions are favored in the final decision:  
 
The process for the authority retiring the RVOE is much more complex than the one of granting it. And it can 
be a process, legally speaking, that can take many years, and that due to inefficiency or whatever, it is very 
easy for the authority to lose it [the trial]. 
 
Finally, regarding the a priori mechanisms, some participants perceive that they are very rigid and do 
not lead to innovation, as they are designed to structure the academic programs in a disciplinary way, 
rather than in a multidisciplinary one. Also, some participants mention that once the RVOE is granted, it is 
very difficult to make changes to a program, inhibiting changes and updates. In fact, most participants 
concur that one main problem of the regulation is that it does not request updates to the academic 
programs. Participants asserted that the RVOE does not need to be renewed and, in most of the cases, 
institutions do not update it for fear of losing it. Benito explains this issue: 
 
And we find institutions that were granted the RVOE in the 70’s, in the 80’s, in the last century, and that is 
their curriculum today; they won’t change it because they are afraid that if they are supervised they will find 
out they don’t have the conditions to get it [RVOE] any more. […] the RVOE is forever, and you don’t have 
even the obligation to update your curriculum.   
 
Problems with a posteriori mechanisms. The problems with a priori mechanisms, and some of the reasons 
why they are designed in this way, have already been presented. Nevertheless, participants also point out 
some problems of the a posteriori mechanisms or those instruments that occur after the educational 
processes take place. All participants recognize that, in many cases, the actual educational act is different 
from what was handed in the paper to the Ministry of Education.  For example, Margarita says: “one thing 
is the program that was approved by SEP, […] and finally another thing is what you are teaching”. 
Participants concur that there is a lack of a posteriori mechanisms use to regulate the system. They 
express that these mechanisms are “missing” or are “scarce”. In this regard, Francisco mentions: “there is a 
lack of other mechanisms that assure that there is compliance with the law”. Especially, all the participants 
agree with Kent (2004) and Canales (2016), that there are no supervisions to assure that institutions comply 
with the law, even though they are supposed to take place. Some participants mention that there is a “lack 
of supervision” and “follow-up”, others consider it is “sporadic” and “very, very sporadic”. In fact, Benito 
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mentions that supervisions only occur when someone complains that the institutions are doing something 
wrong:  
 
It does not happen […]. In fact, in the practice, the supervision only takes places when there is an evident 
problem in the institution. Then, or someone complains that they have committed an injustice. […] even if 
you don’t have the simplified administration. In fact, without me having the data, but from my experience, I 
can tell you that there are no supervisions. 
 
All participants agree there is “a need of supervision”, but they understand that the number of 
institutions is so big that it is a very difficult task. In other words, the number of institutions makes it a 
problem to supervise them all. Pilar mentions: “we need more supervision, and yet we are so many, so 
many, there are two thousands or more institutions”. This coincides with the estimation of higher 
education institutions made by Álvarez (2011) and Rodríguez (2017c). The participants concur that one of 
the problems of supervising so many institutions is the lack of personnel in the Ministry of Education to 
carry on those supervisions. For example, Isabel mentions: “they lack personnel, that the Ministry of 
Education has little staff in the subdivision of higher education […]. In higher education there are not many, 
they are not enough”. 
Some participants also add another problem to the lack of personnel, and that is the lack of competent 
personnel to supervise programs from very different disciplines, as they might not have the knowledge and 
the skills to do so. In this regard, José Manuel mentions: “I think the issue of supervision is about the issue 
of having personnel, but also competent personnel. Let’s see, supervising a Masters in Tax Law. Let’s see 
who will supervise you? With which authority? With which knowledge? To review what?”. Benito concurs 
with him when he says that the personnel in the Ministry do not have the expertise in all the academic 
fields to regulate all the programs. He mentions:  
 
We have a regulatory authority that does not have the academic capacity, and I think it is impossible to have 
it. The Ministry of Education receives over 1,700 requests every year for getting the Recognition of Validity; 
over 1,700 different programs, of course. Which regulatory authority has the capacity of evaluating seriously 
1,700 curricular proposals? It doesn’t exist in the world. 
 
In addition to the human resources, some participants also concur that the Ministry of Education lacks 
the infrastructure and the economical resources to carry out the supervisions to all the great amount of 
institutions that exist. 
Furthermore, participants perceive diverse problems of the design of the quality assurance mechanisms 
used to regulate the system. In first place, they understand why they are voluntary, and acknowledge that, 
in the way the policy is constructed, it cannot be mandatory because of the high costs they represent to the 
institutions. They describe quality assurance processes as “very expensive”, and they consider most 
institutions “cannot afford them” as they would need “to invest a lot of money”. Participants recognize that 
these processes are only affordable for prestigious institutions that charge expensive tuition fees. 
Therefore, they are not accessible for small institutions that have just started, that are willing to comply 
with the law and that are working hard to become high quality. They recognize that these institutions, at 
the moment, lack the economic resources to get accredited. Karla explains this: 
 
Sadly these accreditation processes have an economic cost. There are some small institutions that have just 
been established and that have the will of doing things right, but at the moment, their recourse are limited to 
achieve survival and to fulfill the minimal requirements. These institutions might be very good, but they are 
very small, and they have carried out a great effort to assure the quality, but they might not have the 
economical resources to get accredited by an accreditation agency, maybe it will take them a while to have 
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the resources to do so. So, if you make accreditation mandatory to keep the RVOE, well they might not be 
able to do it now. 
 
Some participants consider quality assurance accreditation processes are expensive because they are 
carried out by private organizations. Also, other participants perceive some problems that derive from 
being private. Some observe that, in order to survive economically, they need to accredit the higher 
institutions or their client will go away. Carmen says: “and then, if they do not accredit you, you go away”. 
In this sense, José Manuel also points out that there can be low quality accreditation agencies too: “as 
there are patito universities, there are also patito accreditation agencies”. 
Other participants also consider that, in many cases, the quality assurance accreditation is not focused 
on quality. These participants perceive the accreditation process is focused in collecting “documents” and 
in technical requirements. For example, Margarita mentions: “if you make an analysis, they do not focus on 
quality”. This coincides with the findings of Buendía (2011) and Silas (2013) who claim that the academia 
perceive quality assurance processes as a checklist of indicators centered in technical issues. To this can be 
added that some participants perceive some of the recommendations given by quality assurance agencies 
as unrealistic to met, demotivating the process of reaccreditation. Carmen puts an example regarding a 
professor working on a veterinary academic program:  
 
She tells me that the recommendation is that they build a hospital inside the university. But the university 
does not have the money for that. So, then [she says] we are going to get accredited now, but then, in three 
years, when they come to review again what we did, they will realize that there is not going to be a hospital. 
Then we are going to lose the accreditation. 
 
Problems with the enforcement of the regulation. In addition to leaving without access to higher education 
to a sector of the population that has already been mentioned, participants also point out other reasons 
why the regulation is flexible, because, as José Manuel clearly mentions that the law is one thing and the 
reality is another thing: “you can see a clear gap between the law and what actually happens”. 
First, most participants coincide that the regulations are not enforced because these institutions play a 
fundamental role in granting higher education to a sector of the population. Participants observe that these 
institutions take away the pressure of the government from its inability to grant access. Second, all 
participants agree that the subdivision of higher education at the Ministry of Education lacks the economic 
resources to guarantee compliance with the law. They consider there is not “enough money in the 
government” , and that there “has been little investment”, as higher education is “left aside” when making 
the budget for education. Therefore, Isabel, among the other participants, concludes that tertiary 
education “is given very little budget”. 
Third, all the participants consider there is a lot of corruption in the system and that limits the 
enforcement of the regulations. They mention: “we have a very corrupt country” (Isabel) and “corruption 
definitely messes everything” (Pilar). Participants consider that ethics are missing in the system, as all the 
regulations can be violated by corruption if the people that are part of the system are not honest and 
honorable. Some participants mention that one of the main problems of enforcing the regulations, and 
where corruption is usually present, is the fact that sometimes the RVOEs are granted to ex public officials 
or to current officials making it difficult to sanction them. As, in many cases, these officials have a high 
influence in the political life of a community or at the national level, it might be “inconvenient” to sanction 
them or close their institutions. Also, in some other cases, participants acknowledge that there is a 
friendship among the university leaders and the public officials making it difficult to enforce the regulation. 
Participants simply say: “they are friends”, and that is a problem. Other situations that the participants 
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commented included that the RVOEs, sometimes, are granted as prizes to ex public officials, rather to 
programs that fulfill the requirements. Participants point out that in these cases, the RVOE is perceived “as 
a reward for their services”. Finally, one participant also acknowledges that, in some cases, the institutions’ 
leaders or their family members might have donated money to the government making it, once again, 
difficult to sanction: “there are certain favoritisms towards people whose parents donate a lot of money, 
then, those persons become untouchable” (Isabel). 
However, all the participants recognize that corruption is not exclusively a problem of the state but a 
problem from the institutions and its individuals as well. Participants allude that some institutions “tend to 
lie”, and consider this as “terrible cases”.  Some situations where this happens are the inspections, as 
institutions show only their best side when the inspector shows up, and therefore, the authority does not 
get to see the reality of what is happening in them. Another situation in which the institutions lie, is in the 
establishment of their legal entity. José Manuel explains this:  
 
There are institutions that have a RVOE and a legal entity, and when they are going to be sanctioned, 
suddenly it changes because of the way the RVOE is granted. Then, how can someone that doesn’t exit 
anymore be sanctioned? So there are people that transfer the RVOEs from one legal entity to another.  
 
In his statement it can be seen that institutions do many illegal things to avoid being sanctioned, 
complicating the capacity of the authority to do so. Other way of acting corruptibly is pointed by Isabel 
where the professors that are supposed to teach do not teach. That means that a person that has the 
credentials to teach because he or she fulfills the requirements, only lends his or her name for the 
institution to be granted the RVOE, but, at the end, this person will not be teaching. She says: “many times 
they don’t teach, that is, they give their names, they get the money, but they do not even know the 
students. They never show up, they never anything”.  
 
Responsibility of all the actors involved. The participants of this study agree that all the actors of the 
education system have some responsibility on the failure of the regulatory policy. Some participants concur 
that the government does not fulfill its responsibility. They consider that it “it washes its hands off”. Karla, 
for example mentions that according to the Constitution, the government should make sure that the 
education granted is of quality, but that is not the case. She mentions: 
 
The 3rd article of the Constitution establishes that the person has the right to receiving quality education. So 
as it is a constitutional right, the state has the responsibility to make sure all education is of quality. So, 
exactly, that doesn’t happen. 
 
Nevertheless, other participants, are more positive about the actions carried out by the government. 
Some acknowledge that, at least, it informs in its website which programs have the RVOE and which have 
lost it.  
Most of the participants agree that this lack of compromise is not only a problem of the government, 
but also the institutions have some responsibility. For example, Margarita claims: “the authority and the 
institutions both are to blame”. Karla assents with Margarita that some institutions are not even interested 
in creating a good curriculum, they only seek to fulfill the minimum requirements. She says:  
 
There is no compromise from the institutions not even in designing a good curriculum. They really make 
things just to see if they get the RVOE, but they are not really conscious of what they want; sometimes they 
hand in the documents, and it is just a copy-paste for all the courses, the only different thing is the name of 
the course. 
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Participants point out that some institutions lack of compromise because they are only interested in the 
economic benefits, and they do everything to maximize the profit. For example, José Manuel mentions that 
there are some institutions:  
 
In which if one wants to pay in cash, pays to a legal entity; if one wants to pay by check, pays to another legal 
entity; and if one wants to pay with credit card, pays to another legal entity. And here everything is arranged 
to make the most profit. 
 
One participant also points out that the society does not help, because technical education is not well 
perceived in the country, so everyone wants to have a university degree. Therefore, it is better to have a 
degree by a low quality higher education intuition than not having one at all. Then, these institutions have 
to do little to enroll students and, as the enrollment is assured, there is no need to become high quality. 
Finally, participants agree that the most affected from this regulatory policy are the students, as they 
perceive it is very difficult for students from low quality institutions to get a job after graduation. Isabel 
states: “basically who gets affected there is the student [because, at the end], who takes care of them? 
Who helps them? That is, they are left alone”. 
In conclusion, participants perceive many problems of the regulatory policy: the regulations do not focus 
on quality as they are very technical; the participation of many authorities leads to overlapping and gives 
more room to permissiveness; they are inflexible for innovation; there is a lack of a posteriori mechanisms 
to assure compliance; quality assurance mechanisms are expensive; and the enforcement of the law is a 
complicated task as the authority lacks the necessary economic and human resources, and there is 
corruption and lack of compromise from all the actors of the system. 
 
IV. 5.9 Need of regulating 
Even though many problems have been encountered in the regulatory policy, all the participants of this 
study agree that the private higher education sector in Mexico needs to be regulated. This category 
includes: quality assurance, student protection and the protection of the society 
Quality assurance. First, all participants agree that private higher education institutions need to be 
regulated to ensure education is “equitable” and quality is assured in the system, as the Higher Education 
Commission (2013) had pointed out. They coincide that the lack of regulations can lead to granting degrees 
without even fulfilling the basic requirements of a minimum level of quality, including designing programs 
where students graduate after a short period of time, because this makes studies more attractive for them. 
Hence, participants consider that the lack of regulations can lead to an abuse and turn “into debauchery” of 
private institutions, where these private providers act as they please, prioritizing the business over the 
quality, and taking advantage of the public good that is education. For example, Pilar mentions: 
 
Can you imagine they would get rid of that? The amount of bad establishments that would do things in a very 
clientelistic way. That you finish your master with 15 credits, […]. That would make people believe there is a 
business. I think there must be a regulation. 
 
Student protection. Regulations are also important to protect students, as some participants highlight. This 
corresponds with the findings of Geiger (1988) and Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, (2012). Participants clearly 
mention that regulations are meant “to protect the student”. In other words, they consider that they help 
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safeguard the students from institutions and people that might take advantage of them. José Manuel 
clearly mentions this: “it is necessary to create a series of rules that help minimize that abuse”.  
Nonetheless, some participants consider that today, in many cases, the regulation is failing to do so. 
These participants emphasize that this should be one of its priorities. They consider the regulations today 
leave students “unprotected” as many low quality institutions “deceive” many of them. Isabel, for example 
acknowledges this failure:  
 
You have a very big problem with all these students that studied, paid; they stole from them because 
someone got rich and they were left without, without, recognition of studies. […] many low middle class 
families invest all their resources as they see a possibility, but instead of helping them, they steal from them. 
 
Here she points out that these students trust the institutions but, at the end, they will not get a 
recognized degree. Participants emphasize that regulations should help reduce this problem and avoid the 
proliferation of low quality institutions. 
 
The protection of the society. Some participants also perceive the important role of the regulations in 
avoiding low qualified professionals in the labor market. In this regard, Fernando mentions that regulations 
are needed: “to protect the society from a professional”. Francisco concurs with Fernando and explains 
why this regulation is needed, mentioning that there is a high risk that an unprepared professional 
performs a job for which the minimal knowledge and skills are lacking. He says:  
 
The fact that these institutions exist, cause that people lacking the training, the skills, and the knowledge of a 
profession are incorporated into the labor market; they don’t even have the essential knowledge to carry on 
the simplest tasks of a profession. That is, they haven’t had a complete training, they haven’t deepened into 
the knowledge, they lack the necessary and sufficient knowledge needed for certain professions. 
 
In short, it can be seen that participants recognize the need of regulating the private higher education 
sector to assure quality, to protect students from getting scammed, and to protect society from 
professionals that lack the knowledge and the skills to perform a specific profession. 
 
IV. 5.10 Proposed recommendations  
Participants of this study contributed to this research proposing some recommendations to improve the 
regulatory policy. This category includes: general recommendations to the regulatory policy, 
recommendations to the organizational dimension, recommendations to the financial dimension, 
recommendations to the staffing dimension, recommendations to the academic dimension, need of all 
actors to cooperate and need of balance between the regulations and the autonomy.  
General recommendations to the regulatory policy. First of all, some participants emphasize the need of 
competent and well-prepared staff, with prior experience in the higher education sector, that work in the 
regulatory bodies applying regulations. For example, Francisco says: “I would recommend that more people 
that have worked in the academic sector, full time or at least part time, would work in the government’s 
regulatory system and in the application of the law”.  
Second, other participants agree that a stricter policy is needed. For some of them, a program without 
the RVOE should not be allowed to be opened by the authority. For example, Margarita says: “I would say 
that you cannot offer a program if you don’t have the RVOE, that although this do not assure quality, but 
no, I don’t give it to you”. Others, instead, support more the idea of being more rigorous in the credential 
of the professors and in promoting quality in the teaching. These participants claim that more severe 
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requirements or “limits” are needed to get the RVOE, and use adjectives like “stricter”, “harder” and 
“stronger” to describe them. Specially, they coincide that more requisites are needed in the staffing 
dimension: “we have to be stricter in the level of teachers” (Fernando), and in the establishment of new 
institutions. Hence, these participants concur that a priori mechanisms need to be reinforced in order for 
the regulation to be focused on quality. In this regard, Margarita says that “a regulation more centered in 
quality rather than in documents” is needed. This coincides with authors like Rodríguez (2004a), Silas 
(2008), Acosta (2011), Cuevas (2011a), de Garay (2013), Álvarez (2011) and Buendía (2016).   
Third, another participant supports the idea that more incentives are needed in the regulatory policy, as 
Raza (2009) had suggested. He mentions that incentivizing high quality private institutions can help them 
expand, giving them the possibility to enroll more students, some that, because of the lack of spaces, might 
finish enrolled in the low quality institutions. Francisco says:  
 
Another way to discourage the establishment of private higher education institutions, can be by using 
incentives; by rewarding the best private institutions with economic resources so that they can expand their 
facilities, improve their infrastructure, and open more spaces for students to study at high quality institutions. 
 
Need of a posteriori mechanisms. Most of the participants of this study agree that supervision is needed to 
improve the system. They emphasize that this supervision has to be “periodic” and “conscious” and, of 
course, it has to “avoid corruption”. For the participants, supervision is key to ensure that what has been 
approved by the authority, actually takes place in the institutions. Also, one participant points out that it is 
needed to assure pertinence with the labor market’s needs. 
Participants also agree that supervision should be more present at institutions that either are beginning, 
or that need to improve their quality, supporting the differentiated regulation. For example, Karla 
mentions: “there must be more follow-up by the Ministry of Educations to the institutions that need it the 
most”. Isabel agrees that this differentiated regulation is needed to provide more help to those institutions 
that need it the most, to really help them improve. She claims:  
 
I would focus not that much on the big ones, but in regularizing all second level and third level institutions in 
the whole country […]. So that really, that is, that they improve to reach the ones that are already good 
quality. And, as they improve, regulation decreases, let’s say, supervision. 
 
Furthermore, most participants agree that, in addition to the supervisions, the curriculum needs to be 
periodically reviewed, to examine what is being taught. They claim the RVOE cannot be granted once and 
forever, but, on the contrary, they suggest the regulations include these periodical evaluations of it, to 
enhance the updates of the programs. They express that these examination processes most be “careful” 
and  “serious”. For example, Isabel emphasizes the importance of updating the curriculum periodically, and 
she acknowledges the need of establishing mechanisms to make these reviews a mandatory regulatory 
policy when she recommends: 
 
It should be mandatory for the programs to be reviewed at least every 5 years, and that there would be a 
follow-up regarding the observations to the curriculum that have been made in the evaluation, to make sure 
they have been made, and new recommendations should be made to keep on satisfying the new needs 
because we live in continuous change. We cannot have the same curriculum for 25 years. 
 
Some participants also talk about an obligatory accreditation policy. They suggest that for an institution 
to keep its RVOEs, getting the accreditation should be a condition. In this regard, Margarita says: “making 
universities to have it. That if in 5 years they haven’t been accredited by FIMPES, sorry, you are out, I 
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remove your RVOE”.  Carmen also supports the mandatory accreditation, but she acknowledges that then it 
should be costless. She says about the obligatory accreditation process: “maybe yes, then they shouldn’t 
charge. It wouldn’t be bad, that the government, within the budget [...] includes some money for 
accreditation”. Participants also point that in the follow ups of these accreditation agencies, it should not 
be open for the institution to choose who should be interviewed, but there should be a random selection 
so that what is really happening at the institutions can be seen.  
In addition to the supervisions, participants also agree that there is a need to enforce the law. José 
Manuel mentions: “I think that the law should be enforced”. Pilar adds that the law should be enforced 
equally to all despite the friendship ties among the authority and the institution: “my recommendations, 
that the law is enforced, that the regulations are enforced to everyone, and to forget about that thing of 
the compadre that owns an institution”.  
Francisco also insists about this enforcement of the law, but he also points out that some institutions 
should be closed. Francisco says: “there should be a better enforcement of the law. This will lead to the 
closing of many institutions, maybe not all, but at least some patito universities, the worst”. Isabel agrees 
with him that programs and institutions that are not good enough, that are not updated and that do not 
give students what they promised, should be closed. She states: “there is a need of closing down programs 
that are not updated, that are not relevant, that do not satisfy the needs of the population, and that offer 
things that they are not being given to the students”. Fernando concurs with them when he mentions: 
“patito universities? I think that it is necessary to close them, as many as possible, and as quickly as 
possible”. 
  
Recommendations to the organizational dimension. Referring to the organizational dimension, some 
participants coincide that the regulations should assure the probity of the investors that are building a new 
higher education institution. They mention that it is needed to assure that the persons establishing an 
institution are ethical and responsible, and that they are not only pursuing economical benefits. For these 
participants the “probity” of the investors and of the leaders of the institution needs to be guaranteed, so 
that the student’s protection is ensured. Participants mention that it has to be assured that they are 
“honest, “ethical”, “prestigious” and “morally good professionals”, that they do not have a “negative 
history” and that do have not committed a “crime”. Isabel, for example, proposes a similar mechanism to 
the law 3 out of 3 used to assure the honesty and transparency of the politicians that are running in for a 
public position. She mentions: “there should be a 3 out of 3 for regulating those who are part of the council 
of the educational institutions”. In this 3 out of 3, the person has to upload to a public platform on the 
Internet all his or her information including CV, properties, patrimony and fiscal information, and the 
interests s/he has to publicly and transparently assure he or she is clean. Francisco better summarizes this 
perspective:  
 
The human beings that get together to create a legal entity must have a social probity and must prove that 
they do not have a negative history. I think this should be more regulated, that they should regulate the 
people that are part of the legal entity and those who will be in charge of the administration, the operation 
and the direction. For example, that the rector is a prestigious person, and that hasn’t committed a crime. For 
example, that the leaders have no criminal records. Something like that would be good, it would be good that 
there was a law where these were requested, to prove they are morally good professionals. 
 
Other participants do not focus so much on assuring the probity of the persons that form the institution, 
but they highlight that a regulation that supports the establishment of university councils for the decision-
making processes is needed, to avoid organizational structures where only one person makes all the 
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decisions. For example, Margarita says: “there should be a council that selects the rector that is going to 
manage the university”. 
 
Recommendations to the financial dimension. In general, participants did not perceive that changes are 
needed to the regulations of the financial dimension. Nevertheless, Isabel points the need of a regulation 
that promotes transparency in the use of the resources, where the information of where you obtained the 
resources and how you are using them is available to the educational community. She says:  
 
You should have there your financial states so that everyone could see them and see where the money 
comes from and how it is spent, to check that it goes to the institution and not to buy a Jacuzzi for the family 
[owner of the institution]. 
 
Recommendations to the staffing dimension. Some participants concur that the selection of academic 
professors should be more regulated. Participants mention that both the institutions and the Ministry of 
Education should be more careful when approving a professor to teach in an academic program, and they 
suggest the modification of the basic requirements to have better prepared professors. Participants 
propose to request some documents like certifying their “morality”, to prove the quality of the work the 
professors have done through their trajectory, and to assure quality and ethics. They also stress the need of 
verifying that the professors that have been approved by the authority when granting the RVOE, are the 
actual professors of the program. In this regard, Margarita mentions: “I think that they have to review the 
professors better. I think this is very important, and review that those professors are the ones that are 
teaching and giving the lectures”. 
 
Recommendations to the academic dimension. Some participants agree that the regulations to the 
academic dimension should be more flexible, leading to more capacity of decision-making, especially when 
designing an innovative academic program, because knowledge changes constantly. However, they 
understand that the regulatory body is not capable of granting this flexibility today. For example, Benito 
asserts: “if we had a regulatory authority capable of evaluating the curricular proposals in all dimensions, 
then it could be more flexible”. Therefore, he proposes that the Ministry should work together with the 
accreditation agencies, or at least that they have to approve the academic program before getting the 
RVOE, to grant more flexibility in the creation of the curriculum. He says: 
 
To lean on accreditation agencies, because, effectively, accreditation agencies have the specialized staff in 
each one of the, of the different areas of the university’s knowledge, and I regret that it remains optional. I do 
think they should get the approval of the curricular proposal […]. I, as a regulatory organism, I don’t put you 
any restriction. You can make the curricular proposal as you want, as you need, as you think it will work 
better, just justify it to the specialist, which is the body that is accrediting you […]. That an accreditation 
agency approves the curricular proposal. 
 
Need of all actors to cooperate. All the participants of this study emphasize the importance of all the actors 
that form part of the education system to cooperate to increase the quality. They mention that “will” is 
essential to achieve cooperation and to reach consensus among all the actors of the higher education 
system. However, they consider that, at the moment, will “is lacking”. For example, they emphasize that 
institutions need to “auto regulate” themselves. They reinforce not only the role of the state to regulate, 
but also the need of the society to help regulate the system, and the will of the institutions to follow those 
regulations for achieving a common good. Concerning this issue José Manuel mentions: 
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There has to be a regulation in which the society auto regulates itself, and there is a need for the state to 
establish certain parameters and that also has the desire of fulfilling those parameters, and of applying the 
law. […] education is not only what others do, but what we all do. 
 
In this sense, first, participants acknowledge that the government has to be stricter when regulating the 
system and set aside corruption. In other words, the state should have the will to avoid deception and 
“frauds”. Participants also agree that the government has the responsibility of informing, clearly and loudly 
to the society, which program does not have the RVOE, because even though they have a list on their 
website, most people, specially new young students, lack of this knowledge. In this regard, some 
participants support the idea and propose a communication campaign done by the government to inform 
the citizens about the programs that lack the RVOE. They emphasize that this campaign can be done using 
the social networks, and that it should indicate students the steps they have to take before enrolling to an 
institution, so that they assure its quality. In Pilar’s words: 
 
A very important thing is that there is a communication campaign in social networks. […] we have to educate 
the people, we have to do a lot of promotion in the social networks; young people that use a lot the social 
networks, so that they follow four steps when selecting an institution for studying there: that it is in the list of 
the Ministry of Education, that it is in FIMPES, or at least that it is in an accreditation process and not only 
that it is in the process, but that it gets the accreditation, and those that I cannot definitely choose. I think 
there must be a campaign so that people would not enroll in those institutions and then they would have to 
close the business. 
 
Other participants stress also the role of the students. These participants stress the responsibility of the 
students to find out all the information regarding the institutions where they want to study, in order to 
avoid deception. This is mentioned by Margarita: 
 
The problem is to form in the students the culture of asking, precisely, why they say their university is good. I 
mean, why I am going to enroll here, and not only because it is cheap. Or I am not going to enroll only 
because it is close to my house, because, finally, even if I am investing little or too much, at the end I am 
investing in my future. So there is the need of a culture where the student asks: excuse me, my program, who 
accredits it? To check in FIMPES, which is an open website; check in ANUIES, because it is also something 
cultural. If we worry about that, and we wouldn’t study there if they were not accredited, the institutions 
would worry about being accredited. 
 
Regarding the government’s responsibility, some participants emphasize the need to plan the higher 
education system, as it cannot be only about opening new programs and new higher education institutions 
specialized in just a few number of disciplines. One participant also proposes more focus of the higher 
education system to the technical education, where some of these institutions can change their focus to 
satisfy this need. Hence, Carmen says: “in Mexico there is a lot of professional preparation. Maybe they can 
help to the technical education. Maybe in that way they can satisfy a need [...]. Maybe they can focus their 
careers on the technical education”.  
Most participants stress the importance of increasing the offer of high quality education in both, public 
and private sectors, and the economic mechanisms to access to high quality and costly private education, in 
order to reduce the enrollment rate of low quality institutions and drive them out of the competition if they 
do not improve. For the participants, increasing the access to both public institutions and to high quality 
institutions, as well as promoting the improvement of medium quality institutions, will help the low quality 
institutions disappear. For example, José Manuel mentions: “as medium quality institutions respond to the 
needs, low quality institutions will disappear”. However, as Levy (2011) suggests, the market regulations 
have tended to fail, as demand absorbing institutions keep on growing even despite the dubious quality. 
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Participants also coincide that investors and leaders need to be aware of the damage they do to young 
people and society in general with low quality institutions, because, until they do so, low quality institutions 
will keep on proliferating. In this regard, José Manuel mentions: “this is the problem, until we realize that 
not treating the young people well is betraying ourselves and the young people”. As it can be seen, he 
highlights on the importance of the institutions becoming aware of their responsibility and the fundamental 
role they play in forming the future of the country. 
Finally, some participants promote the creation of alliances among the actors of the system to 
strengthen the regulatory policy and the quality of the system. They propose that the Ministry of Education 
works together with the accreditation agencies. Karla, for example, mentions: “the Ministry of Education 
has to establish strategic alliances. I am convinced that if there already exist institutions committed to 
guarantee the quality of the education that the higher education institutions offer, they should establish 
alliances”.  
 
Need of balance between the regulations and the autonomy. Finally, some participants emphasize the need 
to find a correct balance between the limits established by the government and the capacity of the 
institutions to govern themselves. In this regard, Francisco mentions:  
 
It is important to find the balance between the state’s limits, but also to establish the minimum things the 
university has to fulfill […], that the invasions to the activities are established and delimited by the law, but 
that they do not exceed of what it is needed. 
 
José Manuel also addresses this need of balance, as both extreme poles can be dangerous for the higher 
education system. He says:  
 
We cannot think that the regulations are the only thing needed to solve the problem, I think that would be 
like a crazy dream, almost everything; but also that the absence of regulations will lead to the maximum 
creativity. There needs to be a balance.  
 
And when asked about increasing the regulations he concluded: “a strict state that intervenes a lot will 
not guarantee a better education either […] sometimes we have to let life regulate us”. 
In conclusion, most of the participants contributed to this research proposing some recommendations 
to improve the current regulatory policy. These recommendations include: adjusting requirements to focus 
on quality, periodical supervisions, obligatory accreditation mechanisms, stricter actions toward low quality 
institutions, enforcement of the law, mechanisms to assure the probity of the leaders of the institution, 
more rigor when approving an academic program, and a strong cooperation among all actors that form part 
of the system.  
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V. Conclusion 
V. 1 Main findings 
The purpose of this study was to analyze in depth the nature of the private higher education in Mexico 
and the current mechanisms that regulate the sector, as well as to explore the different degrees of the 
autonomy that they enjoy in their several operational dimensions, in order to understand how these 
regulations constrain or enhance the institutions’ capacities and to explore their role in the proliferation of 
low quality institutions. 
As we are coming to the end of this research, several conclusions can be pointed out that will be 
structured according to the research questions. Therefore, first of all, how is private higher education 
perceived in Mexico? Private higher education is perceived in Mexico as a fundamental sector of the 
tertiary education level. In this sense, higher education institutions are meant to contribute to the 
economic, political, social, and cultural development of a country (Duderstadt, 2000; Rhodes, 2009; 
Brennan, King & Lebeau, 2004) and such is the case of the Mexican private sector, as some of the 
participants coincide. The private higher education sector in Mexico has developed as a fundamental part 
of the tertiary sector, playing a specific role for the formation of the elites that opposed the ideology taught 
at the public sector. This has been acknowledged by international researchers such as Levy (1986; 2011) 
and Altbach (2005a), by national researchers like Acosta (2005), Olivier (2007), González (2012), and Silas 
(2005a), and by some participants of this research. As Levy (1986) points out, most participants agree that 
the source of the economic resources is the main characteristic to distinguish between private and public 
institutions. However, also both Levy (1986; 2007; 2008), Altbach, (2005a; 2005b) and some participants 
agree that the priority of these institutions is the professionalization of the labor market instead of 
research.  
Nevertheless, as was seen through the pages of this research, the private sector is extensively varied in 
Mexico. Although initially it was associated with high quality and with the formation of the elites, today, its 
multiplicity makes it very complex. Nonetheless, both the general literature review (Altbach, 1998b; Levy; 
2007, 2009) and those studies specifically concerning the Mexican context (Instituto de Investigaciones 
sobre la Universidad y la Educación México, 2002; Luengo, 2003; Kent & Ramírez, 1999; Aguilar, 2003; 
Rodríguez, 2004; Silas, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Cuevas, 2011b; Baptista & Medina, 2011; Muños & Silva, 2013; 
de Garay, 2013; Buendía; 2016; Álvarez, 2011) identify, mainly, two different kinds of private higher 
education institutions: the elite / quality / non-profit, and the demand absorbing institutions / low quality / 
for profit. All of the participants of this study agree with this classification. However, in contrast to Levy’s 
(2009) conclusion that usually for profit institutions are low quality, for some participants this is not 
necessarily the case and cannot be generalized. 
Second, to what extent private higher education is regulated in Mexico and what level of autonomy 
does it enjoy in its several dimensions? Throughout this research it has been shown that private higher 
education institutions in Mexico face few constrains from the regulations, enjoying, subsequently, a general 
high degree of autonomy in its several operational dimensions. However, several precisions that derive 
from this question, can be concluded  
Thus, even though some participants restrain from using the term autonomy to the capacity enjoyed by 
the private higher education institutions to govern themselves and make their own decisions in their 
multiple dimensions due to the constitutional controversy (Serna, 2006; Pinto, 1974; Poder Judicial, 2005; 
Carpizo, 2002), other participants agree that they enjoy certain freedom to administer their institutions 
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without the direct control of the government. All participants also agreed with Roversi-Monaco et al (2003), 
Narro (2011), Estermann and Nokkala (2009), and Henkel (2005), that this capacity has to have some limits 
established by the government. These limits are specified, as Martuscelli and Martínez (2013) pointed out, 
in the legal framework, which can be clearly seen for the Mexican case in Table 13 “Degree of autonomy of 
the private higher education institutions (semi-independent) in Mexico and the regulations that constrain 
it”. For most participants regulations are needed to assure quality, as the Higher Education Commission 
(2013) has asserted, and to protect the students, as Geiger (1988) has pointed out or the consumers in 
terms of Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, (2012), influencing the behavior of the population (Lowi, 1985). 
In general, participants perceive a high degree of autonomy enjoyed by private higher education 
institutions, as regulations do not seem to limit very much their ability to act and self-govern. While they 
enjoy higher degrees of autonomy in the financial, organizational and staffing dimensions, the academic 
dimension is the most constrained, as Anderson and Johnson (1998), Bernasconi (2011), Geiger (1988) and 
Levy (2011) had pointed out. Interestingly, this dimension is the one that gives identity to the institutions 
(Henkel, 2005), being the axis of any educational institution (Grau, 2013). Nonetheless, as Fumasoli, 
Gornitzka and Maasen (2014) had also noticed, most participants also perceive an increase on the 
academic autonomy, but still would like more flexibility in the regulations to this dimension. On the other 
hand, participants did not seem to perceive new constraints to the autonomy, as Huisman and Currie 
(2004), Henkel (2005), and Nybom (2008) have pointed out as a tendency. 
In contrast with the general trends of autonomy presented in the section II. 2.4 “The specificity of 
autonomy for the private higher education”, private higher education institutions in Mexico seem to enjoy 
more autonomy in the organizational dimension, being able to determine their legal entity, and in the 
financial dimension, having more capacity to determine their sources of money and to invest in financial 
markets. However, the staffing and academic dimensions suffer similar limitations with the general trend. 
Participants coincide that there is no need to increase the financial and the staffing regulations, but they 
disagree with respect to the organizational autonomy where, for some, there should not be more 
limitations, but for others, assessing the probity of the leaders and investors, should be included in the 
regulations. 
Third, how are regulations and the existing level of autonomy related to the proliferation of the low 
quality institutions? In contrast to what was found in most of the literature review (Kent, 2004; Buendía 
2016; Luengo, 2003; Álvarez, 2011; Muños & Silva, 2013), the lax regulatory policy was not identified by 
most of the participants as the main reason for the proliferation of the low quality institutions, but the 
inability of the public sector to grant higher education to all who pursue this level of studies, as Kent and 
Ramírez (1999) had also pointed out.  
Despite this fact, this research had started from the findings of authors like Rodríguez (2004a), Silas 
(2008), Acosta (2011), Cuevas (2011a), de Garay (2013), Álvarez (2011) and Buendía (2016), who had 
concluded that there is a very flexible regulatory policy for private higher education in Mexico. 
Nevertheless, several findings regarding this issue can be highlighted, that shade this statement.  
It can be concluded that most of the mechanisms used to regulated the private higher education 
institutions in Mexico are a priori: legislation, basic requirements and approvals, with only few a posteriori 
ones: supervisions and recognition of degrees, not to mention the quality assurance instrument which is 
voluntary. Therefore, other mechanisms introduced in Table 8 “Specific regulatory mechanisms used in 
higher education by their classification” seem to be missing, giving the impression that instruments are 
perceived in Mexico as tools, as they seemed to be picked according to the preference of the policy makers 
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(Howlett, 2009, 1991; Bressers & O’Tool, 1998), which, in this case, is clearly the legislation, as some 
participants mentioned. 
The findings of Howlett (2011) assert that the legislation is the most common regulatory instrument 
because it is the most economical and the easiest to introduce. However, in many occasions, following the 
law depends on the personal’s will, since the surveillance bodies to ensure compliance are very expensive. 
For this reason, its effectiveness is reduced. This seems to be the case in Mexico, since there are few a 
posteriori mechanisms to ensure that the law is complied with, because one thing can be what is delivered 
to obtain the RVOE, and another very different, reality, as some participants have asserted.  
As Kent (2004) and Canales (2016) commented, supervisions rarely occur, as it is also confirmed by most 
participants. These mechanisms of control have not increased over time, contrary to the findings of 
Huisman and Currie (2004), Henkel (2005) Nybom (2008) Volkwein and Malik (1997), being it a lowly 
regulated system, based on the findings presented on table 10 “Regulatory mechanisms by the dimension 
of the autonomy they constrain”. Therefore, supervision is very sporadic, and the main reason seems to be 
the lack of economic resources, the lack of personnel and the lack of competent personnel, as the 
participants highlighted. 
These findings coincide with those presented on Table 7 “Classification of regulatory mechanisms” 
based on the studies of Howlett (2011), Cohn (2011), Gilardi and Maggetti (2011) and Malyshev (2002), and 
the ones from Hall (1993) and Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (2012), which showed that the success of the 
regulation depends on the level of legitimacy of the body that issues the law, and its ability to stay out of 
corruption. Regarding this last aspect, some of the participants also pointed out the problem of enforcing 
the law, especially because of the corruption issue from the authority that regulates it, but also from the 
institutions, as most participants acknowledged.  
Nevertheless, if corruption was not a problem and supervisions actually were carried out, what would it 
be sanctioned and based on what? This is commented because the legal framework does not contemplate 
a large number of actions that are punishable, as it has been seen in the section IV. 3 “Regulations to the 
Mexican private higher education system”, as even operating without RVOE is not considered an infraction 
as long as it is indicated in the advertisement. Some participants understand this policy, but other 
participants encourage a change on the policy. In accordance to the findings of Huisman and Currie (2004) 
the instruments that regulate private higher education in Mexico seem to be soft. 
From the analysis of the regulatory instruments, it has been seen that the authority has assumed that all 
the information available to the actors is enough, which Elmore (1987) had pointed out to be a common 
reason for policy failure. These assumptions, as Blanco (1994) had acknowledged, contribute to increase 
corruption. However, for some participants the legislation was not seen as the problem of the regulatory 
policy.  
On the contrary, some other participants did criticized the instruments claiming they are flexible and lax, 
coinciding with the findings of Rodríguez (2004a), Silas (2008), Acosta (2011), Cuevas (2011a), de Garay 
(2013), Álvarez (2011) and Buendía (2016); these can be supported after the analysis Tuiran’s (2012) report, 
which shows that most programs that apply for the RVOE actually get it. While for most participants, and 
for Buendía (2011) and Silas (2013) the regulation is technical and does not focus on quality, for others it is 
meant to assure the minimum requirements of quality. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the 
purpose of the regulation is not to guarantee quality, but that the minimal requirements to grant education 
are there (Secretaría de Educación Pública, 2015). But, should not the regulation serve to protect the user 
and to assure quality (Higher Education Commission, 2013; Geiger, 1988)? 
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One of the big problems in Mexico is the lack of a definition of quality. Although the academy has 
investigated the issue, regulatory bodies have not defined the word. So, how to guarantee the quality of a 
system if it is not understood what quality is? And why is quality accreditation voluntary? The voluntary 
regulation is understood because accreditation implies a cost, often excessive for small institutions as most 
participants acknowledged.  
It is common that the government delegates authority to regulate to different bodies, as Raza (2009) 
and Fielden (2008) had pointed out. Nonetheless, in this case, private entities that survive with private 
investment assume that responsibility, as some participants pointed out, making it inaccessible to most 
institutions. Accreditation exists in Mexico since 1992 and only a small number of institutions or programs 
have been accredited as both the authors (Rodríguez, 2017c, 2017d; de Garay; 2013; Álvarez, 2011; Cuevas, 
2011b; Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011) and most participants acknowledged. Should not be thought another 
scheme for accreditation? An accessible scheme for the institutions and that it was obligatory? Or should 
not a policy that procures the development of internal quality assurance structures be encouraged? 
It wants to be thought that the Agreement 17/11/17 aims to encourage voluntary accreditation with the 
PMI, however, what did its predecessor, the administrative simplification, achieve in this regard? Is this 
incentive enough for the institutions to voluntarily accredit themselves? Both authors (Acosta, 2012; Silas, 
2005b; Buendía, 2013) and some participants agreed that accreditation today is meant to grant prestige to 
institutions and that it is the basis of the differentiated regulation, but there are institutions whose goal is 
not precisely to be prestigious. 
Concluding about this differentiated regulation is complicated. Contrary to Levy’s (2011) findings of a 
regulation for all the private higher education, Mexico has a kind of differentiated regulation. On one hand, 
the administrative simplification consists in less bureaucratic procedures and less supervision from the 
authority, which some participants appreciate, but on the other hand, there are some institutions that have 
earned some privileges by presidential decrees. These presidential decrees are unclear for the actors of the 
system, as they are particular to each institution. Both, some of the participants, and authors like Cossío 
(2006), Serna (2006) and de Garay (2013) acknowledge this fact. Regarding these special privileges both, 
Levy (2011) and one of the participants agree that they are enjoyed by some groups of the society that 
excerpt a political or social influence in the country.  
Most of the participants and authors like Rodríguez (2008c), coincide that there are different authorities 
that regulate, but some worry about it, as having multiple authorities regulating the same things at the 
same time in the system, has led to an overlapping of duties and more flexibility and corruption (most of 
the participants; Rodríguez, 2004a, 2006; Rodríguez & Ordorika, 2011; Blanco; 1994; Muños & Silva, 2013). 
This is also pointed by Le Galès (2011) who suggests that policy failure is closely related to the numerous 
actors that interact at the different levels of governance. 
The current regulation is carried out by programs, through the RVOE, and it makes a lot of sense 
because different programs have different needs as one of the participants had pointed out. However, who 
runs the educational institutions? How is it guaranteed that the purpose of these leaders is not only getting 
richer through the expense of a human right that is education? Would not a double regulation be needed 
per institution and per program? Of course, without limiting their ability to self-manage, but taking care of 
certain aspects when establishing an institution. This will undoubtedly help the government have a better 
control over the number of institutions that exist and the tasks they perform.  
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V. 2 Conclusion 
As Levy (2011) argues, regulations for the private higher education institutions seem to have failed, and 
such seems to be the case in Mexico where low quality institutions multiply every day. Hence, it does give 
the impression that the regulatory policy is very lax, but more than lax it is a policy that is not focused or 
intended to guarantee quality on one hand, and on the other hand, it is incomplete, since a handful of 
mechanisms are insufficient to regulate a whole system. They lack incentives; they lack clear sanctions; 
they lack a legal framework that only regulates private education, as it is very complicated to regulate the 
different types and modalities of education with a single law when its nature is very different; they lack a 
posteriori mechanisms; and finally they lack the enforcement of the law. 
Nevertheless, as it has been seen throughout this investigation, not all the regulatory policy is wrong 
and there are many aspects that must be rescued and preserved. Participants highlighted the positive 
aspects as they appreciated the trust that is given to them, emphasizing the role of ethics in the 
educational task. The recommendations included are, without a doubt, proposals that arise from the 
experiences of the actors that are part of the tertiary educational level, as it was sought to give them voice 
throughout these pages. Reinforcing a priori mechanisms to focus requirements on quality and to create 
links with incentives; carrying out a posteriori mechanisms and promoting instruments that include 
mandatory periodical reviews of the academic programs; establishing obligatory and accessible quality 
assurance mechanisms; and closing patito institutions that do not seek to improve, are some 
recommendations that have been suggested to help assure the quality of the system and to push low and 
middle quality institutions to improve through the regulatory policy. However, in order for the system to 
genuinely improve, it cannot be forgotten that the commitment of all its actors is needed, and above all, 
the willingness to put aside the corruption that damages so much our Mexico. 
Therefore, this research, this in depth analysis of the private higher education sector, of the capacity of 
its institutions to govern themselves and of the limitations they suffer from the regulations, is expected to 
be useful for policymakers in Mexico, in the search of improving the regulations to the private higher 
education institutions without the detriment of their autonomy; but also it is hoped that this research is 
useful to the actors of the system (university leaders, investors, professors, academic and administrative 
staff), allowing them to carry a reflective process on their daily tasks and responsibilities, so that each one 
can contribute, from their position, to improve the system. 
 
V. 3 Limitations and further research 
Finally, among the limitations encountered during the creation of this research, the conditions of time 
and space undoubtedly stand out. The investigation was carried out while the researcher was studying 
abroad, becoming a challenge the accessibility of the participants narrowing down the possibility to expand 
the sample, as communication is slower when there is a distance and time difference of between. Although 
the interviews were stopped when redundancy was found, the possibility of expanding the data collection 
to enrich this work remains as an opportunity for a future. Another limitation arises in that the majority of 
the sample comes from universities that enjoy the simplified administration. Although participants from 
public universities, from demand absorbing institutions, and from universities that enjoy more autonomy 
by presidential decree, were included to collect varied experiences and perceptions, it is still a possibility of 
expanding research in the future. 
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Undoubtedly, several topics arise as a possibility for further research. It has been very interesting the 
link the participants have pointed out between the proliferation of low quality institutions and the lack of 
access to higher education. This is certainly a topic that should be explored in greater depth in the future, 
as the lack of accessibility has mostly been addressed from the inequality and social justice perspectives, 
and it has been mainly linked to the public sector. Other interesting topic that assuredly generates great 
interest is the quality assurance policy. Although it has been more analyzed in the literature, studies are 
missing to understand why the policy is structured in the way it currently is. In other words, further 
research to comprehend why the regulation does not guarantee quality, why it is only done by program, 
and why accreditation of quality is voluntary, can be carried out in the future.  
Finally, other topic that drew attention during the elaboration of this investigation was the institutions 
that enjoy more autonomy granted by presidential decrees. This was a difficult topic to address because of 
the lack of literature on this issue, and because the agreements are different for each university. Without a 
doubt, a comparative study of the degree of autonomy these institutions enjoy in their different 
operational dimensions would be very interesting, in order to understand the scope of these decrees. 
Undoubtedly, many more topics can be mentioned where it is necessary to investigate more. Therefore, a 
great opportunity is pending for the future.  
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ANNEX 1 
 
The following Table 14 “Autonomy according the type of the institution” analyzes the different degrees 
of autonomy enjoyed by the public and private institutions.  
The classification of the institutions is based on Fielden’s (2008) classification that has already been 
analyzed before, while the findings on the state of autonomy are based on the research done by Bennetot 
and Estermann (2017) Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel (2011), Estermann and Nokkala (2009), Fielden, 
(2008), Bernasconi (2011), Geiger (1988), OECD (2003) and Levy (2011). It is important to mention that the 
table shows the generalities of the degree of autonomy according to each type of institutions but the fact is 
that it depends on the country. Therefore, for every activity corresponding to each one of the dimensions 
of the autonomy (organizational, academic, staffing and finance), the words high, medium and low can be 
found in each of the institutions’ types, where high means, that, in generally, that type of institution is able 
to carry out that activity without restrictions from the government; medium, that institutions face some 
restrictions needing to comply to some requirements, requiring approvals or confirmations, or having to 
carry out negotiations with the government; and low, that restrictions are faced, ceilings are set, and 
processes and parameters need to be followed as established by the law. 
The generalization has been made to be able to contrast the public and the private sectors, but the truth 
is that in some countries both sectors can enjoy a more similar degree of autonomy, while in others there 
can be more disparities. For example, in the case of Mexico, the public sector enjoys a higher degree of 
autonomy in comparison to other counties, as the OECD (2003) has found out. Hence, the table includes a 
column in which the state’s degree is explained and other possibilities of degree of autonomy are 
mentioned.  
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Table 14. Autonomy according the type of the institution 
 Public Private 
Semi autonomous Semi-independent Independent 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
Determine legal status 
Low Legal status determined by law 
Medium 
 
Generally not, but there are some 
countries where they can be either 
non profit or profit organizations 
Medium 
Generally not, but there are some 
countries where they can be either 
non profit or profit organizations 
Define internal rules and 
procedures Low 
Can create some internal laws but 
most depend on the country’s legal 
framework 
Medium 
Define laws but most times require 
approval 
High Define rules, no need for approval 
Select members of 
executive board and 
academic bodies 
Medium 
Most can select the rectors, but still 
many public institutions need 
approval by an external authority 
High 
They select the members for their 
governance bodies 
High 
They select the members for their 
governance bodies 
Establish criteria and 
durability of leadership 
positions 
Low 
Most require to follow some 
guidelines established by law 
High 
Decide own criteria and periodicity of 
the positions 
High 
Decide own criteria and periodicity of 
the positions 
Dismiss the university’s 
head Low 
Most need confirmation by an 
external authority, and the process 
is established by law 
High 
Can dismiss the head without 
restrictions from the government 
High 
Can dismiss the head without 
restrictions from the government 
Select external members in 
the governing bodies 
 
Low 
 
Most cannot appoint external 
members without approval, and 
many face constraints 
High 
Can decide if they want external 
members in the governance bodies, 
and the criteria 
High 
Can decide if they want external 
members in the governance bodies, 
and the criteria 
Determine structures 
High 
Most can create their structures, 
but some face restrictions by law 
High 
Can determine own structures, most 
suffer isomorphism from public 
institutions 
High 
Can determine own structures, most 
suffer isomorphism from public 
institutions 
Create a legal entity 
High 
Most can create legal entities, 
some only non-profit ones 
High Mostly non profit entities High Mostly non profit entities 
Decide the orientation of its 
governance bodies Low Most face restrictions by law High 
Can decide the orientation of the 
institution and the members of the 
governance bodies 
High 
Can decide the orientation of the 
institution and the members of the 
governance bodies 
Decide mission and goals 
Low Most face restrictions by law Medium 
Most decide specific mission and 
goals, but need to be based on the 
country’s legal framework  
Medium 
Most decide specific mission and 
goals, but need to be based on the 
country’s legal framework 
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 Public Private 
Semi autonomous Semi-independent Independent 
A
ca
d
em
ic
 
Decide the number of 
students Medium 
The number of students most of 
the time is either negotiated or set 
by the external authority 
High 
Most institutions can decide freely 
the number of students they enroll 
High 
Institutions can decide freely the 
number of students they enroll 
Determine academic profile 
High 
In most countries the academic 
profile is freely developed by 
institutions, but in some is 
predetermined 
High 
Institutions can determine their 
academic profile but this tends to be 
based on market needs 
High 
Institutions can determine their 
academic profile but this tends to be 
based on market needs 
Open/close programs 
Low 
Most institutions face restrictions 
when opening new programs, 
needing an external approval or 
accreditation 
Low 
Most institutions need the approval 
of an external authority to open a 
new program 
High 
Most institutions do not need the 
approval of an external institution 
when offering a new program 
Design curriculum and 
content 
High 
Most institutions can design the 
curriculum without constrains 
Low 
Most institutions face restrictions 
when designing the curriculum, and 
have to comply to external 
requirements 
High 
Most institutions can design the 
curriculum without constraints 
Establish admission 
mechanisms 
Medium 
For bachelor students most 
institutions face external 
restrictions, and either have to 
negotiate the admission 
mechanisms or are set by an 
external authority 
High 
Institutions can select and establish 
their admission mechanisms with the 
only constrain of the student having 
a secondary diploma before studying 
higher education 
High 
Institutions can select and establish 
their admission mechanisms with the 
only constrain of the student having 
a secondary diploma before studying 
higher education 
High 
For degree students most 
institutions do not face restrictions 
from external authorities 
Design and implement 
quality assurance 
mechanisms 
Low 
Most institutions need to comply to 
the quality assurance agencies and 
mechanisms delimited by the 
government 
Low 
Most institutions need to comply to 
the quality assurance agencies and 
mechanisms delimited by the 
government 
Low 
Most institutions need to comply to 
the quality assurance agencies and 
mechanisms delimited by the 
government 
Make research decisions 
High 
Most institutions seem to be able 
to make their own research 
decisions freely, but are controlled 
by financial schemes 
High 
Most institutions make their research 
decisions without restrictions 
High 
Institutions make their research 
decisions without restrictions 
Select language of 
instruction High 
Most institutions can select the 
language of instruction 
High 
Most institutions face no restrictions 
when selecting the language of 
instruction 
High 
Most institutions face no restrictions 
when selecting the language of 
instruction 
Award degrees 
High 
Most institutions award their own 
degrees 
Low 
Degrees need to be recognized by 
the authorities 
High 
Most institutions award their own 
degrees 
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 Public Private 
Semi autonomous Semi-independent Independent 
St
af
fi
n
g 
Recruit and select academic 
staff Medium 
Most countries have to comply to 
the law requirements  
Medium 
They can select their academic staff, 
but have to comply to the law 
requirements  
High 
Can select their academic staff 
without restrictions 
Recruit and select 
administrative staff High 
Most countries can select their 
administrative staff without 
needing to comply to the law 
High 
No restrictions when selecting 
administrative staff 
High 
No restrictions when selecting 
administrative staff 
Determine salary scales 
Medium 
Most institutions face constraints 
when determining salaries, needing 
to comply to the law, or to an 
external authority; sometimes are 
negotiated, while others are set 
ceilings 
High 
Institutions decide the salaries of 
their staff 
High 
Institutions decide the salaries of 
their staff 
Establish staffing policies 
Medium 
Most countries face restrictions 
and external regulations that need 
to comply with when establishing 
their staffing policies 
Medium 
Even though most parameters can be 
freely decided by the institutions, the 
policies related to the academic staff 
hiring, teaching, and researching, 
need to fulfill basic requirements 
High 
Most institutions face no restrictions 
when establishing their staffing 
policies 
Dismiss staff 
Low 
Most institutions need to comply to 
the regulations and the labor law 
when dismissing the staff  
High 
Most institutions can decide when to 
terminate the contract of its 
employees, usually for justified 
reasons; labor laws apply 
High 
Most institutions can decide when to 
terminate the contract of its 
employees, usually for justified 
reasons; labor laws apply 
Promote staff 
Medium 
Most institutions cannot promote 
freely their staff as they face 
regulations 
High 
Most institutions can promote their 
staff as pleasing, according to their 
internal rules 
High 
Most institutions can promote their 
staff as pleasing, according to their 
internal rules 
Fi
n
an
ci
al
 
Keep surplus  
High 
Most can keep surplus without 
restrictions 
Low 
Surplus needs to be reinvested in the 
institution 
Low 
Surplus needs to be reinvested in the 
institution 
High 
No limitations if they are for profit 
institutions 
Borrow money 
Low 
Most face restrictions or cannot 
even borrow money 
High No restrictions for borrowing money High No restrictions for borrowing money 
Own buildings  
High 
Most can own buildings, but face 
restrictions if wanting to sell 
High Tend to own the buildings High Tend to own the buildings 
Charge tuition fees 
High Most can charge tuition fees  High 
Charge tuition fees without 
constraints 
High 
Charge tuition fees without 
constraints 
Determine tuition fees 
Low 
Most face restrictions, ceilings or 
external impositions when charging 
tuition fees 
High 
No restrictions when setting tuition 
fees 
High 
No restrictions when setting tuition 
fees 
Invest in financial markets Low Most are not able to invest in Medium Even though they could do it, being Medium Even though they could do it, being 
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 Public Private 
Semi autonomous Semi-independent Independent 
financial markets non-profit organization in a way 
influences reinvesting the resources 
in the institution 
non profit organization in a way 
influences reinvesting the resources 
in the institution 
High 
For profit institutions do invest in 
financial markets 
Decide expenditures 
High 
Most face no restrictions in 
allocating resources  
Low 
Limited to improving higher 
education institutions if they are non-
profit organizations Low 
Limited to improving higher 
education institutions 
High 
No limitations if they are for profit 
institutions 
Determine sources of 
money 
High 
Most can create entities, and 
charge tuition fees 
Medium 
Even though there is no explicit 
sources of money, being non-profit 
organization limits to mainly tuition 
fees and philanthropy, in addition to 
public funds 
Medium 
Even though there is no explicit 
sources of money, being non profit 
organization limits to mainly tuition 
fees and philanthropy, in addition to 
public funds 
       Table elaborated by the author based on the findings of Bennetot and Estermann (2017) Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel (2011), Estermann and Nokkala (2009), Bernasconi (2011), 
Fielden (2008), Geiger (1988), OECD (2003), and Levy (2011). 
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ANNEX 2 
 
The detailed profile of the participants.  
PhD. Isabel. Isabel is a full time professor at a private higher education institution in Mexico, where she 
teaches, researches and directs a postgraduate program in Management of Educational Institutions. She is 
also an evaluator of higher education programs for two quality assurance agencies. She has been working 
in the field of higher education for more than 15 years now.  
PhD. Margarita. Margarita is also a full time professor at a Mexican private higher education institution, 
where she teaches, researches and coordinates the graduation processes. She is also a consultant in 
educational processes of both private and public institutions. She is a member of the evaluation team of 
agreement 286. She has been working for 28 years in the Mexican higher education system. 
LL.M. Francisco. Francisco is a full time research professor at a private higher education institution in 
Mexico. There he teaches and researchers. Francisco is an expert in the constitutional law and the Mexican 
legal framework. He has been working in the field of higher education for 10 years. 
PhD. Pilar. Pilar is a full time research professor at a Mexican private higher education institution, where 
she researches and directs the postgraduate programs of the School of Education. She belongs to the 
National System of Researcher [SIN] and within her research areas it can be highlighted the study of private 
university in the country. She is also the chief editor of an academic journal. She has been working in 
private higher education institutions for 25 years, and it is worth mentioning that she has worked in 
different private universities, where one of them has a greater degree of autonomy granted by presidential 
decree45.  
LL.M. Karla. Karla is a full time administrative staff at a private higher education in Mexico, where she 
directs the department of School Services [Servicios Escolares]. She is charge of making sure the university 
complies with the requirements of the Ministry of Education, being the connection between the two 
institutions. She has worked in the field of private higher education for 15 years. Before this, she also 
worked in the editorial direction of an academic journal. Within her research areas it can be highlighted the 
study of the regulations to private higher education in Mexico. Karla has also taught at public universities. 
PhD. José Manuel. José Manuel has worked in the private higher education sector in Mexico for 27 years. 
Among the activities he has carried out, he has been a full time professor and researcher, as well as was as 
rector of an institution for 9 years, and member of the governing board of the university for more than 15 
years now. Among his research interests, the institution of the university and its organs can be highlighted. 
PhD. Carmen. Carmen is a full time researcher and professor at a private higher education institution in 
Mexico, where she directs the department of teacher training of the institution. However, she has been the 
director of an academic program and the dean of one the schools of the university. She has worked on the 
field of higher education for 33 years, and she is a researcher of the National Science Foundation of the 
United States. Her research interests include retention in higher education in Mexico.  
PhD. Benito. Benito has worked in both private and public higher education institutions in Mexico. At public 
universities he has taught diverse courses, while at private institutions first, he was the director of the 
department of School Services [Servicios Escolares] for more than 13 years, and second, he has been the 
rector of a higher education institution that can be considered for absorbing the demand for over 20 years 
now. In addition Benito is also the director of an academic journal, position he has hold for 21 years, and he 
is the creator and the president of the board of directors of a quality assurance agency since 2007, agency 
that has accredited more than 56 programs on the field. 
                                                     
45 On a later stage of this research the presidential decrees will be explained. 
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PhD. Fernando. Fernando has worked in the field of higher education for over 25 years, focusing mainly in 
the public sector. He was dean of one of the faculties for 8 years, and has been member of the governing 
board of four different public higher education institutions. In addition, he has worked at the public 
administration holding different positions that include secretary of the division of higher education at the 
federal Ministry of Education. 
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ANNEX 3 
 
E-mail in the origicnal language (Spanish) sent to the participants requesting and interview.  
 
Estimado/a _________________, 
 
Espero se encuentre muy bien. Mi nombre es María Diez Uriarte y actualmente me encuentro estudiando 
la Maestría en Innovación e Investigación en Educación Superior (Masters in Research and Innovation in 
Higher Education), programa conjunto entre Danube University Krems, Beijing Normal University y la 
Universidad de Tampere, en cuya última institución me encuentro realizando mi tesis. 
Mi tema de tesis es sobre las regulaciones a la educación superior privada en México y la autonomía de 
estas instituciones. En la revisión de literatura que he realizado, diferentes autores sostienen que la 
regulación actual es laxa de tal manera que esto justo ha dado cabida a la proliferación de las instituciones 
de educación superior de baja calidad. De esta manera ha surgido mi interés por explorar cómo está 
regulada hoy la educación superior privada en México y qué grado de autogestión gozan estas 
instituciones, con la finalidad de conocer el tema a profundidad y emitir recomendaciones que eviten, a 
futuro, la proliferación de las instituciones de baja calidad sin el detrimento de la capacidad de autogestión 
del sector privado. 
Por tal motive que quería preguntarle si lo/a podría entrevistar para obtener más información al respecto, y 
conocer dicho fenómeno desde sus perspectiva.  
La entrevista tendría que ser electrónica porque me encuentro en el extranjero, y sería de una hora 
aproximadamente. Esta puede ser anónima, si así lo desea. Y aunque no lo sea, la información es 
confidencial y solo para mi uso personal. 
 
Agradezco de antemano sus atenciones y le envío un cordial saludo, 
 
María Diez Uriarte 
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E-mail in English sent to the participants requesting and interview.  
 
Dear___________________, 
 
I hope you are fine. My name is María Diez Uriarte, and I am currently studying the Masters in Research 
and Innovation in Higher Education (MARIHE), joint degree program between the Danube University Krems 
(Austria), the University of Tampere (Finland), the Beijing Normal University (China) and the University of 
Applied Sciences Osnabrueck (Germany). Precisely in the University of Tampere is where I am carrying out 
my thesis research. 
My research topic is about the regulations to private higher education in Mexico, and the autonomy of 
these institutions. In the literature review I have carried out, I have found out that many authors consider 
that the current regulatory policy has allowed the proliferation of low quality institutions. Therefore, this 
has derived on me the interest to explore how private higher education in Mexico is regulated today and 
what degree of autonomy these institutions enjoy, with the aim of issuing recommendations that avoid, in 
the future, the proliferation of low-quality institutions without the detriment of the self-management 
capacity of the private sector. 
For this reason, I am writing to you to ask you if I could interview you to get more information in this 
regard, and get to know the phenomenon from your perspective.  
The interview will have to be online because I am now in Finland. It will last for about one hour, more or 
less, and it can be anonymous, if you prefer so. The information will be confidential and only for my 
personal use. 
 
I thank you in advanced for all your attentions. 
 
Best regards, 
 
María Diez Uriarte 
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ANNEX 4 
 
Letter of confidentiality in the origicnal language (Spanish) sent to the participants. 
 
Estimado/a _________________, 
 
Espero se encuentre muy bien. Antes que nada, agradezco de antemano su participación en esta entrevista, 
lo cual es de gran ayuda para enriquecer mi trabajo de investigación y conocer el fenómeno de la educación 
superior privada desde su perspectiva.  
Como ya le he comentado con anterioridad, el propósito de mi estudio es analizar las actuales regulaciones 
a la educación superior privada en México, con la finalidad de proponer mejoras y evitar la proliferación de 
las instituciones de baja calidad, sin el detrimento de la capacidad de autogestión de aquellas instituciones 
que se apegan a los parámetros establecidos bajo la ley y que son reconocidas por su alta calidad. 
La duración de la entrevista será de aproximadamente una hora, y el audio será grabado con fines 
personales, para un mejor análisis del contenido proporcionado, más solamente yo tendré acceso al 
mismo.  
El estudio es confidencial, y si así lo desea puede usted participar bajo otro nombre con el fin de que no 
pueda ser conectado con el mismo en el futuro. Sus contribuciones serán citadas bajo el nombre que usted 
lo desee. 
El estudio final será presentado a la Universidad de Tampere en Finlandia, donde es supervisado por Jussi 
Kivistö (jussi.kivisto@staff.uta.fi ; Tel. +358 50 4211070), actual director del grupo de investigación en 
educación superior (HEG: Higher Educación Group) perteneciente a la Escuela de Administración de dicha 
universidad. 
Por su participación no habrá contribución económica, por lo que se le agradece de antemano la misma.   
Cualquier duda que tenga, quedo a su disposición. 
 
Saludos cordiales, 
 
María Diez Uriarte 
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Letter of confidentiality in English sent to the participants. 
 
Dear ____________________, 
 
I hope you are fine. First of all, I would like to thank you in advance for your participation in this interview, 
which is a great opportunity for me to enrich my research work with your perspectives, and deepen into 
the phenomenon of private higher education. 
As I have mentioned before, the purpose of my study is to analyze the current regulations for private higher 
education in Mexico, with the purpose of proposing improvements that avoid the proliferation of the low 
quality institutions, without the detriment of the autonomy of those institutions that adhere to the 
parameters established by law and that are recognized for their high quality. 
The interview will last approximately one hour, and the audio will be recorded for personal purposes, but I 
will be the only one that to have access to it. 
The study is confidential, and if you wish you can participate under another name so that you cannot be 
connected with it in the future. Your contributions will be cited under the name you choose. 
The final study will be presented to the University of Tampere in Finland, where it is already being 
supervised by Jussi Kivistö (jussi.kivisto@staff.uta.fi; Tel. +358 50 4211070), current director of the research 
group HEG (Higher Education Group), which belongs to the School of Management. 
For your participation, there will be no financial contribution, for which I really appreciate your 
participation in advance. 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Best regards, 
 
María Diez Uriarte 
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ANNEX 5 
 
Interview’s question guide in the orginal language (Spanish) 
 
Autonomía y regulaciones a la educación superior privada en México 
 
1. ¿Qué se entiende por educación superior particular en México? 
 
2. En términos generales, ¿cómo se clasifica la educación superior particular en México? 
 
3. ¿Existen diferencias en las regulaciones a las distintas instituciones de educación superior particular en 
México? 
a. Si sí, ¿cuáles son estas diferencias? 
b. Si no, ¿por qué cree usted que no hay diferencias? 
 
4. Algunos autores consideran que las instituciones de educación superior particular en México no pueden 
tener autonomía porque ésta, constitucionalmente, únicamente puede otorgarse a las instituciones 
públicas. Sin embargo, la autonomía es un concepto  
relacional y en algunos aspectos las regulaciones permiten ciertas libertades o un mayor grado de 
autonomía, por así decirlo, en algunos aspectos como la dimensión financiera. ¿Qué opina usted al 
respecto? 
 
5. Podría describir, según su percepción el grado de autonomía o autogestión que gozan las instituciones de 
educación superior particular en México: 
a. ¿Cuánta libertad gozan en los aspectos organizacionales? 
b. ¿Cuánta libertad gozan en los aspectos financieros? 
c. ¿Cuánta libertad gozan en las decisiones sobre sus empleados? 
d. ¿Cuánta libertad gozan en los aspectos académicos? 
 
6. ¿Qué opina de este nivel de autonomía o autogestión que gozan las instituciones de educación superior 
particular en México? 
 
7. ¿Cómo piensa que las regulaciones actuales limitan la autonomía de las instituciones particulares? 
a. Dimensión organizacional 
b. Dimensión financiera 
c. Dimensión de personal  
d. Dimensión académica 
 
8.  Algunos autores considera que las instituciones de educación superior deben gozar un alto grado de 
autonomía académica para un buen desempeño y para mejorar la calidad. Sin embargo, las instituciones 
particulares de educación superior en México sufren las mayores limitaciones en esta dimensión (Eje: 
RVOE, requisitos básicos para profesores y currículum, etc. ). Partiendo de esto, ¿considera usted que 
debería haber cambios en las restricciones a la dimensión académica en la política regulatoria?  
a. Si sí, ¿qué cambios sugiere? 
b. Si no, ¿por qué no? 
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9.  En su opinión, ¿considera deberían existir más regulaciones a la educación superior particular para evitar 
la proliferación de las instituciones de baja calidad? ¿Por qué? 
 
10. Algunos autores sugieren que la proliferación de las universidades de baja calidad se debe a la 
ineficiencia de la política regulatoria en México y los instrumentos usados para regular el sistema, debido a 
que hacen falta instrumentos que verifiquen el cumplimiento de la ley como supervisiones, reportes y 
auditorias. En otras palabras, la política regulatoria en México a la educación superior particular está 
compuesta por leyes, pero hacen falta otros mecanismos para asegurar que las leyes se cumplan. ¿Qué 
piensa al respecto? 
 
11. Otros autores sugieren que las regulaciones a la educación superior particular son laxas y demasiado 
flexibles en México. ¿Qué piensa al respecto? 
a. Si sí, ¿por qué piensa que las regulaciones son laxas y flexibles? 
b. Si no, ¿por qué considera usted que no son laxas y flexibles? 
 
12. ¿Por qué piensa usted que el gobierno no cierra las instituciones particulares cuyos programas no 
cuentan con RVOE? 
 
13. ¿Por qué piensa que los procesos de evaluación y acreditación  de la calidad son opcionales para las 
instituciones particulares de educación superior en México? 
 
14. Desde hace pocos años se ha permitido en México la creación de instituciones particulares con fines de 
lucro. ¿Considera que estas instituciones causan el detrimento de la calidad en educación superior? 
 
15. De acuerdo con su experiencia, ¿qué recomendaciones sugeriría para mejorar las regulaciones a la 
educación superior particular en México, sin afectar su capacidad de autogestión? 
  
  
 
146 
Interview’s question guide in English 
 
Autonomy and regulations to private higher education in Mexico 
 
1. What do you understand for private higher education? 
 
2. In broad terms how can private higher education institutions be classified in Mexico? 
 
3. Are there differences in the regulations between the different types of private higher education 
institutions? 
a. If yes, which are these differences? 
b. If no, why do you think there are no differences? 
 
4. Some authors consider that private higher education institutions in Mexico cannot be granted autonomy, 
as autonomy, according to the constitution, can only be granted to public institutions. However, autonomy 
is a relational concept and, the regulations allow greater degree of self-governance in some operational 
dimensions than in others. For example, in the financial dimension. What do you think in this regard? 
 
5. According to you perception, how much degree of autonomy do private higher education institutions 
enjoy en Mexico in the different dimensions: academic, financial, organizational and staffing 
 
6. What do you think about that degree of autonomy that the different Mexican private higher education 
institutions enjoy?   
 
7. How do you think that the current regulations constrain the autonomy of the private institutions in its 
different dimensions: organizational, staffing, financial and academic? 
  
8. Some authors consider that institutions should enjoy a higher degree of academic autonomy for a good 
performance and for the enhancement of quality. However, private higher education institutions suffer the 
most constraints in this regard (Ex: RVOE, list of requirements for professors or for the curriculum, etc). 
Should there be changes in the restrictions to the academic dimension in the regulatory policy? 
 
9. In your opinion, should there be more regulations to the private higher education to avoid the 
proliferation of low quality institutions? Why? 
 
10. Some authors suggest that the proliferation of low private quality institutions is due to the inefficiency 
of the regulatory policy and the nature of the regulatory mechanisms, as there is a lack of a posteriori 
instruments like supervisions, reports and audits used in higher education to assure there is actual 
compliance with the law and the requirements. In other words, the regulatory policy for private higher 
education in Mexico is mainly composed by legislative instruments lacking mechanisms to assure there is 
compliance. What do you think in this regard? 
 
11. Other authors claim that the regulations for the private higher education are lax and flexible in Mexico. 
What would you say in this regard?  
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12. Why do you think the government does not close institutions whose programs lack the RVOE? 
 
13. Why do you think quality assurance mechanisms are optional for private higher education institutions in 
Mexico? 
 
14. From a couple of years now the creation of for profit private higher education institutions in Mexico is 
allowed. Do you think that this institutions affect the detriment of the quality of the higher education 
system? Why? 
 
15. According to your experience, which recommendations would you suggest to improve the regulations 
of the Mexican private higher education institutions without constraining the autonomy more? 
 
 
 
